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This study had two principal goals. The first was to
take a broad look at policing in Indian Country in
order to better understand the many arrangements
for administering reservation police departments,
develop an initial assessment of the challenges fac-
ing Indian policing, and identify policing strategies
and approaches that might be successful in respond-
ing to the growing crime problem in Indian Country.
The second was to evaluate the prospects for commu-
nity policing in Indian Country. Could this strategy,
which grew out of the experience of police depart-
ments in urban settings, be usefully applied to the
strikingly different cultural, geographic, and demo-
graphic features typical of Indian reservations? This
study is a first effort to characterize the variety of
arrangements for reservation policing combined with
a more comprehensive effort to better understand the
operations of a limited set of representative depart-
ments and their tribal contexts.
Methodology
Research for this study included several compo-
nents. We began with a literature review and visits
to several Indian police departments and the Indian
Police Academy in New Mexico. We then distrib-
uted a two-part survey to Indian police departments
and undertook intensive site visits to four reserva-
tions. The strategy for selecting study sites was to
choose Indian nations that varied on as many rele-
vant dimensions as could be captured in a small
sample. The four nations selected were the Tohono
O’odham (in Arizona), the Gila River Indian
Community (also in Arizona), the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation (in Montana), and the Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation (in North
Dakota). We studied these reservation departments
and the tribal contexts in which they operate in
order to gain a richer understanding of the diverse
and complex ways in which Native communities
cope with policing challenges. One caution is
offered here and echoed in the work of other
researchers and practitioners in Indian Country (for
example, Elias 1998): All but the most basic and
easily verified data must be interpreted carefully.
For complex reasons, researchers must hold very
loosely to data describing important dimensions of
policing (including crime) in Indian Country.
Policing in Indian Country: The Context
In the mid-1990s, estimates of the non-Alaska serv-
ice population (the number of Native Americans liv-
ing on or very near reservations) ranged from 1.1
to 1.3 million (Indian Health Service 1997). This
population is distributed across the more than 330
Indian nations in the continental United States.
Indian nations exhibit an exceptionally wide variety
of social and economic characteristics. One important
additional type of variation is the substantial cultural
diversity found among American Indian communi-
ties. While “American Indian” is a single race catego-
ry on the U.S. Census, members of one tribe can be
as different from those of another tribe as citizens of
Greece are from citizens of Vietnam. Even so, most
Indian nations face severe social and economic
problems. Despite new tribal opportunities and ven-
tures, American Indians living on reservations have
been and may remain the poorest minority in the
United States (Kilborn 1992; Cornell et al. 1998;
Pace 2000).
More than 200 police departments operate in Indian
Country, serving an even larger number of tribal
communities. These departments range in size from
only 2 or 3 officers to more than 200 officers. The
communities they serve are as small as the Grand
Canyon-based Havasupai Tribe (with a population
of only 600) and as large as the Navajo Nation
(with a population of more than 250,000 and a land
area larger than the State of Connecticut).
The most common administrative arrangement
for police departments in Indian Country is
organization under the auspices of the Indian
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Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
of 1975. Also known as Public Law 93–638 (PL
93–638), this law gives tribes the opportunity to
establish their own government functions by con-
tracting with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
Thus, “638ed” departments are administered by
tribes under contract with the BIA’s Division of
Law Enforcement Services. Typically, a 638 con-
tract establishes the department’s organizational
framework and performance standards and provides
basic funding for the police function. Officers and
nonsworn staff of these departments are tribal
employees.
Departments administered by the BIA are the
second most common type of police department
in Indian Country. Staff in these departments are
Federal employees. For many years, patrol officers
were under the line authority of the local BIA
superintendent (each reservation has a BIA superin-
tendent who oversees all or most of the BIA func-
tions on that reservation), and criminal investigators
were under the line authority of the BIA’s Division
of Law Enforcement Services. Recent changes have
placed line authority for patrol under the BIA’s
Division of Law Enforcement Services as well.
Less common are departments that receive funding
under the auspices of the self-governance amend-
ments to PL 93–638 and departments that are
funded completely with tribal money. These
arrangements grant tribes much more control over
government functions than is permitted under 638
contracts. A number of tribes rely on State and
local authorities for police services under Public
Law 83–280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953). This law, passed
as part of a larger effort to “terminate” American
Indian tribes, gave a number of States the power
to enforce the same criminal laws within Indian
Country as they did outside of Indian Country.
The typical department serves an area the size of
Delaware, but with a population of only 10,000, that
is patrolled by no more than three police officers
and as few as one officer at any one time (a level of
police coverage that is much lower than in other
urban and rural areas of the country). In other words,
the typical setting is a large area with a relatively
small population patrolled by a small number of
police officers; the superficial description is of a
rural environment with rural-style policing. In fact,
many reservation residents live in fairly dense
communities, which share attributes of suburban
and urban areas. Officers who work in Indian
Country are almost always graduates of high
schools and certified law enforcement training 
academies; a slight majority are Native American.
Eileen Luna and Samuel Walker (1998) offer detailed
statistical profiles of these departments. Therefore,
our focus is on the core management challenges
across the range of departments. While there are
many more small departments (approximately 150)
than medium-sized or large departments, they serve
substantially fewer people—between 25 and 30 per-
cent of all the citizens served by the BIA and tribally
administered police departments in Indian Country.
These very small departments have at most nine offi-
cers. Among the most important challenges facing
these departments is providing around-the-clock
police coverage to their communities. These depart-
ments rarely have more than one officer on duty at
any time, and their officers often work without ade-
quate backup. They are true generalists, working
across numerous police and administrative functions.
There are more than 75 medium-sized police
departments in Indian Country, serving over half of
the Native Americans living in reservation commu-
nities subject to BIA or tribal policing. These
departments have from 10 to 50 officers. The key
organizational attribute that distinguishes medium-
sized departments from small departments is that 
it is theoretically possible for these departments to
provide 24-hour police coverage, even though it
may be quite difficult in practical terms. At the high
end of the size range, departments can support some
specialized activities; not only are some officers
free to focus on standard patrol activities, but some
may specialize in such areas as substance abuse and
domestic violence. This transition signals a staffing
level at which specialization can help a department
focus on critical strategic issues.
Two police departments in Indian Country—those
of the Navajo Nation and the Oglala Sioux Tribe—
have 100 or more officers. These departments serve
about 15 percent of the residents of Indian Country
and feature levels of organizational complexity not
present in smaller departments. This complexity is
driven by increased specialization, more elaborate
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oversight mechanisms, district-based organization,
and other factors.
Inadequate funding is an important obstacle to good
policing in Indian Country. Existing data suggest
that tribes have between 55 and 75 percent of the
resource base available to non-Indian communities.
But the terms used in this comparison may underes-
timate the resource needs of Indian Country depart-
ments. The appropriate police coverage (police
officers per thousand residents) comparison may
not be between Indian departments and departments
serving communities of similar size, but between
Indian departments and communities with similar
crime problems. Given that the violent crime rate
in Indian Country is between double and triple the
national average (Greenfeld and Smith 1999, 2),
comparable communities would be large urban
areas with high violent crime rates. For example,
Baltimore, Detroit, New York City, and Washington,
D.C., feature high police-to-citizen ratios, from 3.9
to 6.6 officers per thousand residents (Bureau of
Justice Statistics 1998).1 Few, if any, departments in
Indian Country have ratios of more than 2 officers
per thousand residents.
Crime Trends in Indian Country
The threat of increasing crime, particularly violent
crime, is especially worrisome because we know
far less than we would like about crime in Indian
Country. The lack of good data on crime in Indian
Country stems from (1) issues of culture, geogra-
phy, and economics unique to American Indian
reservations; (2) the limited administrative and tech-
nological resources available to tribal police depart-
ments; (3) inadequate coordination between tribal
and Federal agencies; and (4) management prob-
lems common to both tribal and BIA police depart-
ments. Even when it is possible to obtain accurate
tribal-level data, the prevalence and character of
crime vary widely from reservation to reservation.
Our research suggests the following about the gen-
eral prevalence, distribution, and character of crime
on reservations:
● The overall workload of police departments in
Indian Country has been increasing at a signifi-
cant rate. In other words, the intensity and range
of problems to which police departments in
Indian Country must respond appear to be
increasing.
● Although many Native reservation residents live
in rural, isolated areas, a significant percentage of
reservation populations has settled in semiurban
communities. Much, if not most, crime on reser-
vations occurs in these fairly dense areas.
● Notwithstanding the recent reports of dramatic
increases in violent crime on reservations, espe-
cially among youth, the crimes that most occupy
police in Indian Country are directly or indirectly
related to alcohol abuse. Alcohol-related crime is
a deep and complex problem, which—by contrast
to the problem of violent crime—has received
insufficient attention (and resources).
The State of Policing in Indian Country
The typical department that we describe is attempt-
ing to cope with an increasing workload (a change
driven by rising crime, increased police involvement
in the social concerns that relate to crime, and
greater community demands for police services) and
is doing so with a quite limited resource base. In
fact, this characterization only begins to capture the
severity and complexity of the challenges to reserva-
tion policing. Police in Indian Country function
within a complicated jurisdictional web, answer to
multiple authorities, may operate without strategic
direction from their tribal governments, and often
lack a sense of “partnership” with their service 
populations. In a review of one of the largest police
departments in Indian Country, Naranjo and col-
leagues (1996) both echo and expand on these con-
cerns. They find that—
● Poor employee morale and high turnover result in
a lack of well-qualified and experienced officers.
● Inadequate budgets, fiscal mismanagement, and
even corruption create serious obstacles to the
effective delivery of important police services
and programs.
● Basic departmental management is flawed.
● Undue political interference in police operations
inhibits the ability of the police to perform their
duties in a fair and equitable manner and reduces
the credibility of the police in the eyes of the
community.
Such findings have led many researchers, policy-
makers, and police professionals to conclude that
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reservation policing is in crisis. In response, a num-
ber of special reports, commissions, conferences,
and blue-ribbon committees have grappled with the
problems and have produced a wide variety of rec-
ommendations and proposals. These include increas-
ing funding, tightening management, clarifying
ambiguous reporting relationships, and improving
technology. Many of these responses are necessary
to improve policing in Indian Country, but we are
concerned that they may treat the symptoms, rather
than the disease.
In particular, we argue that many of the problems
with policing in Indian Country, which subsequent-
ly affect the quality of policing, are linked in impor-
tant ways to Federal policy. Strong evidence points
to longstanding, cumulative negative effects of
Federal policy on the practice of policing in Indian
Country. The historical record shows how Federal
policy created a system that served the interests of
the U.S. government and nontribal citizens and
failed to promote the ability of Indian nations to
design and exert meaningful control over their own
policing institutions. Departments administered by
the BIA are not agents of tribes but of the Federal
Government and, as such, have limited incentive to
look to the communities they serve for legitimacy
or for authorization of the police function. Over
time, this arrangement has created a significant gap
between tribal police and the communities they
serve, a gap that is reflected in mismatches between
police and community priorities and between police
methods and tribal norms and values.
We stress that when tribal members do turn to the
police with problems, they encounter organizations
with priorities that have been shaped by a model
of policing that limits their attention to a narrow
band of crime problems and police strategies. An
emblematic example of this philosophy came from
a high BIA official encountered on a site visit who
stated, “Law enforcement is law enforcement”—a
claim that often exempts Indian police departments
from adapting strategies, policies, and procedures
to local needs. As a result, disputes, conflicts, and
problems that police and citizens see as each other’s
responsibility can continue to simmer and escalate
into real crimes. In addition, as tribal members con-
clude that the police are insensitive and unrespon-
sive to community needs, their support for the
police diminishes.
Lessons From Research on Effective
Governance in Indian Country
A substantial body of research suggests a road map
for understanding and beginning to remedy the prob-
lems with policing that are rooted in Federal policy.
Beginning in the 1970s, a handful of Indian nations
embarked on successful paths of social and econom-
ic development. Research by the Harvard Project on
American Indian Economic Development indicates
that the common denominator among these success-
ful tribes was an effective government—one that
was capable of both determining and implementing
the policy priorities of the community.
One indicator of a tribal government’s ability to
make and implement effective decisions is whether
or not it has increased control over its own institu-
tions. Stability, the separation of powers, and
competent, respected bureaucracies are further indi-
cators of a tribal government’s effectiveness. The
research also indicates that an alignment between
the form and powers of a government’s contempo-
rary institutions and the form and powers of its pre-
reservation institutions is most likely to create this
stability, respect, and legitimacy. 
An important lesson from this research is the effect
of increased tribal control over tribal institutions.
Only those tribes that have acquired meaningful
control over their governing institutions have expe-
rienced improvements in local economic and social
conditions. The research has not found a single case
of sustained economic development where the tribe
is not in the driver’s seat. While tribal-BIA relation-
ships in thriving Indian nations range from coopera-
tive to contentious, they are all characterized by a
demotion of the BIA (and of other Federal agen-
cies) from decisionmaker to advisor and provider
of technical assistance. The general point is that
self-determined institutions, ones that reflect
American Indian nations’ sovereignty, are more
effective.
This lesson has yet to be applied to Indian policing.
Federal policies that regulate Indian policing have
the twin effect of reducing tribal control and diffus-
ing accountability for institutional performance.
Tribes regularly blame Federal agencies for the poor
state of policing in Indian Country; not only are the
resources provided by Federal agencies inadequate,
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but Federal policies are driven by a misreading of
tribes’ real needs and priorities. On the other hand,
representatives of Federal agencies express skepti-
cism about the ability and intention of tribes to
develop and manage effective police departments.
The very fact that power is shared between tribal
and Federal authorities allows each to avoid their
more appropriate roles and, thus, to perpetuate
poor policing.
The second relevant lesson for Indian policing from
this research is the importance of cultural match.
A consonance between present and prereservation
institutional forms confers legitimacy on the meth-
ods and outcomes of government decisionmaking
and channels political energy in productive direc-
tions. How do the dynamics of cultural match play
out in practical terms? The police officer at Tohono
O’odham who aggressively confronts a suspect will
have offended longstanding tribal norms and will
have failed to draw on them in the service of obtain-
ing the suspect’s compliance. By contrast, the police
officer at Turtle Mountain or one of the Lakota
tribes who fails to confront a suspect is guilty of the
same error. To the extent that the ethos of the organ-
ization in which these officers work perpetuates
such conflicts, both public support for and the eff c-
tiveness of the organization are diminished. It is,
however, important not to be naive about the possi-
bilities. There are no guarantees that prereservation
institutions will be effective in a contemporary
setting. If old forms cannot be adapted to modern
problems, the challenge becomes to design new
ones that both make cultural sense and work.
The Possibilities for Community
Policing in Indian Country
If the roots of the problems with Indian policing lie
in Federal policy, and if a road map for remedying
these problems is provided by research showing
how the effectiveness of other tribal government
functions has increased, the question remains:
How, exactly, can similar work be accomplished
with policing? 
Community policing may be the answer. Commu-
nity policing is a method by which communities
lend their authority to the police enterprise, see their
norms and values reflected in the police mission,
and employ their considerable formal and informal
resources to address crime. In turn, the strategy
enhances the capacity of police to address crime
and to help communities become strong, independ-
ent, and resourceful. (We emphasize that communi-
ty policing is not only a set of tactics, such as foot
patrol, but also a process by which police partner
with communities.) Indeed, the growing body of
experience with and research on community polic-
ing is remarkably congruent with the findings on
effective governing institutions in Indian Country.
Community policing gives rise to law enforcement
institutions that have the characteristics cited above
(self-determination and cultural appropriateness)
and such institutions have the potential to substan-
tially improve public safety. Seen in this light,
community policing provides a framework that
tribes might use to design and implement Native
approaches to policing—approaches that should
improve the quality of policing in Indian Country
and, rather than perpetuate an inappropriate Federal
structure, enhance tribal nation building.
Our earlier finding—that tribal citizens rely increas-
ingly on their police departments to settle disputes,
conflicts, and problems that police themselves do
not consistently treat as legitimate crime prob-
lems—reinforces the conclusion. The overarching
lesson of community policing is that if reservation
police were to pay attention to these problems, and
if they were to use credible tribal approaches as
remedies, they would become more effective prob-
lem solvers, more respected by tribal citizens, and
better able to prevent problems that might otherwise
escalate. 
The first step in improving policing in Indian
Country, therefore, is to systematically link commu-
nity values to departmental values and to express
these values in concrete operations. For any given
Indian nation, the systems that animate and guide
policing—such as the organizational structures of
the police department, tribal personnel and training
systems, local management information and control
systems, and departmental policies and proce-
dures—can be linked to a vision of policing shaped
by that nation’s beliefs, priorities, and resources.
The policies and procedures for dispatch offer a
useful, concrete example of this nuts-and-bolts link-
age between policing systems and tribal priorities.
Depending on a dispatcher’s assessment of a call, a
local elder could accompany a responding officer;
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in many instances, the officer might be there only to
support the elder’s authority (or vice versa). Such an
effort would lend credibility to the modern police
function while showing respect for important tribal
traditions. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Tribes, with the support of the Federal Government,
must reconsider the foundations of policing on
American Indian reservations. The lessons drawn
by tribes, academics, and policymakers from the
research on and accumulating experience in
community policing and the design of effective 
governing institutions in Indian Country provide the
necessary starting points for tribes as they rethink
policing. The same evidence and experience can
productively inform the development of Federal
policy. Significantly, we do not recommend
that policymakers direct their full attention and
resources to increasing funding for reservation
police departments, developing specialized crime-
fighting task forces, and improving technology.
Without the core investment in “rethinking polic-
ing” that we describe, these efforts do not do
enough to help Indian police departments and
tribal communities address the problems they face.
Similarly, we are not recommending that tribes
reflexively resurrect dormant prereservation meth-
ods of social control and policing, nor are we giving
a blanket endorsement to restorative justice. The
challenge is to create workable, nation-specific
policing institutions and approaches informed by
traditional customs—because they lay the best foun-
dation for improving safety, preventing crime, and
promoting the practice of effective policing in
Indian Country.
Note
1. These rates were calculated from 1996 data found in
table 1.28 (p. 39) and table 3.118 (pp. 276–281).
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview
Study Goals
This study had two principal goals. The first was to
take a broad look at policing in Indian Country to
better understand the many arrangements for admin-
istering reservation police departments, develop an
initial assessment of the challenges facing Indian
policing, and identify policing approaches that might
be successful in responding to the growing crime
problem in Indian Country. The task was complex,
especially because the research literature on policing
in Indian Country is limited and the variety of polic-
ing arrangements and communities served is consid-
erable. More than 200 police departments serve an
even larger number of tribal communities. Most
departments are administered by tribes, but some are
administered by the Federal Government and some
by State and local governments. They range in size
from only 2 or 3 officers to more than 200 officers.
The communities they serve are as small as the
Grand Canyon-based Havasupai Tribe (with a popu-
lation of only 600) and the Puyallup Tribe (whose
104-acre reservation is part of greater Tacoma,
Washington) and as large as the Navajo Nation
(with a population of more than 250,000 and a
land area larger than the State of Connecticut).
Our second goal was to evaluate the prospects for
community policing in Indian Country. Could this
strategy, which grew out of the experience of police
departments in urban settings, be usefully applied
to the strikingly different cultural, geographic, and
demographic features typical of Indian reservations?
Despite their differences, both urban areas and
Indian nations face the task of building local capaci-
ty to address severe social and economic problems.
To the extent that community policing provides an
opportunity for communities to develop and employ
their own resources, priorities, and values in the
service of public safety, it might also help tribes
solve their own problems. Therefore, we sought to
understand whether some form of community polic-
ing might be appropriate in Indian Country.
This was an exploratory study. It represents a first
effort at characterizing the variety of arrangements
for policing in Indian Country, while trying to gain
an indepth understanding of the operations of a lim-
ited set of representative departments and their trib-
al contexts. This suggests a third goal: identifying
important topics for further research. Given the
limited research on policing in Indian Country, the
variety of policing arrangements, and the consider-
able cultural and socioeconomic diversity across
tribes, this study can offer only a limited under-
standing of the dynamics influencing the perform-
ance of police departments that serve reservation
communities. For example, such topics as law
enforcement under Public Law 83–280 (PL 83–280)
and the complex problems of criminal jurisdiction
and interagency cooperation require separate treat-
ment; these important issues merit comprehensive
research. Our primary intent is to provide useful
data and guidance to police, policymakers, and trib-
al leaders. Therefore, this Research Report attempts
to balance recommendations for further research
with recommendations for near-term actions to
address the most pressing concerns.
A brief description of the study components can be
found in the sidebar “Study Methodology.” Appendix
A contains a detailed description of the methodology.
Organization of the Report
This Research Report proceeds in four steps.
First we develop the context of policing in Indian
Country by introducing the wide variety of socio-
economic, cultural, and political conditions that
characterize Indian Country and by offering a brief
overview of the typical Indian police department.
Defining the context in both these ways helps to
focus our analysis and our recommendations. Next
we describe the crime problems to which these
departments must respond, prefacing this descrip-
tion with a discussion of the difficulties in obtaining
reliable and useful crime data from Indian Country.
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Study Methodology
Research for this study included four components:
● A review of relevant literature.
● Brief visits to several Indian police depart-
ments and the Indian Police Academy in
Artesia, New Mexico.
● Intensive site visits to four reservations.
● A two-part survey distributed to Indian police
departments.
Each study component is described below. See
appendix A for a more complete discussion of
the study methodology.
Literature Review
Several areas of literature provided background
and context for the primary research. These
included American Indian issues, policing, sociol-
ogy, and anthropology. For all areas, both histori-
cal and current materials, ranging from academic
works to local newspaper articles, were found to
be relevant.
American Indian topics included history, the his-
tory of policing on Indian reservations, culture,
economic development, governance, sovereignty,
and materials specific to the four tribes studied
in depth. Policing topics included the history of
policing, community policing, rural policing,
and the organization and management of police
departments. The sociology review focused on
rural sociology. The anthropology review focused
largely on Native American anthropology, but
also included some literature related to social
control and the development of modern legal sys-
tems in indigenous societies. The scope of the lit-
erature search is reflected in the references at the
end of this report.
Brief Visits to Several Police Departments
We made brief visits to several tribes and their
police departments to inform our selection of
departments to be studied in depth. These 
brief visits also were useful as a means of
understanding possible survey issues. Members
of the research team visited 10 tribes across
the Southwest, the Northwest, the East, and the
Northern Plains, and, to understand the training
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) provides to
police officers, the team visited the Indian Police
Academy in Artesia, New Mexico.
Indepth Study of Four Police Departments
We studied in depth four departments and the
tribal contexts in which they operate to gain a
richer understanding of the diverse and complex
ways in which Native communities cope with
their policing challenges. Many aspects of 
reservation policing were difficult to understand
or even know about without intensive onsite
research. For example, we used this method to
clarify the details of organizational process and
structure. Likewise, because it allows investment
in relationships, we expected the site-visit
approach to provide data on community mem-
bers’ more closely guarded opinions (such as
their honest perceptions of their police depart-
ments). Data from the four indepth studies are
integrated throughout this Research Report and
are at the core of its discussion and analysis.
Like the brief site visits, intensive onsite research
was an important precursor to survey work.
Because information about the practice of polic-
ing in Indian Country is so limited, onsite work
helped define the topics on which broad-based
survey data were needed. Similarly, the substantial
variation in justice administration, jurisdictional
arrangements, and socioeconomic conditions that
exist in Indian Country suggests that only some
quantitative data comparisons are meaningful;
intensive study helped focus the survey on those
that are.
Our site-selection strategy was to choose Indian
nations that varied on as many relevant dimen-
sions as could be captured in such a small sam-
ple.1 The most important dimensions on which we
sought significant variation were crime problems
and other policing challenges, culture, economics,
geography, and the management and administra-




The University of Arizona (Tucson) mailed the
first questionnaire (part I of the survey) to more
than 200 police departments in the continental
United States, regardless of size. This distribu-
tion was intended to be comprehensive and
included all departments whose primary respon-
sibility is to police Indian Country.3 Harvard
University mailed the second questionnaire (part
II)—which was longer and more in depth than
part I and included some organizational ques-
tions—to 67 large tribes (but only 66 depart-
ments, since two of the large tribes share a BIA
department). These nations are the Harvard Project
on American Indian Economic Development’s
usual study sample, a group for which the Project
possesses substantial background data. In gener-
al, these larger nations set the practice standard
for Indian Country in terms of business activity,
government and administrative function, and
political rights.4 Because of their probable greater
importance, our greater familiarity with them,
and our access to better data about them overall,
we made a concentrated effort to increase the
response rate among these tribes. All data that
we report from both questionnaires of the survey
refer to this smaller study sample.
The questionnaires and list of respondents are
included in appendix B. Forty-six of the 66
departments serving large tribes responded to
part I of the survey and 39 to part II.
One caution is offered here and echoed through-
out this report and in the work of other criminal
justice researchers and practitioners in Indian
Country (for example, Elias 1998; Luna 1998;
Luna and Walker 1998; Wood 1998). All but the
most basic and easily verified data must be inter-
preted carefully. That is why we develop a por-
trait of the typical department that focuses more
on management challenges.
Notes
1. In some cases, but not all, our work was facilitated
by existing working relationships with tribes. However,
having such a relationship was not a criterion for selection.
2. PL 83–280 provides significant variation along sev-
eral of these dimensions. We excluded these different
administrative and jurisdictional arrangements from
our study, however, because the impacts of the law—
and the reform options available to tribes whose polic-
ing institutions are subject to it—are important enough
to merit a study of their own.
3. There are approximately 330 reservations in the
lower 48 United States, but many fewer Indian police
departments. This is because some BIA-administered
departments serve more than one reservation (particular-
ly where tribal communities are small) and some tribes
are not eligible to have their own police departments.
4. Using the 1980 Census as a benchmark, the Harvard
Project on American Indian Economic Development
sample includes tribes with populations of 1,000 or m e
that are located in traditional Indian areas of the conti-
nental United States. However, the sample excludes
Oklahoma-based tribes, both because they lack distinct
land bases (the only reservation per se in Oklahoma
belongs to the Osage) and because the U.S. Bureau of
the Census collects data for them in a way that is not
comparable to the way it collects data for other tribes.
Our third step is to address problems of organiza-
tion and management, beginning with a description
of the range of departments in Indian Country and
data on reporting structures, staffing, and funding.
Specific examples from our site visits give a fuller
picture of the primary management challenges that
reservation police departments face. The severity of
these challenges leads us to consider whether the
resource constraints we found adequately explain
the problems with policing. Finally, to better under-
stand the problems faced by police departments and
the tribal communities they serve, we look to the
history of reservation policing and, in particular, to
the impact of Federal policy.
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Overview of Conclusions and
Recommendations
A central conclusion of this analysis is that Federal
policy has failed to promote the ability of Indian
nations to design and exert meaningful control
over their own policing institutions. Findings from
research in Indian Country on the characteristics
of effective governing institutions highlight this
problem. The research indicates that governing
institutions are more effective when they are self-
determined and when they reflect, in a functionally
meaningful way, a tribe’s underlying cultural norms
and values (Cornell and Kalt 1995, 1998). Research
and experience in community policing are congruent
with these findings. The community policing strate-
gy, which involves embedding community priorities
and values in the overall function of the police
enterprise, enhances the capacity of police to assist
communities (Sparrow, Moore,and Kennedy 1990;
Kelling and Moore 1988). Together, the findings
suggest that pursuing such a strategy would enable
Indian communities to lend their authority to the
police enterprise, see their norms and values (their
culture) reflected in the police mission, employ
their considerable formal and informal resources to
address crime, and develop more effective policing
institutions overall.
The first step in improving policing in Indian
Country, therefore, is to systematically link commu-
nity values to departmental values and express these
values in concrete operations. For any Indian nation,
the systems that animate and guide policing—such
as the policies and procedures of the police depart-
ment, the organizational structures of the police
department and overall criminal justice system, the
tribal personnel and training systems, the local man-
agement information and control systems, and the
tribal agencies that conduct strategic planning—
can be linked to a vision of policing shaped by that
nation’s priorities, resources, and needs. These
conclusions and recommendations do not address
the full range of problems faced by Indian policing.
Instead, they focus on a fundamental issue: The
tribes, with the support of the Federal Government,
must reconsider the foundations of policing on
American Indian reservations.
Policing in many parts of Indian Country occurs in
an environment characterized by serious crime and
deteriorating social conditions, a situation that has
drawn the attention of politicians, police executives,
tribal leaders, and researchers and that suggests that
investments in improving policing are urgently
needed. The heightened attention and concern are
welcome. Policymakers are now thinking harder
about how to protect tribal communities from crime
and how to better support the efforts of tribal crimi-
nal justice agencies. But the very urgency to address
violence, gangs, drug-related crime, and substance
abuse in Indian Country may have a downside. It
may push too quickly toward the conclusion that
addressing the problems is simply a matter of
obtaining better data on crime, increasing funding,
and improving police management. However, these
improvements alone are likely to have a limited
effect on the ability of tribal communities and the
police departments that serve them to independently
address the substantial problems they face. Although
our research indicates that these inputs are impor-
tant, it also shows that they do not address the issue
most central to effective policing in Indian Country:
the challenge of designing Indian police departments
as core institutions of tribal government. Thus, we
believe that the first priority both for tribal leaders
and communities and for law enforcement profes-
sionals, politicians, policymakers, and researchers
should be to work together to rethink policing in
Indian Country. Addressing the fundamental ques-
tions of policing will enable them to better understand
the situation and develop the kinds of investments
(e.g., data, money, technology, technical assistance)
that will best serve efforts to improve policing.
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Chapter 2. Policing in Indian Country:
The Context
What is Indian Country, and what do we mean
when we refer to Indian reservations and Indian
nations? Whom do police in Indian Country serve?
What does the typical police department in Indian
Country look like (especially, who polices Indian
Country)? And finally, what are the basics of the
criminal justice system in Indian Country? This sec-
tion sets the scene for the discussions that follow.
What Is “Indian Country”?
“Indian Country” comprises the 56 million acres of
land owned by Indian communities in the United
States.1 According to the BIA (1998a) there are
more than 330 federally recognized Indian tribes 
in the lower 48 United States. Nearly all tribes have
reservations, which are lands the United States
“reserved for” tribes in treaties, statutes, or execu-
tive orders during the Euro-American western
expansion of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries
(BIA 1998b). Most of Indian Country is located
west of the Mississippi River, but it also includes 
a number of reservations belonging to tribes in the
East. Overall, Indians live on reservations in 34 con-
tinental States, and all reservations have some form
of policing arrangement (BIA 1998b; Bureau of the
Census 1993).
Increasingly, tribes are referred to as “nations” to
acknowledge their distinct political status vis-à-vis
the U.S. Federal and State governments: Indian gov-
ernments are not part of the Federal hierarchy but,
instead, have a government-to-government relation-
ship with the United States (Reno 1995). Under this
arrangement, American Indians hold dual citizenship
as citizens of both the United States and their Native
nation. Because limitations on tribal authority do
exist (for example, tribes do not float their own cur-
rencies or provide for their own defense), it may be
more accurate to describe Indian nations as semisov-
ereign, or “domestic dependent nations,” as Chief
Justice Marshall did in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
(30 U.S. (5 Pet.)1(1831)). Yet, while tribes control a
narrower scope of policy than do such nations as
Germany and Brazil, they have significantly more
scope for policymaking than cities or even U.S.
States. Indian nations adopt constitutions for their
societies, write civil laws to regulate conduct and
commerce within their territorial boundaries, and
enforce those laws with their own judicial systems.
In brief, modern tribes exercise substantial, but not
complete, rights of self-determination and self-
government.
Whom Do Police in Indian Country
Serve?
In 1995, the BIA estimated a non-Alaska service
population (the number of Natives living on or very
near reservations) of 1.1 million. Other estimates
are higher. Using data from the 1990 census and a
historical growth factor, the Indian Health Service
(1997) estimated a 1996 non-Alaska service popu-
lation of more than 1.3 million, which would rise
by more than 100,000 by the year 2000. These
differences reflect difficulties in enumerating the
reservation-based Indian population, the high birth
rates that are typical on many reservations, and in
some cases, in-migration.
Improved economic opportunities are the primary
cause of in-migration in the Indian communities
where it is occurring, but such positive economic
changes are the exception rather than the rule. In
particular, the perception that Native Americans are
generally enjoying increased prosperity as a result
of the growth of the gaming industry is mistaken.
According to the Government Accounting Office
(1997), almost half of all gaming revenues earned in
1995 were generated by only 8 of the 184 gaming
tribes. Thus, despite new tribal opportunities and
ventures, American Indians remain the poorest
minority in the United States. Those living in reser-
vation communities, commonly characterized by
severe unemployment (sometimes reaching 80 to
90 percent2) and the attendant social and economic
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symptoms of poverty, are the worst off of all (see,
for example, Kilborn 1992).
Important education and health outcomes also are
poor. For example, as of 1990,the high school com-
pletion rate among reservation-resident Natives age
25 and over was 54 percent; the national rate for all
races was 78 percent (Bureau of the Census 1993,
312, table 7; 1998, 158, table 243). Rates of alco-
holism among American Indians are extraordinarily
high, and even higher than for other minorities, who
are themselves at increased risk of alcohol abuse
(see, for example, Greenfeld 1998). Consequently,
the rates among Natives of alcohol-related health
problems—chronic liver disease, cirrhosis, fetal
alcohol syndrome—are much higher than for other
population groups. Indexes of social dysfunction,
such as suicide and homicide, are also much higher
than for either the general population or other
minority populations; for instance, the suicide rate
is almost triple that of the general population
(Indian Health Service 1997).
Even so, many Indian nations are experiencing 
significant countertrends. For example, through
aggressive economic development and effective
governance, unemployment among the Mississippi
Choctaw fell from 80 percent in the early 1980s 
to virtually zero in 1996; average family income
increased approximately sevenfold, to $22,000,
during the same period (Bordewich 1996). The
Gila River Indian Community was able to provide
funding to more than 200 college students in the
late 1990s, as opposed to only a handful earlier in
the decade. This support will dramatically increase
the percentage of community members who are
recorded as college graduates in the next census.3 In
sum, Indian Country comprises a striking variety of
economic and social conditions and characteristics.
An important additional type of variation is the sub-
stantial cultural diversity found among American
Indian communities. Although “American Indian”
is a single race category on the U.S. Census, this
grouping hides the fact that members of one tribe
can be as different from members of another tribe
as citizens of Greece are from citizens of Vietnam.
Certainly, tribes’ geographic dispersion is one source
of diversity. Peoples sharing similar natural sur-
roundings developed somewhat similar cultures
and related languages; tribal subgroups then refined
the common culture in distinct ways, which gave
rise to a wide variety of cultures throughout Indian
Country. One rough categorization of these differ-
ences separates the Indians of the continental United
States into five cultural-geographic groups:
● Farmers of the eastern forests.
● Nomadic hunters of the plains and prairies.
● Farmers and herders of the Southwest.
● Seed gatherers of California and the intermoun-
tain Great Basin.
● Ocean and river fishermen of the Northwest
(Driver 1969; Waldman 1985).
Another method for classifying Native Americans’
cultural diversity is based on language. Early stud-
ies found more than 70 distinct linguistic families
and isolates among some 250 North American
Indian languages. However, with the extinction of
some languages and reclassification of others,
linguists now group most extant North American
Indian languages into six primary families:
● Eskimo and Aleut (Far North).
● Algonquian (various tribes in the eastern forests,
the Plains, and the Far West).
● Athabascan and related languages (the
Mackenzie-Yukon Basin, the Navajos in the
Southwest, and some West Coast peoples).
● Uto-Aztecan and related languages (the Great
Basin and Rocky Mountains area, the Plains,
and the majority of the Pueblos).
● Chinookan and related languages (several 
scattered Far Western tribes).
● Siouan and related languages (people in such 
disparate regions as the Northeast, the Southeast,
the Plains, New Mexico, and northern
California).4
Languages within the six families display linguistic
similarities, but in practice they are mutually unin-
telligible, a fact that reinforces cultural differences.
Despite decades of suppression and English assimi-
lation, Native language use may now be on the
upswing.5 Thus, the extraordinary cultural variation
among historical Indian nations is, and should con-
tinue to be, an important distinguishing factor
among modern Indian nations.
Type of Law
Enforcement Public Law Self- Tribally Public  Law
Program 93–638 BIA Governance Funded 83–280
Number 88 64 22 4 N/A
Trend Increasing Decreasing No trend No trend No trend
numbers numbers
Administered Tribe Federal Tribe Tribe State or local
by Government law enforcement 
agencies
Officers are Tribe Federal Tribe Tribe State or local
employees of Government law enforcement 
agencies
Funding Federal (often Federal Tribe Tribe Primarily State 
with tribal Government and local entities
contribution)
Source: Data in this table derive from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Division of Law Enforcement Services, “Listing of Reservations Where Major Crimes
Act Applies By Area Office and Type of Law Enforcement Program,” U.S. Department of the Interior, Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 31, 1995.
Exhibit 1: Types of Indian Police Departments and Their Characteristics, 1995
tribes the opportunity to assume responsibility for
many programs previously administered by the
Federal Government by contracting with the BIA
(Canby 1998, 30–31). Thus, these police depart-
ments are administered by tribes under contract
with the BIA Division of Law Enforcement
Services. Typically, a 638 contract establishes the
department’s organizational framework and per-
formance standards and provides basic funding for
the police function. Officers and nonsworn staff of
638 contract departments are tribal employees.
Tribes have used the Self-Determination Act quite
aggressively to acquire increased control of their
police departments. In 1995, for example, 88
departments (nearly half of the non-Public Law
83–280 tribes) were administered under the aus-
pices of PL 93–638.
BIA Administration
Departments administered by the BIA are the 
second most common type of police department
in Indian Country. Staff in these departments are
Federal employees and are part of a national, BIA-
employed hierarchy of law enforcement officers.
For many years, patrol officers were under the line
authority of the local BIA superintendent (each
Finally, the history and politics of place also con-
tribute to distinct cultural identities. As reservations
were created, members of several indigenous groups
were sometimes assigned to one locality; converse-
ly, members of some large indigenous groups were
located on several land bases. Over time, the people
of each reservation experienced unique struggles.
These historical, geographical, and cultural-linguistic
differences together support the proposition that
the resident community of each of these 330-plus,
unique “nations” is the most appropriate group to
undertake policymaking and problem solving.
Who Polices Indian Country?
The array of administrative arrangements for polic-
ing in Indian Country is complex (see exhibit 1).
Members of the police departments that serve reser-
vation communities may be tribal, Federal, State,
county, or municipal employees.
Tribal or Public Law 93–638 Policing
The most common administrative arrangement is
for police departments to be organized under the
auspices of the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975. Also known as
Public Law 93–638 (PL 93–638), this law gives
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reservation has a BIA superintendent who oversees
all or most BIA functions on that reservation), and
criminal investigators were under the line authority
of the BIA Division of Law Enforcement Services.
Recent changes have placed line authority for patrol
under the BIA Division of Law Enforcement
Services as well.
In 1995, 64 departments (slightly more than one-
third of the non-PL 83–280 tribes) were adminis-
tered by the BIA.
Self-Governance Policing and Tribally
Funded Departments
By far less common than the types described above,
but significant nevertheless, are departments that
receive funding under the auspices of the self-
governance amendments to Public Law 93–638 and
departments that receive complete funding from
tribal coffers. 
Like tribes with 638ed police departments, tribes
with self-governance arrangements contract (except
in this case, the terminology is to “compact”) with
the BIA to assume responsibility for law enforce-
ment services that might otherwise be performed by
the BIA. The primary difference between contract-
ing under PL 93–638 and compacting under its self-
governance amendments is that financing is through
a block grant, rather than as payment for budgeted
line items. These contractual requirements and
funding mechanisms grant tribes much more control
over government functions than is permitted under
638 contracts. In 1995, 22 Indian police depart-
ments (approximately 12 percent of the non-PL
83–280 tribes) were administered through self-
governance.
Although tribes achieve a high degree of organiza-
tional freedom through self-governance compacts,
tribes that fully fund their own police departments
gain near-complete tribal control of their law
enforcement institutions. Given resource constraints
in Indian Country, however, only four of the non-PL
83–280 tribes had tribally funded departments in
1995.
Public Law 83–280 Policing
A number of tribes rely on State and local authori-
ties for police services under Public Law 83–280,
67 Stat. 588 (1953). This law, passed as part of a
larger effort to “terminate” American Indian tribes,
gave California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
Wisconsin, and (later) Alaska the power to enforce
the same criminal laws within Indian Country as
they did outside of Indian Country. The law also
“provided that any other state could assume such
jurisdiction by statute or state constitutional amend-
ment,” and many did so (Canby 1998, 27; Barker
1998, 46–49). With the advent of the Federal policy
of self-determination in the 1970s, some States
retroceded policing responsibility back to tribes.
Nonetheless, a significant number of Indian commu-
nities still rely on State and local police services,
which usually are paid for by the surrounding, and
generally larger, non-Indian community. 
The number of tribes subject to policing through
PL 83–280 is fairly static and relatively large (for
example, it includes many of the more than 100
tribes in California). We have excluded them from
this study, which focuses on tribes that either police
themselves or have a present opportunity to do so.
Often, PL 83–280 tribes have rather small popula-
tions or limited land bases, characteristics that make
self-policing much more difficult. We agree with
other researchers, however, that, despite these con-
straints, PL 83–280 tribes should have an opportunity
to determine the policing arrangement that best
serves their members (Goldberg and Singleton
1998). The complexity of these issues merits sepa-
rate, comprehensive treatment.
Other Administrative Arrangements
To this already complicated picture, we must add
several more possibilities. First, tribes can contract
with the BIA for individual police functions.
Therefore, some departments will have a tribal
patrol function and a BIA criminal investigation
function. Second, an increasing number of depart-
ments include both tribally employed and BIA-
employed patrol officers. The Community Oriented
Policing Service (COPS) program6 is one driving
force behind this mix. Its grants provide funding
for new local-level officers, who cannot be Federal
employees. Thus, tribes that receive COPS grants
but have BIA-administered departments have had
to hire officers under tribal auspices.
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The Typical Department in Indian Country
Despite the complexity of administrative arrange-
ments, it is possible to construct a rough portrait of
the typical police department serving Indian Country.
This sketch is a step toward developing a general
understanding of the context of policing in Indian
Country. The data for this portrait come from the
approximately 40 respondents to our survey of the
67 largest tribes (66 largest departments) located
in the continental United States.
The typical department is administered either by the
tribe through a 638 contract or by the BIA. It has 32
employees (of whom approximately 9 are civilians,
6 are detention officers, 16 are police officers, and 1
to 3 are command staff). Given the around-the-clock
nature of policing, the numbers imply that the typi-
cal department has only a few officers on duty at
any one time. The sworn officers are high school
graduates and graduates of certified law enforce-
ment training academies. A slight majority are
Native American.
The typical department polices a reservation land
area of 500,000 acres and serves approximately
10,000 tribal members.7 Therefore, the typical set-
ting is a large land area with a relatively small
population patrolled by a small number of police
officers, and the superficial description is of a rural
environment with rural-style policing. In fact, sub-
stantial numbers of reservation residents live in
fairly dense communities that share attributes of
suburban and urban areas. Nonetheless, the figures
are roughly equivalent to an area the size of
Delaware, but with a population of only 10,000
that is patrolled by no more than three police offi-
cers (and as few as one officer) at any one time—
a level of police coverage that is much lower than
in other urban and rural areas of the country.
The typical department has an operating budget of
approximately $1 million per year, which also is
less than its rural counterparts and much less than
the typical urban police department. In keeping with
this limited resource base, the facilities and equip-
ment that support such a department are generally
old: The department typically is housed in a build-
ing that is 20 or more years old and relies on a
vehicle fleet that is at least 3 years old.
The Criminal Justice System in
Indian Country
The components of the criminal justice system in
Indian Country are similar to those of non-Indian
communities throughout the country. The primary
components are the judiciary, the prosecutorial and
defense bars, the correctional system (including
probation), and the police. However, the complex
jurisdictional arrangements in Indian Country mean
that for nearly every serious crime, the U.S. Attorney
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have
potential jurisdiction. This is markedly different
from the situation in non-Indian communities: On
reservations, Federal agencies play a potentially
broad role in the operation of what is essentially
a local criminal justice system.
Although the arrangements may vary from reserva-
tion to reservation, three factors always come into
play in determining criminal jurisdiction in Indian
Country. These factors tend to narrow tribal juris-
diction and expand either State or Federal jurisdic-
tion over a wide range of crimes:
● Where the crime was committed.Only crimes
committed in Indian Country, on trust land, fall
under the jurisdiction of tribes. All crimes com-
mitted outside of Indian Country, even if they
involve American Indians, fall under State or
Federal jurisdiction.
● Who committed the crime (Indian or non-
Indian). For tribal jurisdiction, the alleged
offender must be an American Indian. Sometimes,
however, even Indians who are not members of
the tribe on whose reservation the crime occurred
may be exempt from that tribe’s jurisdiction.
Regardless of the nature of the crime or the loca-
tion in which it occurred, non-Indians are not
under the criminal jurisdiction of tribes.
● What crime was committed.As a result of the
Major Crimes Act of 1885 (18 U.S.C.A. §1153)
and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (25
U.S.C.A. §1302(7)), tribes have jurisdiction only
over less serious crimes. Most serious crimes—
including murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary,
and robbery—fall under the jurisdiction of
Federal authorities. However, some tribes have
found ways to exercise increased authority
over the investigation and adjudication of more
serious crimes.8
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Other attributes of the criminal justice system in
Indian Country that often are highlighted by experts
in the field and are relevant to this discussion
include the following:
● Like police departments in Indian Country, other
Indian Country criminal justice agencies suffer
from major resource constraints (see Odum
1991).
● Indian Country has a greater representation of
nonprofessionals in the judiciary and the prose-
cution and defense bars than non-Indian commu-
nities do (see Melton 1998).
● Indian Country has a severe shortage of jail space
and correctional treatment programs, particularly
with regard to substance abuse (Office of the
Inspector General 1996).
Summary
The context for policing in Indian Country can be
summarized as follows:
● The communities served are aptly described as
nations, and these nations exhibit an exceptional-
ly wide variety of social, economic, and cultural
characteristics. Even so, most Indian nations face
severe social and economic problems.
● Departments serving most residents of Indian
Country are administered either by the BIA or
by tribes through a contractual arrangement with
the BIA.
● Departments have limited resources with which
to accomplish their mission. This is exemplified
by the typical department, which patrols a large
land area with a small number of police officers,
works with older equipment and facilities, and
depends on a relatively small operating budget.
● The criminal justice system within which depart-
ments operate is similar to that of non-Indian
communities, except for the stricter limits on
tribal jurisdiction and the more prominent role
of Federal agencies.
Notes
1. Indian Country was defined by the U.S. Congress in
1948 (18 U.S.C.A. §151) as “a) all land within the limits
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States government, notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, b) all dependent Indian commu-
nities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a
state, and c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-
way running through the same.” See Canby (1998,
113–114). 
2. See, for example, Bureau of Indian Affairs (1996).
To be counted as “unemployed” in BIA’s calculation of
the unemployment rate, an individual must be seeking
work. But given limited opportunities, many reservation
residents may have given up the search. A calculation
that includes these “discouraged workers” is probably
more accurate than the standard calculation of the
employment rate, which leads to unemployment esti-
mates in the 80- to 90-percent range for some reserva-
tion communities.
3. Personal interview with the Director of the Gila River
Indian Community Department of Education, October
29, 1998.
4. For example, see Driver (1969, 43–45), who bases his
table on Voegelin and Voegelin (1966).
5. The Native American Languages Acts of 1990 (PL
101–477) and 1992 (PL 102–254) are examples of the
renewed interest in Native language. These laws, which
articulate a U.S. Government policy of protecting indige-
nous languages, were passed at the express request of
Native groups.
6. The Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) in the U.S. Department of Justice
is “responsible for advancing community policing,
including the hiring of 100,000 additional community
policing officers” (quoted from the COPS Web page,
http://www.usdoj.gov/cops/gpa/default.htm).
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7. The average acreage calculation—based on survey
data, not on the entire universe of reservations—excludes
the Navajo reservation, which is atypically large. The
average population estimate does not derive from survey
data, but rather, was reported to us by members of the
Executive Committee for Indian Country Law Enforcement
Improvements. It may substantially overestimate the
actual number of tribal members served by the typical
department. Data from the U.S. Census, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs Labor Force Survey, and the tribes them-
selves suggest that the figure may be as low as 6,000.
The simple and unfortunate fact is that data on the Native
population actually served by police in Indian Country
are of limited reliability. Indeed, the range of difference
reported here suggests that researchers and policymakers
must be especially wary of “per capita” estimates (for
example, policing resources per tribal member served)
and of policy recommendations that depend heavily on
these figures; they can be made to say many things. This
issue is discussed in greater detail in chapter 4.
8. For example, tribal police and prosecutors sometimes
charge alleged criminals with misdemeanors (over which
Indian nations have jurisdiction) in addition to (or instead
of) felonies (over which Indian nations do not have juris-
diction); this allows the community to keep the alleged
criminal within the tribal system or seek some remedy,
even when the Federal system is too overburdened to
pursue prosecution.
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Chapter 3. Crime Trends in Indian Country
The Limitations of Indian Country 
Crime Data
General Remarks
In recent years, policymakers and law enforcement
professionals have become increasingly concerned
that crime, particularly violent crime, is increasing
rapidly on American Indian reservations. (See, for
example, Claiborne 1998; Executive Committee for
Indian Country Law Improvements 1997; Mydans
1995; and “Why Does Violent Crime on Indian
Lands Soar” 1997.) The problem is all the more
worrisome because we know far less than we would
like about crime in Indian Country (on the tribal,
regional, and national levels) (Executive Committee
1997; Clark 1996b). Broadly, the lack of accurate
data on crime in Indian Country can be attributed to
the underreporting of crime. More specific reasons
for the lack of accurate crime data include issues
of culture, geography, and economics unique to
American Indian reservations; the limited adminis-
trative and technological resources available to
tribal police departments; inadequate coordination
between tribal and Federal agencies; and manage-
ment problems common to both tribal and BIA
police departments.1 Furthermore, even when it is
possible to obtain accurate tribal-level data, multiple
complex factors cause the prevalence and character
of crime to vary widely from reservation to reserva-
tion, a fact that strongly cautions against using data
from a few tribes as a basis for projecting overall
trends. For example, during 1995 at least 15 homi-
cides occurred on the Gila River reservation, a com-
munity with a robust economy and a population of
approximately 10,000 (Clark 1996b). In contrast,
the Oglala Sioux—a much larger tribe (40,000) that
is plagued with serious social problems and a strug-
gling economy—had only one homicide during a
similar period. Equally dramatic contrasts can be
found throughout Indian Country.
Policymakers and law enforcement professionals
frequently focus on the obstacles to formulating
effective anticrime strategies (Luna 1998). While
the information is useful, this focus tends to obscure
much that is known about crime and its context in
Indian Country—information that might be immedi-
ately useful to policymakers, law enforcement pro-
fessionals, and tribal leadership. Therefore, although
this report discusses the factors contributing to a lack
of accurate data on crime in Indian Country, it also
draws attention to what is known and what that infor-
mation suggests about the strategies available for
addressing crime on American Indian reservations.
Reasons for Poor Crime Data in Indian Country
The underreporting of crime on reservations occurs
on two levels: between reservation citizens and their
police agencies and between these tribal-level police
agencies and such Federal agencies as the FBI and
the BIA. On the first level, underreporting is attribut-
able to cultural and demographic factors that are
highly characteristic of Indian Country. The exten-
sive research literature on underreporting of crime
cites distrust of police, the shame or humiliation
associated with certain kinds of crime, and fear of
retaliation as strong predictors of underreporting
(Skogan 1977; Wasserman 1998). These factors are
unusually common in Native American communities.
In many, there is a longstanding distrust of law enforce-
ment authorities. On social, cultural, and even politi-
cal levels, the issues of shame and fear of retaliation
are also present. Tribal members underreport because
of the shame associated with such crimes as child
abuse, child neglect, and domestic violence; because
of their fear that the (typically) small, intimate reser-
vation community will be unable to protect those
who report such crimes; and because close and com-
plicated family and clan relationships among victims,
offenders, and police officers discourage reporting.2
14
Unfortunately, these causes of underreporting of
crime are exacerbated by other characteristics of
reservation life (see Silverman 1996). For example,
geographic isolation from police departments and
from tribal social service agencies heightens the
fear of retaliation that victims of family violence
may have and further discourages reporting. On
some reservations, this fear is increased even more
by a lack of ready access to telephone service in
isolated or poor villages. Data from the 1990
Census show that “the majority of American Indian
homes on reservations (53 percent) did not have a
telephone.” By comparison, only 9 percent of non-
metropolitan households in the U.S. population
overall did not have a phone (Bureau of the Census
1995, 1). Finally, in those tribes where traditional
means of dispute resolution and social norm enforce-
ment have declined, but where new methods—like
police intervention—are not readily available or are
not viewed as legitimate or effective by the tribal
community, many crimes may never come to the
attention of police authorities.3
The second level at which underreporting occurs
originates with reservation police departments.
Even if citizens report crimes or crimes are other-
wise made known to police departments, data are
either not collected or not forwarded to Federal
agencies. Four problems, most of which are associ-
ated with the small size of typical police depart-
ments in Indian Country, play the greatest role in
this level of underreporting: staff shortages and time
constraints, limited data-collection capacities, com-
peting Federal and local priorities, and problems
with department administration and management.
Because the small size of police departments in
Indian Country places time constraints on staff, data
collection is extremely expensive relative to the
overall budget of the department. Police officers
and other staff in the departments we visited referred
to themselves as generalists and commented that the
time needed for specialized administrative tasks com-
petes with, and often loses out to, fighting crime and
providing emergency services. When police officers
also must serve as jail staff, as is the case in approx-
imately 50 percent of all departments surveyed, their
time is stretched even further. Simply put, because
these small departments cannot afford to dedicate
staff to any specialized function, the cost of data
collection and analysis is much greater than it is
for larger departments.
Small departments serving small communities often
lack systematic methods for collecting and analyz-
ing crime data. Like other observers, we found that
many Indian Country police departments do not
have automated call management (i.e., 911 systems)
and data collection and analysis systems; survey
results suggest that approximately half of the depart-
ments lack them. In several tribes we visited, data
regarding crime reports and arrests could be collect-
ed only by reviewing handwritten records, and even
this level of effort was not always possible, because
written records were not consistently maintained.
There seem to be two reasons for the limited amount
of automation—Indian police departments’ scant
resources, which have made the purchase of such
systems prohibitively expensive, and the small size
of typical reservation communities, which for many
years did not require sophisticated call and data
management capacity for adequate policing. As
tribal populations and crime both increased,4 Indian
police departments suddenly found themselves far
behind their larger, urban counterparts (and some-
what behind their comparable rural counterparts) in
building such systems.5 An additional complication,
related to the problem above, is that even some
departments with automated systems for data col-
lection and analysis cannot maximize the benefits
of these systems, since the departments do not have
staff trained to use them to their full advantage.
Even when data are collected, the reporting of data
(and the referral of cases) by tribal departments to
Federal agencies has been problematic. As recently
as 1996, for example, one northern plains tribe
reported no major crimes of any kind to Federal
officials for several months—a precipitous and
unlikely decrease over the previous period.6 In large
part, the problem arises because of competing local
and Federal priorities, which means that individual
Indian police departments have little or no incentive
to report data on major felonies. Because the com-
munities they police tend to be small and highly
interconnected, officers already have a good sense
of the prevalence of serious crimes, and it is diffi-
cult for them to see how an official compilation of
data would provide any better information. Because
Indian police officers spend so much more time on
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routine patrol activities than they do on the crimes
covered by Federal reporting requirements, report-
ing may appear fairly unimportant to them. And, if
tribal police think that Federal agencies give low
priority to the prosecution of crimes that occur on
reservations, they may believe that reporting serves
no purpose.7 Unfortunately, while the impact on
individual tribes may be negligible, the failure to
report or refer these serious crimes has important
implications for understanding the prevalence and
distribution of crime on regional and national levels.
Such data might be very useful, for example, in
understanding crime on reservations close to urban
areas or near international borders where the illegal
activity associated with urban gangs, drug traffick-
ing, and illegal immigration might follow signifi-
cant regional or national patterns.8
Problems with department administration and man-
agement also stymie the collection and reporting of
reservation crime data. Chapter 4 discusses these
issues, but one example can illustrate how such
problems (striking in their triviality but alarming in
their frequency) work against the efficient collection
of useful crime data. In this case, the many police
districts in the department of a large plains tribe
were required to submit incident report records to
the department headquarters on a fixed date each
month. Districts were notoriously late with their
submissions, but the response was neither to modify
deadlines nor to work with districts to improve
reporting. Instead, late information was simply dis-
carded.9 As a result, this information was unavail-
able to the tribe and to Federal agencies for
purposes of planning and management.
The Prevalence, Distribution, and
Character of Crime on American 
Indian Reservations
Given the above constraints on developing a
detailed, accurate analysis of crime trends, this
section describes what the general prevalence, dis-
tribution, and character of crime on reservations
suggest about the evolving role of police in Indian
Country. Three factors appear most important.
First, although it is difficult to accurately describe
crime trends in Indian Country, the overall 
workload of police departments in Indian Country
has been increasing at a significant rate. In other
words, the intensity and range of problems to which
police departments in Indian Country must respond
appear to be increasing.
Second, many Native reservation residents live 
in rural, isolated areas and the resources and tech-
nologies available to effectively police these areas
are in short supply. These conditions tend to obscure
the fact that many other Native reservation resi-
dents have settled in semiurban communities and
much, if not most, crime on reservations occurs in
these fairly dense communities. Crime in these
areas may be amenable to well-developed, tested
strategies adapted from urban contexts.
Third, notwithstanding the recent reports of dramat-
ic increases in violent crime on reservations, espe-
cially among youth, the crimes that most occupy
police in Indian Country (as measured by calls for
service, incident reports, and arrests) are directly or
indirectly related to alcohol abuse. Alcohol-related
crime is a deep and complex problem that—in con-
trast to the problem of violent crime—has received
insufficient attention.
The Increasing Workload of Police
Departments in Indian Country
The workload of police departments in Indian
Country is increasing at a significant rate. General
evidence of this trend comes from our survey data,
brief site visits, and four intensive site visits.
Specific evidence is given in exhibits 2–5, which
approximate the increase in calls for service, inci-
dent reports, and arrests from the Tohono O’odham
Nation, the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation, and the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation.
The Tohono O’odham data (exhibits 2 and 3) show
an average annual increase between 1994 and 1996
of more than 20 percent in incident reports and
nearly 30 percent in arrests. During that period,
not only the overall pressure on the department
increased, but also the workload of individual offi-
cers because the number of sworn officers remained
relatively constant. The Three Affiliated Tribes’ data
(exhibit 4) show an average annual increase in arrests
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Exhibit 5. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Citations and Number of Calls, 1992–1996
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As at Tohono O’odham, this led to an increased
demand for service from individual officers, since
the increase in calls for service and arrests out-
paced the expansion of the Fort Berthold depart-
ment staff.10 The Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes’ data (exhibit 5) show an average annual
increase of 15 percent in calls for service and 45
percent in cited offenses from fiscal year 1992 to
fiscal year 1996. Several new officers were hired in
fiscal year 1995, but again, not in proportion to the
additional workload.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that these workload
increases are partly due to increases in serious
crime and emergencies on reservations. But other
simple explanations should not be overlooked. For
example, unlike many smaller Indian police depart-
ments, the Tohono O’odham department has a 911
system; the community’s growing reliance on 911 is
a strong contributing factor to the increase in calls
for service. These systems may be a broader cause
of the increased workload we observed across Indian
Country. As Indian police departments implement
automated call management, they may be experi-
encing the surge in high-priority calls and height-
ened demand that urban departments experienced
when they established 911 systems (Sparrow, Moore,
and Kennedy 1990). For the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai department, the large increase in
demand from fiscal year 1994 to 1995 occurred
as a result of “retrocession,” by which the State
of Montana ceded control over reservation policing
to the tribe. (This change is discussed in greater
depth in chapter 4.) While this was a fairly dra-
matic increase in tribal control, in which a tribe
subject to the authority of PL 83–280 regained its
former rights, other Indian nations also are increas-
ing their jurisdictional sweep, largely through cross-
deputization agreements. Thus, another simple cause
of Indian police departments’ increased workload
is increased authority over the offenses committed
within reservation boundaries.
Yet, there is good reason to believe that the increased
workload in Indian police departments is not simply
the result of rising serious crime and emergencies,
the greater availability of 911 services, or expanded
jurisdictional rights. It also appears that communi-
ties are placing new demands on police departments
to respond more frequently and more rapidly to a
broad range of problems. Many researchers have
asserted that tribal communities have become less
and less reliant on traditional methods of problem
or conflict resolution and more reliant on the police
(for example, Nielsen 1996; Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples 1996). Our observations support
this conclusion. For example, at Tohono O’odham,
not only has the demand for police services increased,
but, in recent years, there has also been a steady
increase in the tribal advocates’ caseloads;11 by 1996,
each of the 10 advocates handled approximately 500
cases per year, an estimate that does not include the
cases handled by private attorneys and other legal
services providers on the reservation. Similarly,
defense advocates at Gila River reported that they
stopped accepting traffic cases (misdemeanor viola-
tions of tribal traffic laws) in the early 1990s because
so many more serious cases filled their dockets.
The Geographic Distribution of 
Reservation Crime
The argument is often made that the unique demo-
graphics and geography of Indian Country require
uniquely rural approaches to crime prevention and
control. In general, however, researchers and police
professionals have found that such strategies are not
as well developed as those for urban areas (Weisheit,
Wells, and Falcone 1995). Most rural strategies leave
unsolved the problem of how to provide adequate
police coverage to widely spread communities (for
example, Cordner 1994). Police professionals in
Indian Country often describe how a single call from
an outlying area of a large reservation can take an
officer out of service for several hours, perhaps even
a full day. That creates a serious coverage problem
for departments in which only one to three officers
are on duty at any one time.
Conversely, it is often underemphasized that while
many reservation residents live in isolated rural
areas, a significant number have settled in semiur-
ban townships and villages, and much, if not most,
crime on reservations occurs in these more densely
populated areas. At Tohono O’odham, for example,
half of the reservation’s population of 14,000 lives
in Sells, Arizona, but considerably more than 50
percent of the incidents that officers initiated or
responded to in 1995 and 1996 took place there. In
addition, officers estimated that of these calls, the
majority originated in two relatively small U.S.
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Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) neighborhoods known as the “rentals,” while
another 18 percent originated in a small urban area
near the city of Tucson. At Fort Berthold, approxi-
mately 1,500 of the almost 2,000 arrests made by
the police department in 1994 were made in the
relatively densely populated New Town district, an
area that is home to 50 percent of the reservation’s
total population. Gila River police officers also iden-
tified the HUD rental developments in Sacaton and
St. Johns as high-crime/frequent-call areas, and offi-
cers at Flathead identified a crowded trailer park in
one small reservation town as a particularly trouble-
some site. In such areas, police quite possibly could
use strategies developed for urban areas effectively
and efficiently.
In addition to their semiurban character, these
neighborhoods exhibit numerous and unmistakable
signs of decay and abandonment that invite crime
(Wilson and Kelling 1982). This is not from the
casual disorder that may be a cultural variant and
not necessarily a reliable indicator that an area has
in some significant way been abandoned by local
residents and authorities. As noted above, crime in
the town of Sells on the Tohono O’odham reserva-
tion and in the towns of Sacaton and St. Johns on
the Gila River reservation is most prevalent in run-
down public housing areas that share many attrib-
utes of urban public housing developments. At
Tohono O’odham, the rentals contrast dramatically
with a nearby immaculate and orderly village, Big
Fields, in which very little crime occurs; tribal
police officers reported that they rarely patrol Big
Fields, simply because crime is so low there and, in
any event, residents “look out for each other.” In a
HUD housing development on the Flathead reserva-
tion, crime and disorder dropped precipitously when
residents mowed lawns, cleaned up the neighbor-
hood, and reported illegal or suspicious activities to
police. These results are similar to results in urban
neighborhoods when residents take an active stand
against physical disorder, abandonment, and decay.
Again, strategies that have proven useful in urban
areas also might be applicable to dense reservation
housing areas.
In sum, analysis of the geographic distribution of
crime on reservations suggests that useful means of
addressing crime in urban areas—strategies such as
community policing, which have led to interven-
tions like Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, and other
fruitful problem-solving approaches, such as those
that have led to the eradication of open-air drug
markets—are underused or at least undertested in
Indian Country. Indeed, such approaches might
have particular promise in reservation housing proj-
ects, since their limited size and population might
permit police to more easily develop detailed and
expert knowledge of key community characteristics,
which is vital for successful problem solving.
Alcohol-Related Crime in Indian Country
In spite of recent reports of dramatic increases in
violent crime in Indian Country, particularly youth
violence (Clark 1996a; Goldblatt 1998; Weyerman
1998),12 the crimes that most occupy police in
Indian Country are directly or indirectly related 
to alcohol abuse (Gossage and May 1998; Indian
Health Service 1997). Identifying alcohol abuse as 
a leading problem in Indian Country is not new, and
the “finding” may sound trite. But this conclusion
was stated by tribal members, tribal leaders, and
tribal police officers, and we are simply reporting 
it here. In particular, the conclusion that alcohol-
related crime is the leading crime problem in Indian
Country is based on evidence from our surveys and
site visits. Across all survey responses, for example,
the constellation of crimes that were directly related
to alcohol abuse (such as driving under the influ-
ence (DUI), the sale of alcohol to minors, and drunk
and disorderly conduct) or were indirectly related to
alcohol abuse (such as domestic violence, child
abuse and neglect, and assault) constituted the lead-
ing category of calls for service, incident reports,
and arrests. Also, the great majority of police offi-
cers and administrators, tribal leaders, and commu-
nity members who were interviewed cited alcohol
abuse as the single biggest challenge facing their
departments and communities. The commanding
officer at Fort Berthold, for example, estimated that
90 percent of his department’s calls for service were
driven by some form of alcohol abuse. Similarly, an
acting commanding officer at Gila River estimated
that 98 percent of calls there were alcohol-related.
While it did not focus on reservation residents but
on American Indians overall, a recent Bureau of
Justice Statistics (BJS) study provides additional
evidence of these claims. Analysis of victimization
data shows that “American Indian victims of
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violence were the most likely of all races of victims
to indicate that the offender committed the offense
while drinking.” Also, “the 1997 arrest rate among
American Indians for alcohol-related offenses was
more than double that found among all races,”
although drug arrest rates were lower than average
(Greenfeld and Smith 1999, vi–vii).
Alcohol abuse is a difficult problem, and police
involvement is only one part of the solution to
alcohol-related crime. Community members realize
this as well. For instance, the director of the Gila
River Indian Community Department of Social
Services expressed a belief that a comprehensive
community strategy for combating alcohol abuse
was the only way that further inroads could be made
against crime and other social problems associated
with alcohol abuse. Members of the Gila River
Youth Council reported that they helped found a
local Boys and Girls Club so that young children
living in homes where alcohol abuse was common
could have more positive role models. In other
words, tribal community leaders acknowledge
the need for broad-based and creative solutions.
Yet it is also the case that police departments in
Indian Country are not organized to deal most 
effectively with alcohol-related crime. For example,
although many departments have drug task forces,
largely funded through Federal programs, these
focus on “harder” drugs than alcohol. Among the
Salish and Kootenai, for example, drug task force
officers focused on methamphetamine, which was
being transported and marketed via the reservation,
but largely to non-Natives. Site visits found no evi-
dence of similar comprehensive planning and deter-
rence programs that deal with alcohol-related
crime. If such programs exist, they are rare. Perhaps
more so than other crime categories, alcohol-related
crime reflects an entire nexus of social problems
and, as the director of social services at Gila River
attested, it requires broad solutions. However, at one
site we visited, when asked for directions to the
Department of Social Services, police department
officials provided directions to a building that the
agency had not occupied for a year. The lack of
basic connections to such a vital partner as Social
Services signals that the police are not organized to
respond to the dire problem of alcohol-related
crime.
Notes
1. The problem of data collection with regard to criminal
justice issues and agencies in Indian Country is widely
noted by researchers and policymakers. See, for example,
Elias (1998).
2. Many of these problems are not unique to Indian
Country but are common to the small, tightly knit com-
munities of rural areas across the country. See, for exam-
ple, Weisheit, Wells, and Falcone (1995).
3. See Judicature79(3)(1995), a special issue entitled
“Indian Tribal Courts and Justice,” especially, Ada Pecos
Melton, “Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society,”
126–133.
4. We note again that tribal populations are growing at
a much faster rate than the overall U.S. population (see
Indian Health Service 1997) and that some reservation
communities report the return of tribal members as a
result of improved economic opportunities. Some inter-
viewees also speculated that there was a relationship
between return migration and crime; they posited that,
having lived away from the stabilizing influence of cul-
ture and extended family, returning members had an
increased predisposition to crime.
5. Of course, the lack of automated call management and
data collection systems is not unique to Indian Country.
Whether or not a police department has such a system is
determined to a significant degree by the size and loca-
tion (urban vs. rural) of the department. Virtually all the
departments serving U.S. cities of 50,000 or more have
some kind of 911 system, but in 1993, only 70 percent
of the departments serving communities of fewer than
10,000 had one (or used an existing system in partnership
with a local law enforcement agency, such as a sheriff’s
department or the State police), and that percentage
decreases further with the size of the community served.
The situation is similar with regard to computerized data
management. While nearly all the departments in the
country that serve populations over 10,000 have a data
management system, in 1993 only 39 percent of the
departments serving communities smaller than 2,500
had one (Reaves 1996). In this context, the lack of 911
systems in Indian Country seems less dramatic, but the
point remains that without methods for systematically
collecting and analyzing crime data, Indian police depart-
ments will tend to underreport crime. 
6. Interview with Ted Quasula, chief of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs Division of Law Enforcement Services,
December 1997.
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7. On the other hand, Federal agencies complain that
tribes do not refer cases in a timely manner (thus, evi-
dence is not fresh and witnesses are difficult to locate or
their memory has faded) or that preliminary preparation
of the cases has not been adequate. Both the tribal and
Federal problems are widely reported. See, for example,
the Native American Subcommittee, House Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee (1997).
8. These reporting problems exist not only between tribal
and Federal law enforcement agencies, but also between
tribal criminal justice agencies. For example, in several
of the systems we studied in depth, the juvenile division
of the tribal courts compiled data on juvenile crime but
did not regularly pass it on to the tribal police depart-
ment—either because the police never asked for it or
because the police department rarely used the informa-
tion for planning purposes.
9. Problems with this department were widely reported in
Indian Country Today.See, for example, Roach (1997)
and Melmer and Roach (1997). Also see the report by
Naranjo et al. (1996). 
10. Since 1996, both departments have significantly
expanded, in part due to COPS funding. While new
staff have improved these departments’ response to the
increased demand for police services, the rapid personnel
expansion has created significant organizational chal-
lenges. Furthermore, the fact that COPS funding has
a sunset clause means that many departments in Indian
Country will once again be vulnerable to this increase
in demand.
11. Tribal advocates provide free legal services to tribal
members.
12. Also, the President’s budget for fiscal year 1999
included specific appropriations to combat crime on
Indian lands: $51 million for “20 FBI agents and 26
attorneys to enhance investigations and prosecutions by
attacking violent crime and gangs, establishing the Indian
Tribal Courts Program, and creating a New Drug Testing
and Intervention Program” (quoted from “DOJ Seeks
4.4% Raise for FY99” 1998). 
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Chapter 4. Organization and Management of
Police Departments in Indian Country
This section examines the ways in which police
departments serving American Indian reservations
are organized and managed to respond to crime.
We begin by adding depth and detail to the descrip-
tion of police departments provided in chapter 2,
including a fuller account of their budgetary
resources. Then, using both the perspective pro-
vided by our survey and specific data from the
departments we studied intensively, we examine
the organization, strategic planning systems, orga-
nizational technology, and personnel systems that
Indian police departments employ in their efforts
to address crime. While we frequently allude to
the ways that the Federal and tribal governments
support the police function, a more comprehensive
discussion of their roles is reserved for the next
chapter.
Characteristics of Departments Serving
Indian Country
Earlier, we presented a brief profile of the typical
department to focus our analysis and recommenda-
tions; we complete this picture with a description
of the variation found in the more than 200 tribally
and BIA-administered police departments in Indian
Country. Luna offers a detailed statistical profile of
these departments; another is being developed by
the COPS office (Luna 1998; Luna and Walker
1998; Wood 1998). Therefore, while we offer some
basic statistics, this section focuses on the core
management challenges across the range. These
management challenges are as follows: size, adminis-
trative arrangements, staffing and personnel, facili-
ties and equipment, and funding.
Size
Small departments.These departments have at
most nine officers, usually fewer. While there are
many more small departments (approximately 150)
than medium-sized or large departments, they serve
substantially fewer people: between 25 and 30 
percent of the citizens served by BIA and tribally
administered police departments in Indian Country.
Among the most important problems facing small
departments is the challenge of providing daily,
around-the-clock police coverage to their communi-
ties. Rarely is more than one officer on duty at any
time. As a result, officers often work without ade-
quate backup and common events (such as an 
officer’s illness or need to testify in court) can
substantially reduce or eliminate the availability
of police services.
The officers working in small departments are true
generalists, as they work not only across different
police functions but also in administrative and
support functions. They may serve as dispatchers,
investigators, patrol officers, detention officers, and
custodians. During site visits, we even observed
patrol officers in these small departments preparing
food for detainees and sentenced inmates. In the
not-so-distant past, tribal police sometimes served
as prosecutors.1 Organizational charts for depart-
ments of this size do not adequately reflect the
variety and complexity of the work their officers
perform.
Medium departments.These departments have
between 10 and 50 sworn officers. There are more
than 75 medium-sized police departments in Indian
Country, serving roughly 60 percent of the Native
Americans living in reservation communities sub-
ject to BIA or tribal policing. The typical depart-
ment we describe in chapter 2 is medium-sized and,
therefore, gives an apt indication of the manage-
ment challenges these departments face.2
The key organizational attribute that distinguishes
medium-sized departments from small departments
is that a minimum of one or two officers are on duty
at all times. That is, it is theoretically possible for
these departments to provide 24-hour police cover-
age, even though it may be quite difficult in practi-
cal terms. At the low end of the size range, in terms
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of the demands made on staff members to perform 
a wide range of duties, the departments face chal-
lenges similar to those of the small departments in
Indian Country. At the high end of the size range,
the departments can support some specialized activ-
ities; not only are some officers free to focus on
standard patrol activities, but others may specialize
in such areas as gang violence, substance abuse, and
domestic violence. This transition may signal that
there is a staffing level at which specialization can
enable a department to focus on critical strategic
and planning issues, a focus that is not possible if
officers and command staff must respond to a wide
range of demands.
In recent years, many medium-sized departments
have experienced significant growth in staff, prima-
rily through grants from the Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services (COPS). For example, the
Three Affiliated Tribes department almost doubled
in size. A few other tribes have been able to augment
police staffs with their own resources. One of our
site-visit tribes, the Gila River Indian Community,
used gaming profits to double the size of its patrol
staff, from approximately 18 to 38 officers.
Large departments.These departments have more
than 50 sworn officers. The two largest departments
in Indian Country—those of the Navajo Nation and
the Oglala Sioux Tribe—have 100 or more uniformed
officers. Together these two departments serve
approximately 15 percent of the nearly 1.4 million
residents of Indian Country. The police functions of
both the Navajo Nation and the Oglala Sioux Tribe
operate under a 638 contract.
The large departments feature levels of organiza-
tional complexity not present in small and medium-
sized departments. Increased specialization, more
elaborate (but not necessarily more efficient) over-
sight mechanisms, and district-based organization
are some of the factors that drive the complexity.
Surprisingly, however, some of the primary manage-
ment challenges that large departments face are
similar to those in smaller departments. For exam-
ple, for many years, the Oglala Sioux Tribe’s
Department of Public Safety (OSTDPS) had
approximately 85 officers spread over nine districts,
and each district had its own local command staff.
While district-based organization had some positive
aspects, it also created a high ratio of command staff
to sworn staff. As in small departments, demands on
OSTDPS’s patrol staff to perform a wide range of
duties, many unrelated to the patrol function, were
considerable. Similarly, despite the overall size of
the department, OSTDPS’s district-based organiza-
tion presented a formidable challenge in providing
adequate police coverage over the entire expanse of
the Pine Ridge reservation. In recent years, challenges
such as these, as well as the problems of managing
a large department in a large, highly politicized
community, have put tremendous pressure on the
largest police departments in Indian Country.
Administrative Arrangements
The two most common department types are those
administered by the BIA and those administered
by tribes under 638 contracts. These classifications
appear straightforward, but the complexity of orga-
nizational and administrative arrangements is signif-
icantly increased by the following factors:
● The variety of administrative arrangements
for policing in Indian Country. As discussed in
chapter 2, 638 and BIA departments are only the
primary administrative possibilities.
● The split in line authority for the investigative
and patrol functions between different divi-
sions within the BIA. Until very recently, the
BIA’s Law Enforcement Division, headquartered
in Albuquerque, had line authority for criminal
investigation (that is, line authority was placed
at the national and regional levels), while BIA
superintendents at the reservation level had line
authority over other police functions, including
patrol, dispatch, and detention (that is, line
authority was placed at the local level). In a
handful of cases, one function was under a 638
contract and the other was provided by the BIA.
● The presence of both Federal and tribal sworn
officers in many departments administered by
the BIA. In BIA departments, officers hired by
the BIA are Federal employees. However, many
tribes have also hired tribal officers to supple-
ment the limited number of BIA positions.
Despite these factors, it is possible to describe
the general reporting arrangement between tribes
and the departments that serve them. When the
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department is administered by the BIA, the reporting
relationship is mediated by the BIA. That is, the BIA,
not the tribe, has direct supervisory responsibility
over the department’s executive. (In practical terms,
however, tribes wield considerable power over many
decisions regarding department policies.) When the
tribe administers the department under a 638 con-
tract, the reporting relationship between police
departments and the tribes they serve is not medi-
ated by an outside party. This direct supervision
may be exercised in a variety of ways: Oversight
might be provided by tribal executives (variously
known as tribal chairs, presidents, and governors),
by elected legislative committees, or by other
appointed bodies.
An often difficult oversight issue arises in depart-
ments that employ both Federal and tribal officers.3
The usual approach in these departments is for trib-
ally funded officers to be supervised by the BIA
police department command staff through a formal
agreement with the tribe. Because of the implica-
tions this arrangement has for department manage-
ment, it should not be regarded as a “paper”
complexity. First, the dual authority structure allows
compensation, training, and equipment inequities,
which are likely to lead to personnel and manage-
ment problems. In our survey, for example, tribes
frequently reported that the salary and benefit pack-
ages of tribal officers tend to be less attractive than
those of BIA officers, who, as Federal employees,
are eligible for more generous Federal packages.4
These differences may create an incentive system
that results in a group of officers with inferior
capacities. When tribal officers have been hired
with COPS program funds, the problem worsens.5
Because the COPS program does not provide train-
ing or equipment funds, some tribes have expressed
reluctance to make these kinds of investments in
officers who, due to the time limit on COPS grants,
may be with their departments for only a few years.
Second, the dual authority structure may create a
group of officers who have a stronger loyalty to the
tribal government than to their BIA managers. In
the dynamic political context of Indian Country
today, this division of loyalties may be problematic.
During intense political conflicts, for example,
disputants have ordered tribal officers to arrest or
detain Federal officers and vice versa.
Staffing and Personnel
In general, the sworn officers in Indian police
departments are high school graduates (in our
survey, 100 percent) and graduates of certified 
law enforcement training academies (85 percent).
Although the figures are comparable to those for
non-Indian departments across the country, depart-
ment leaders frequently noted that such figures
mask important deficiencies in the qualifications of
current police personnel, as well as serious prob-
lems with recruiting qualified officers. (In fact,
departments ranked problems with recruiting and
training qualified applicants as among the most seri-
ous they faced.) For instance, more so than in non-
Indian communities, required background checks
turn up issues that disqualify prospective officers
from service. In a few cases, the percentage of
graduates from law enforcement academies was
substantially lower than 85 percent. It is likely that
these departments included large numbers of newly
hired officers—often, these additions were made
possible with COPS funding—who had not yet had
an opportunity to attend a law enforcement acade-
my. Unusually large numbers of new hires can
result in considerable waiting periods for available
slots at nearby city, regional, or State police training
academies.
Two-thirds of the officers in the departments we
surveyed were Native American, and 56 percent
were members of the tribes they served.6 In Indian
Country, where issues of culture and sovereignty
are pronounced, the fact that, on average, only half
of the members of a given police force were also
members of the tribal community they served may
be an important issue for further examination. A
more critical finding is that only 13 percent of the
police officers serving Indian Country spoke a
language native to the community they served,
although this figure may mask important regional
differences. For example, many officers serving
the Navajo Nation are native speakers, while it is
exceedingly rare for officers serving reservations
in North Dakota to speak an appropriate native
language. Most of the approximately 33 percent
of officers who were not Native American were
Caucasian, but in some areas, particularly the
Southwest, Hispanics predominated. Twelve percent
of the police officers in the departments we surveyed
were women.
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A final, important observation is that many depart-
ments we visited and surveyed had additional assis-
tance from local ranger programs. These programs
are not part of the Federal model; that is, they are
not a generic component of Indian police depart-
ments, and rangers are not generally formal staff
members of a department. Instead, the programs
are locally generated, quasi-official components of
reservation criminal justice systems. They appear to
have evolved where coverage needs or community
concerns required additional service that the police
department itself did not provide. In some cases,
rangers provide services driven by the rural charac-
ter of reservations, including range and wildlife
management. In these cases, their function is close
to that of fish and game officers. In other cases,
their services are only indirectly tied to the rural
features of reservations and are driven more by
regional crime issues, such as illegal immigration
and drug smuggling on the Tohono O’odham reser-
vation and criminal trespass on the Gila River reser-
vation. In these instances, rangers also assume some
responsibilities of Federal law enforcement agencies.
Because of the programs’ extremely local origins,
rangers’ roles and responsibilities vary from tribe to
tribe, although in every case the presence of rangers
obliquely increases the personnel resources of their
local police department.
Facilities and Equipment
During site visits, we saw substantial evidence
that the physical resources supporting Indian police
departments and their employees were either inade-
quate or designed in a manner that made them impos-
sible to use efficiently. For example, while the
square footage of police facilities reported by police
departments participating in our survey is on a par
with national averages and recommendations, the
space is neither well designed nor in satisfactory
condition to support police activities (see also
Kaestle 1989; Pilant 1995). In most cases, waiting
rooms for the public are rare, areas that staff can
use to write reports are cramped or nonexistent, and
amenities for officers (such as lockers and changing
facilities) are virtually nonexistent. Computer capa-
bilities are outmoded, deficient, or absent. Many
vehicle fleets are at least 3 years old. Indeed, most
of the facilities we inspected were so old (the typi-
cal building is 20 or more years old) and in such
poor condition that they could not adequately 
support a modern, progressive police department.
Finally, as has been widely reported elsewhere, jail
and detention facilities are also inadequate (LeBeau
1998; Office of the Inspector General 1996). In our
survey, almost two-thirds of all departments reported
that their jail and detention space was overcrowded.
At most sites we visited, the jail facilities were too
small, poorly designed, or in poor repair.
Funding
Although several recent research and policy efforts
have cited limited funds as a formidable problem
for police departments in Indian Country (including
Executive Committee for Indian Country Law
Enforcement Improvements 1997), assessing the
degree of inadequacy of these resources is some-
what complicated. While we generally agree that
a lack of funding presents an important obstacle to
good policing in Indian Country, we also found
that available data were sometimes inadequate and
sometimes pointed to multiple, conflicting conclu-
sions.7 In the discussion below, we use three refer-
ence points—officers per 1,000 residents, dollars
spent on law enforcement per capita, and dollars
spent per employee—to provide a fuller understand-
ing of the resources available to departments in
Indian Country (see exhibit 6).
● Officers per 1,000 residents.This index com-
pares police coverage in Indian Country to cover-
age in non-Indian communities, both rural and
urban. Our survey findings essentially support
the U.S. Department of Justice estimate that
the ratio of police officers to residents in Indian
Country is 1.3 per thousand (Executive Committee
1997, 6). However, the assertion that this ratio
represents half the level of police coverage in
comparable non-Indian communities is not con-
sistently supported across data sources. For com-
munities of less than 10,000 population, the FBI
(1997) reported 2.9 officers per 1,000 inhabitants
in 1996, but other Federal data contradict this
estimate. For example, the BJS census of State
and local law enforcement agencies indicates that
the 1996 ratio hovered between 1.8 and 2.0 in
predominantly rural States like South Dakota,
North Dakota, and Montana (Reaves and
Goldberg 1998, 4).8
Comparable Comparable Non- 
Non-Indian Jurisdictions: National Indian Jurisdictions:
Indian Country Small, Rural Average High Crime 
Officers per 1.3 1.8–2.0 2.3 3.9–6.6
1,000 residents
Law enforcement $83 $104 $131 N/A
dollars per capita
Dollars spent $36,000 $43,400 $48,200 N/A
per employee
Data sources: Executive Committee for Indian Country Law Enforcement Improvements 1997; Federal Bureau of Investigation 1997; Reaves 1996;
Reaves and Goldberg 1998.
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● Law enforcement dollars per capita.This figure
provides an index of the total financial resources
available to the community to provide law enforce-
ment services. The Indian communities respond-
ing to our survey spent approximately $83 in
public safety funds on each resident. In contrast,
non-Indian communities with populations between
10,000 and 25,000 spent approximately $104 on
each resident. If Indian Country compares best
to communities at the lower end of this range, it
might be assumed that the difference is overesti-
mated, but even for smaller non-Indian communi-
ties (with population 2,500–10,000) the figure is
$101 (Reaves 1996, 7).
● Dollars spent per employee.This provides an
index of the “support” employees, particularly
officers, receive in terms of salaries (and perhaps
in terms of equipment, facilities, and training)
and the ability of the tribe or department to pay
salaries sufficient to recruit and retain highly
qualified officers. We found that tribes spend sig-
nificantly less per employee than their non-Indian
counterparts. The average operating expenditure
per employee for the tribes responding to our sur-
vey was approximately $36,000, compared with
approximately $43,400 for non-Indian depart-
ments serving communities of between 10,000
and 25,000 residents (Reaves 1996, 7). The
national average is even higher.9 Direct data on
officer salaries provide additional information.
Our survey responses suggest that pay for officers
in medium-sized to large tribes is higher than for
the smaller Indian police departments described
by Luna and Walker (1998) but slightly lower
than the pay that entry-level officers receive in
communities of comparable size ($21,200 to
$24,600) (Reaves 1996, 8). The salaries of offi-
cers in Indian police departments are also highly
variable. The range in our sample was as low as
$13,000 and as high as $32,000.10 Some observers
believe that tribes inflate the salaries they report
in such surveys, but it is unclear why tribes would
want to present evidence of a large resource base
while arguing vigorously for increased funding.
In summary, existing data suggest that tribes have
between 55 and 80 percent of the resource base
available to non-Indian communities. But, for three
important reasons, we believe the terms used in this
comparison may underestimate the actual budgetary
needs of police departments in Indian Country.
First, and most important, the appropriate police
coverage (police officers per thousand residents)
comparison may not be between Indian departments
and departments serving communities of similar size,
but between Indian departments and communities
with similar crime and social problems. Given that
the violent crime rate in Indian Country is between
double and triple the national average (Greenfeld
and Smith 1999, 2), comparable communities would
be large urban areas with high violent crime rates
and attendant social problems. Such communities—
for example, Baltimore, Detroit, New York City, and
Washington, D.C.—feature high police-to-citizen
ratios, from 3.9 to 6.6 officers per thousand residents
(Bureau of Justice Statistics 1998, 39, table 1.28;
276–278, table 3.118). This comparison suggests
that the resource differential between Indian and
non-Indian departments is significantly greater than
the above estimate.
Exhibit 6. Resources Available to Police Departments in Indian Country
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Second, a particularly important factor in providing
police coverage in Indian Country—the immense
size of many western reservations—is not reflected
in the above estimates. On reservations where the
area patrolled is large and the tribal community
widely distributed, it is necessary to account for the
distances that must be traveled to provide adequate
police coverage. Service calls in remote areas of all
four reservations we studied intensively could occu-
py a police officer for half a day or longer, especial-
ly in inclement weather. Making police officers as
available in Indian communities as they are else-
where would require resources above and beyond
those necessary to rectify the differences noted in
this discussion.
Finally, the ratios fail to recognize that capital budg-
ets for policing are exceedingly uncommon in Indian
Country. The absence of capital budgets is particu-
larly significant for large western reservations. The
great distances that police must travel increase the
need for facilities and technology (such infrastruc-
ture as substations and sophisticated communica-
tions technology) that improve the ability of police
to serve large areas and are appropriately financed
through capital budgets. Frequently, operating budg-
ets appear to be the only means available to depart-
ments to finance and support infrastructure (we were
unable to confirm this through a review of police
and tribal budgets, however). This shortfall, invisible
in the ratios given above, leads to a problem cited
earlier in this section: The facilities and technology
that support Indian Country police officers are often
in poor repair or otherwise inadequate.
Furthermore, capital budget deficiencies extend to
other components of the criminal justice system,
and they also have a direct negative effect on the
quality of policing. Detention facilities and the serv-
ices such facilities often support, such as alcohol-
treatment programs, are an instructive example:
Both are wanting (see LeBeau 1998). Thus, officers
who attempt to develop a proactive response to a
household where alcohol abuse generates repeat
calls for service (for child neglect or domestic 
violence, for example) often must substitute a brief
stay in an overcrowded, outdated jail for alcohol
treatment. The result is an uninterrupted demand
by that household for police services. In sum, the
investment necessary to put the physical infrastruc-
ture of Indian Country criminal justice systems on
par with their non-Native counterparts is substantial.
A Closer Look at Four Indian Police
Departments
The Indian Country police department described
thus far is one that is attempting to cope with an
increasing workload in terms of both community
demands and crime, and is attempting to do so with
a significantly limited resource base. In fact, this
characterization does not capture the severity or
complexity of the challenges to policing in Indian
Country. This section strives to complete the picture
by providing contextual detail. It describes pressing
problems with the operation, organization, and man-
agement of police departments in Indian Country
through profiles of the departments and tribes we
studied in depth.  
Briefly, we find that although many problems occur
on the level of day-to-day operations (for example,
poor direct supervision, poorly developed policies
and procedures, poor pre- and inservice training), the
most prevalent problems point forcefully to an addi-
tional and more significant issue: police departments
serving Indian nations face critical institutional
design challenges. The descriptions that follow high-
light how the problems Indian police departments
face are tied to the ways in which these departments
relate to the communities they serve and to the fact
that tribes have yet to recreate the police function
in terms of their specific needs, priorities, and
resources.11 The discussions introduce the remainder
of this report, which considers more fully the issue of
the institutional design of police departments serving
Indian reservations.
We preface these profiles by noting that the tribes
and departments described have made and are mak-
ing remarkable progress. In response to the prob-
lems described below, the Tohono O’odham Nation
has remade its department. Likewise, by investing
tribal government resources in policing, the Gila
River Indian Community has taken significant steps
toward building its own police department, one
that can serve its community better. The Flathead
department is among the best managed departments
in Indian Country, and Fort Berthold’s efforts with
29
regard to community policing are among the most
ambitious.
Tohono O’odham Nation
The first tribe we studied intensively was the
Tohono O’odham Nation, in extreme south central
Arizona. Located in the arid, but beautiful, Sonoran
Desert, the Tohono O’odham reservation is charac-
terized not only by the desert landscape but also by
seasonal monsoons and towering mountain ranges.
The Nation is among the largest in the United States,
consisting of almost 2.9 million acres, an area about
the size of Connecticut.12 The size, landscape, cli-
mate, and population distribution present many con-
trasts to typical urban policing; for example, some
residences in remote areas can be reached only by
horseback and may not be accessible at all during
monsoons. The reservation shares approximately 80
miles of border with Mexico and the international
border actually splits the Nation. A significant num-
ber of tribal members live in Mexico and move
freely across the border. Tribal enrollment is 17,500;
approximately 14,000 of these members live on the
reservation. The seat of the Nation’s government
and its population center is the town of Sells, with
approximately 7,000 residents.
The Tohono O’odham Nation is relatively unassimi-
lated; native language use and other evidence of the
retention of tradition are high. Tribal gatherings and
meetings strongly reflect important cultural attrib-
utes of talking things out and reaching consensus.
Traditional tribal ceremonies are well attended. The
Nation’s chief executive and legislative council are
popularly elected. The primary political subdivi-
sions are districts, with each of the Nation’s 11 dis-
tricts electing two representatives to the council. In
addition, each district elects a district chairperson,
whose role is roughly analogous to that of a mayor.
Districts and villages play a substantial role in
reservation life; the majority of tribal members we
interviewed said they identified with their village
first, their district second, and the Nation third.13
The Tohono O’odham entered into a 638 contract to
administer their police department in October 1982,
which makes it one of the first tribes to acquire 
control over its police department from the Federal
Government. We first visited the tribe and observed
the operation of its police department during the
summer and early winter of 1996. The department
had 55 positions for sworn officers, which made it,
on paper, one of the largest Indian Country police
departments; at that time, however, 20 (40 percent)
of these positions were unfilled. In addition, the
department had approximately 20 civilian employ-
ees and 11 detention officers. The department also
had a large budget relative to most departments in
Indian Country: $7 million in 1996, which was per-
haps the highest in Indian Country regardless of the
population served (and much more than a non-
Indian department of comparable size).
In sum, the department had a number of advantages:
It existed amidst a relatively strong tribal culture
that invigorated tribal norms and values, was backed
by a lengthy period of direct tribal control of the
police department, and had the support of a gener-
ous budget. Despite these advantages, crime on
the reservation seemed to be increasing rapidly,
turnover at the department’s executive and staff
levels was high, and the department’s credibility
was suffering from severe management problems.
Although we emphasize that these were the prob-
lems in the Tohono O’odham department of 1996
and that the situation has improved dramatically
since that time,14 we choose to focus on the depart-
ment as it was then because the challenges it faced
are typical of the challenges that confront depart-
ments throughout Indian Country today.
At the time of our first visit, a major cluster of
problems for the Tohono O’odham police depart-
ment concerned day-to-day operations. The acting
chief, who had been with the department for more
than 10 years, could not produce such basic documen-
tation as personnel files and policy and procedure
manuals, nor in the course of our many conversa-
tions could he recall with any degree of specificity
recent modifications or revisions to department poli-
cies. This was also the case with the department’s
second in command. In addition, all of the patrol
officers we interviewed stated that they could not
recall using or being instructed to use departmental
manuals, although they assured us the manuals
existed. Casual attitudes regarding written policies
and procedures are not unusual in the small depart-
ments we have visited, where important policies and
procedures can be easily communicated in roll calls
and other meetings or through informal channels.
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However, the officers we spoke with could not
recall any regular practice of communicating and
reinforcing departmental policies and procedures.
The lack of attention to basic policies and proce-
dures had a wide range of effects on a department’s
operation and on its relations with the community.
Some were disturbing, but relatively minor; for
example, families of some detainees and inmates
were refused visits during regular visiting hours,
but others were permitted visits during nonvisiting
hours. We attributed much of this to an overcrowded
jail that put tremendous pressure on detention staff.
Some effects, however, were clearly more serious;
interviews with representatives of other tribal
criminal justice agencies (including those normally
friendly to police) revealed that the failure to main-
tain and enforce departmental policies and procedures
had severe consequences for both the department
and the community. In the previous year, high-speed
pursuits had led to tragic and (in the view of many
tribal members and agency representatives) avoid-
able automobile crashes. Nevertheless, department
representatives were unable to produce for review
either old or new policies and procedures regarding
high-speed chases. Interviewees noted that the lack
of policies and procedures handicapped even the
best-intentioned officers, who were forced to work
without useful guidelines for critical police activi-
ties. Conversely, it was difficult to hold negligent
officers accountable when clear standards were not
in place. Our interviews indicated that this lack of
accountability had seriously compromised the credi-
bility of the department, not only among its crimi-
nal justice agency partners, but also with the tribal
community.
During subsequent visits we learned that these 
problems were not unusual, but were emblematic of
department management and operations. As is the
case with many departments in crisis, the number
and extent of the problems had increasingly isolated
the organization from the community (Sparrow,
Moore, and Kennedy 1990). As the department
became increasingly insular, its focus on crime
problems became the product more of its own priori-
ties than of those of the community. Interviews
with members of the department and members of
the community suggested a mismatch both between
police and community priorities and between police
and community perceptions of the role of police in
community life. Police complained that tribal mem-
bers were pressuring them to pay too much atten-
tion to such “low-level” problems as disputes
between neighbors, school-age children, and family
members—problems that formerly would have been
settled at either the village or the district level. On
the other hand, community members complained
that police officers were concerned only with such
activities as chasing bootleggers and drug smug-
glers. Community members often acknowledged
that these and other conventional police activities
were important—that they constituted “real” police
business—but they also stated that they needed
someone who would help them with their problems.
This public frustration contributed to the growth of
a popular but controversial quasi-official component
of the criminal justice system: district-administered
ranger programs. At the time of our first visit in
1996, several districts had already instituted such
programs, and other districts were demanding fund-
ing from the tribal government to start them. The
Tohono O’odham ranger program originally began
by patrolling outlying villages and remote areas.
Rangers described themselves as the eyes and ears
of the police department; they were not permitted to
interact with or detain potential suspects but func-
tioned mostly to reassure residents that they were
safe and to respond to the emergencies and needs of
elderly or isolated residents. At Tohono O’odham, it
may be that the dynamic driving the growth of the
ranger program was similar to that driving the growth
of private security services in non-Indian communi-
ties in the 1970s and 1980s (Sparrow, Moore, and
Kennedy 1990, 47–50). The poor performance and
increasing isolation of the police department precip-
itated a loss of market share to rangers, who were
managed on the district level and were directly
accountable to the district chairperson. In effect,
rangers were seen as more responsive than police
officers to the needs of residents.
To some extent, the diminished credibility of the
police department was both the cause and a result
of the growing problem of recruiting and retaining
qualified officers. As already noted, approximately
40 percent of the funded patrol positions were
unfilled when we first visited. Historically, the abili-
ty of tribal candidates to complete certified police
training academies had been limited. Prior to 1996,
40 to 90 percent of Tohono O’odham recruits failed
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to complete a certified training program (depending
on the year or class of recruits).15 Our interviews
suggested that the problem that most plagued young
recruits from the Tohono O’odham Nation was the
inability to complete the academic modules of
law enforcement certification courses.16 Tribal and
department leadership attributed this to a lack of
well-developed study habits necessary to survive the
highly regimented program. They also felt that many
O’odham youth at the police academy were away
from family and friends for the first time and that
they were ill-prepared for this intense exposure to 
a new, sometimes hostile culture.
In summary, the management issues that most
plagued the Tohono O’odham department in 1996
were a lack of day-to-day attention to departmental
policies and procedures, a disconnect between
police and community priorities, and difficulties
in recruiting and training officers. While the depart-
ment has made tremendous strides toward resolving
these problems, they are generally widespread in
Indian Country.
The Gila River Indian Community
The second tribe we visited was the nearby Gila
River Indian Community, which is located on
372,000 acres immediately south of Phoenix,
Arizona, one of the fastest growing urban areas in
the United States. Despite the proximity of Phoenix,
however, the geography of the reservation is rural:
Villages are spread across the reservation, and much
of the desert land is accessible only by off-road
vehicles. In 1994, the Gila River Enrollment Office
counted approximately 11,550 enrolled members;
in 1996, approximately the same number of Indians
lived on the reservation itself, making it, population-
wise, the fourth largest reservation in Arizona and
sixth largest in the United States. Although the
Gila River reservation was established by an Act
of Congress in 1859, the ancestors of Community
members have been residents of south central
Arizona for hundreds of years. The group is for-
mally called a “community” because members of
two tribes call the reservation home: the Akimel
O’odham (“the River People,” formerly known as
the Pima) and the Pee-Posh (also known as the
Maricopa). The Akimel O’odham, the larger of
the two tribes, is closely related to the Tohono
O’odham (“the Desert People”), discussed above.
The Community’s proximity to Phoenix and other
smaller cities (Chandler, Casa Grande, Coolidge)
has both positive and negative ramifications. For
example, when the Community entered the gaming
business in the mid-1990s, its access to a large urban
market provided quick and enduring financial suc-
cess. Profits from the gaming enterprise fund a sig-
nificant fraction of tribal government operations
and give Gila River opportunities that many other
Native nations do not have. On the other hand, the
Gila River Indian Community also suffers from
many problems that are typically considered “urban,”
including youth gang involvement and a high rate
of violent crime. In the mid-1990s, reservation crime
rates caused Gila River to be known as one of the
most crime-ridden Indian communities in the United
States. The ready influence of non-Indian society
has also led to a greater loss of tradition and cul-
tural practices than at Tohono O’odham, although
efforts are being made to revive traditions and lan-
guage and, especially, to expose children to them.
The Gila River Indian Community has an elected
governor, lieutenant governor, and 17-member
Community Council, as well as an appointed com-
munity manager. The seat of the Community gov-
ernment is Sacaton, a small town approximately 
25 miles from central Phoenix. The reservation is
divided into seven districts, each with an elected
district leader, a district council, and a district serv-
ice center coordinator. Like Tohono O’odham’s, the
Akimel O’odham culture emphasizes talking things
out, a characteristic that is reflected in the many
meetings held at all levels of tribal government.
The police department at Gila River has a tumul-
tuous history. When our research began in mid-
1996, the department was a BIA department,
headed by a BIA police captain (equivalent to a
police chief in a municipal police department),
who was responsible to an acting Pima Agency
Superintendent in Sacaton. Although the tribe had
run the department for a brief period in the 1970s,
law enforcement was returned to the BIA, reported-
ly because some non-BIA sources of Federal fund-
ing were no longer available. In subsequent years,
police captains came and went, with acting captains
filling in the gaps. During the same period, crime at
Gila River was increasing and becoming more vio-
lent, and the jail became known for its overcrowded,
unsanitary, and unsafe conditions.17
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In response to the growing crime problem and fears
that the BIA department had too few resources to
meet community needs, the tribal government creat-
ed two additional entities to provide law enforce-
ment services—the rangers and the reserves. The
rangers operated briefly in the 1970s and were reor-
ganized in the 1990s under the auspices of the Gila
River Indian Community Department of Land and
Water Resources. The reason for this reporting
structure was twofold: First, it acknowledged that
one of the rangers’ primary functions was to protect
the natural and cultural resources of the Gila River
Community; second, it was a way to work outside
of the BIA to increase the police presence on the
reservation. In practice, the rangers’ job was to
patrol and police the vast off-road areas of the reser-
vation and cover for and back up regular police
officers. While they carried a tribal commission to
enforce tribal ordinances (all civil offenses), it was
not unusual for them to encounter criminal offenses.
In these situations, they held the offenders until BIA
or county police arrived, confiscated weapons or
property, transported or accompanied the offenders
to the reservation boundary, or just asked the
offenders to leave. Although the rangers’ authority
was sometimes questioned (usually by violators or
off-reservation police), at the time of our initial
visits, they had become a regular and accepted law
enforcement presence in the Community.
The reserves’ role was somewhat different. They 
provided additional coverage to police officers and
rangers who would otherwise work alone. This was
backup that Community members deemed neces-
sary, given the amount of crime and violence on
the reservation. Reserves also provided security
services at public events (especially dances), since
police officers could not be spared routinely for
those details.
In addition to commissioning the rangers and
reserves, the Community began a further effort to
improve policing: It renewed attempts to 638 the
BIA department. Initially, the tribal government
assigned responsibility for the 638 process to the
Law Enforcement Commission, a body whose origi-
nal charge was to hear complaints by Community
members against the police as well as concerns of
police officers about their department. Commission
members found their liaison and advisory roles to
be clear—but the 638 assignment was not. The
Commission received a contract from the BIA to
hire a consultant to assist with the process, and the
consultant drafted a 638 application, but by late
1995, progress had broken down. The Commission
felt it lacked appropriate administrative assistance
from the tribal government for creating the neces-
sary policies and structures to support the proposed
police department. It wanted to hire a police chief,
who would oversee the 638 process and thereby
establish his own department. Others in tribal gov-
ernment wanted to hire a 638 consultant to handle
the process. In the midst of this debate, pressure for
improved policing became especially intense, and
the Community government decided to invest some
of its newly gained gaming income in the hiring of
20 tribal police officers—that is, officers who were
hired and paid by the tribe, but incorporated into the
BIA department and supervised by its captain.
When we arrived in August 1996 for a second visit,
authority, communication, and administration prob-
lems in the department were evident and, in some
cases, growing. For example, a new BIA captain
had just been assigned to Gila River, the acting
Pima Agency BIA superintendent was about to be
replaced by a permanent superintendent, and the 20
new tribal police officers were beginning to return
from training and integrate into the force. While
reporting structures and relationships were clear on
paper, they were being tested in practice. The previ-
ous acting captain had reverted to his rank of ser-
geant. Communications from the captain down to
the officers generally occurred in three ways: through
the three sergeants, through memos placed in the
officers’ department mailboxes, or through memos
pinned to the squadroom bulletin board. But at this
point, there were no formal roll calls. Furthermore,
officers who lived on the reservation took their
cruisers home and started their shifts in their cars by
radioing to the dispatcher, so that timely receipt of
the memos was hit-or-miss. Administrative record-
keeping was in disarray,18 and accountability within
the department (from officers to sergeants and from
sergeants to the captain) was weak. Although the
new captain hoped to make some important changes
in community relations (and knew that Gila River
was likely to enter into a 638 contract), he felt that
the administrative problems came first; he saw
his first task as “grabbing hold administratively.”
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Community perceptions were that the department
was still in poor shape, although residents hoped
that “their officers” would make things better. Most
saw eventual tribal management as the only way to
both solve the ongoing management problems and
improve the quality of policing.
Even so, 638 progress remained slow. By the time
of our final visit in 1998, the tribe had removed the
Law Enforcement Commission from the core of the
process and appointed a five-person 638 committee
to prepare the required application. The committee
was headed by the assistant community manager
and included a tribal attorney, the chairman of the
Law Enforcement Commission, an economic devel-
opment planner, and a program planner. In addition,
a police consultant from San Jose was hired to work
with the committee.
Meanwhile, some change occurred at the depart-
ment level, although new problems arose. The
police captain who had arrived in mid-1996 was
transferred from the Gila River Indian Community
and replaced by an acting captain—a criminal
investigator who would report directly to the BIA
Phoenix Area Office, rather than to the Pima Agency
Superintendent. The removal of the captain was not
related to the 638 process; however, the continuing
turmoil in the department and the need to prepare
the department for tribal management occasioned
the specific assignment of the criminal investigator
to Gila River. He made substantial progress in putting
the department in order. Procedures were more for-
malized than they had been, greater accountability
was established, and preparations were made for the
department and its personnel to shift from BIA to
tribal administration.19 Nevertheless, before the 638
application was accepted and departmental prepa-
rations were complete, the supervising criminal
investigator was reassigned, purportedly because
the Gila River planners objected to his BIA chain of
command—reporting to the Area Office in Phoenix,
rather than to the Pima Agency Superintendent in
Sacaton.
On August 10, 1998, the Gila River Indian Com-
munity, its 638 contract with the BIA in place,
assumed managerial control of its police department.
A member of the department, who had moved from
BIA to tribal police earlier in the year and was then
promoted to sergeant, was named acting police
director while applicants for the permanent position
were being considered.
From at least the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s,
police management at Gila River was driven by
crises: personnel turnover, increasing crime (espe-
cially increasing violent crime), a sense of urgency
to increase the size of the department, and pressure
to develop a 638 contract. The series of short-term
and acting BIA captains in the Gila River Police
Department and the fractured 638 process were
indicative of (and perhaps also a result of) a depart-
ment in turmoil. Although Gila River’s government
responded decisively to the problems by hiring
additional officers and building new facilities and,
eventually, by developing a 638 contract, it did not
focus on comprehensive or strategic planning. For
Gila River (as for other tribes), the most opportune
time to develop such capacities would have been
during the 638 application process.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes live
on the Flathead Indian Reservation, which is locat-
ed on 1.2 million acres in northwestern Montana
(north of Missoula and south of Kalispell and
Glacier National Park, in the Mission Valley).20
Although the Tribes owned about 22 million acres
in the early 1800s, many lands within the reserva-
tion were lost to homesteaders after the Hell Gate
Treaty of 1855. The current land ownership pattern
is best described as a checkerboard, although the
Confederated Tribes have been aggressively repur-
chasing lands since at least the 1940s. The Tribes
and tribal members currently own more than 51 per-
cent of the land within the reservation’s boundaries.
Because of the history of homesteading, more non-
Indians than Indians now reside on the reservation.
The reservation population comprises approximate-
ly 18,000 non-Indians, compared with 4,100 tribal
members and 2,000 other Indians. Another 2,700
enrolled members live off-reservation. This mix of
tribal and nontribal residents creates an even greater
jurisdictional complexity than exists on most other
reservations. In addition to the State and tribal
police, for example, four counties (Flathead, Lake,
Missoula, and Sanders) and four municipalities (Hot
Springs, Polson, Ronan, and St. Ignatius) operate
their own law enforcement agencies within the
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reservation boundaries. The governmental seat
of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
including its police department, is in Pablo.
The governing body of the Confederated Tribes is
the Tribal Council, which includes 10 members
from 8 districts. The Council chairperson, who is
elected from and by the 10 members, is the Tribes’
chief executive, although the Council also hires an
executive secretary to oversee many government
departments, including Law and Order (the police
department). The BIA had a strong presence on the
reservation until the mid-1970s, but today its pres-
ence and influence are extremely limited. For exam-
ple, the Salish and Kootenai police department
operates under a self-governance compact (see chap-
ter 2), an arrangement in which BIA involvement is
minimal.
At the time of our visits in mid-1997, the police
chief had been with the department for 25 years.
He first joined as an officer (one of only four) and
4 years later was promoted to chief. Ten years later,
the department still had only six officers. In 1986,
in the wake of local protests over water rates, the
department hired five more officers. Just before the
1994 retrocession agreement (described in greater
detail below) was implemented, another five offi-
cers were hired. As of 1997, the department includ-
ed 17 sworn positions (including 2 vacancies): 11
patrol officers, 2 investigators (one of whom was
on detail to a regional narcotics task force), 2 ser-
geants, 1 lieutenant, and 1 police chief. All sworn
officers, except the drug task force officer, were
tribal members. The department also included 13
civilians—5 jailers, 6 dispatchers, 1 clerk, and 1
cook—among whom there was considerable overlap
of duties and job sharing. For example, the clerk
was once a dispatcher-jailer in the department and
sometimes still filled in as dispatcher, jailer, or cook;
in addition, because she had been trained to inter-
view child victims of sexual abuse and female vic-
tims of domestic violence, she could assist both the
police department and social services in their inves-
tigative duties. Also, some of the civilians had
attended the police academy.
In contrast to most of the other facilities we visited,
the Salish and Kootenai police headquarters and
jail were exceptionally clean and orderly. Neverthe-
less, the police chief was concerned about poor
conditions for the inmates: They were isolated in
their cells, had little to do, rarely saw the light of
day, and had only occasional access to a very small
exercise yard. Meals were delivered to cells because
there was no common area in which the inmates
could gather. However, managers of the Salish and
Kootenai facility were not struggling with over-
crowding,21 poor sanitary conditions, or violence.
In general, the Tribal Council and tribal administra-
tion have strongly supported the police department,
evidenced in part by departmental budget alloca-
tions. Although most of the department’s funding
comes from the Tribes’ BIA funds (in 1997,
$1,228,686 came from BIA funds and $11,546
directly from the Tribes), the virtue of compacting
(as opposed to contracting) is that the tribal govern-
ment sets budget priorities and allocates funds. The
police department, like other departments, submits its
budget request to the tribal government. Then, the
Confederated Tribes’ Office of Administration and
Budget creates an overall tribal budget, the Council
approves allocations, and financial officers disburse
funds. According to the police chief, fiscal year
1997 was the first year in which the department
received less than it had requested.
By most accounts and by our own observation, the
Salish and Kootenai police department is a well-run,
professional department. The department is well
connected to the tribal government for oversight
purposes, has been increasing in size consistent
with community needs, boasts an extremely compe-
tent and generally well-liked staff, and is concerned
about the traditional problems under its purview.
Yet, we also observed that, institutionally, the
department has been struggling to respond to sever-
al opportunities for improving the already high
quality of policing it has offered the community.
For example, the department installed a new com-
puter system, Swift Justice, shortly before the site
visits began in 1997. It provides officers with
report-writing software, which allows new incident
data to be immediately incorporated into the sys-
tem, links the data with jail and dispatch informa-
tion, and offers improved storage and reporting
functions. While department personnel were gener-
ally pleased with the transition to the new system
and its capacities, both officers and prosecutors
missed the traditional access to paper reports for
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reviewing cases. Prosecutors, in particular, suffered
from the limited information flow. They had been
accustomed to learning about cases promptly by
looking through a basket of reports as they (the
prosecutors) passed through the police department,
but the new computer system, to which the prosecu-
tors were not linked, eliminated these hard copies.
Nevertheless, the new system allows the department
to produce incident reports, monthly and annual
reports, and other analyses more quickly and effi-
ciently than it had before. The department clerk
manages the system, creating the reports and pro-
viding technical assistance to the officers. It is
unclear, however, whether the available statistics
are used by the chief or others to determine or
change departmental strategy. In other words, oppor-
tunities for better institutional linkage between the
police department and the prosecutors office and
for improved strategic planning may have been
bypassed.
The retrocession agreement is a second example
of challenges faced by the department. Signed by
the State of Montana, the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes, and all the jurisdictions (except
Lake County) within the reservation boundaries,22
the agreement cedes “exclusive jurisdiction over
misdemeanor crimes committed by Indians” back
to the Tribes.23 This right had been withdrawn from
the Confederated Tribes under the provisions of
PL 83–280 (which subjected many Indian nations
to the criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction of the
States). 
Retrocession engendered a flood of new police
activity. Calls to the department nearly doubled
between 1993 and 1996, from 4,109 to 7,049. To its
credit, the Salish and Kootenai department adjust-
ed well to its increase in size and activity level, as
well as to the new jurisdictional rules. Salish and
Kootenai officers reported (and we observed) that
they worked well with officers from the other juris-
dictions, even the Lake County deputies (although
on an administrative level, Lake County and the
Confederated Tribesdid not have a warm relation-
ship).24 Even so, the retrocession agreement contin-
ues to implicitly challenge the department to move
beyond reliance on rapid-response policing to
rethinking its strategy and role in the community.
Another challenge was noted at the time of our
site visits. Although the department had been run-
ning smoothly, both community members and the
Tribal Council were starting to ask for a new police
strategy—they were explicitly asking the depart-
ment to become more involved in and establish bet-
ter relationships with the community. In July 1997,
as part of the budget process, the Council sent memo-
randa to all departments, specifying its expectations.
According to the police chief, the Council always
had asked departments to write a list of goals as
part of the budget process, but this was the first
time that the Council had given a return list of
expectations. For the police department, the Council
requested the following:
● A focus on community law enforcement work,
rather than traffic enforcement.25
● A focus on community relations, to build trust
and relationships.
● Presence at tribal and community activities.
At the same time, some communities were asking
for more police presence and involvement. One
community at the southern end of the reservation,
Arlee, had been experiencing vandalism and other
crimes by juveniles, including a bank robbery. Its
residents were asking that individual officers be
responsible for specific geographical areas, rather
than “running from community to community.”
Some tribal members even suggested that officers
live in the specific communities they policed. At an
Arlee community meeting in August 1997, the com-
munity learned that it would get a resident officer—
not by departmental design but by the fortuitous
relocation of a new officer. This officer had retired
from a police department in another State, owned
land in Arlee, and had just been hired by the Salish
and Kootenai department. At the meeting, he
expressed his intention to be available to the Arlee
community—in the schools, at community activi-
ties, and in the neighborhood crime watch group.
He also challenged a Lake County deputy sheriff
who attended the meeting and lived in Arlee to do
the same (according to residents’ private comments,
however, this deputy sheriff had not been, and was
not likely to be, either visible or responsive to their
requests). Although the tribal officer could not
promise to be the neighborhood patrol officer (the
police department had said it could not give any
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community its own officer), he did take the initia-
tive to commit himself to an ongoing relationship
with his community, one that would take him
beyond his working hours to bring the presence of
a concerned police officer into the neighborhood.
We found it notable that a police officer, especially a
new one, felt free to make this commitment; he was
stepping outside the bounds of Confederated Tribes
police practice but must have felt that his chief
would support him.
Although the Salish and Kootenai police department
is responsive, stable, and generally well respected,
at the time of our site visits, it was facing new chal-
lenges. Most striking were the Council’s expecta-
tions, which seemed to reflect community concerns
and suggested the need for a new policing strategy.
With the encouragement of the Council and the
community, the department was poised to use these
new challenges as an opportunity to think strategi-
cally and develop a policing style even more tightly
bound to the Tribes’ institutions, priorities, values,
and needs.
Three Affiliated Tribes
The Three Affiliated Tribes (the Mandan, Hidatsa,
and Arikara) live on the Fort Berthold Reservation
in west-central North Dakota. Tribal membership is
approximately 10,000, of whom 4,000 live on the
reservation. The Tribes have developed a modest
gambling enterprise, but poor economic conditions
predominate. The geography of this area presents
a striking contrast to the desert landscapes of the
Tohono O’odham and Gila River reservations and
the mountainous vistas of the Flathead reservation:
The Fort Berthold Reservation occupies approxi-
mately 1 million acres of softly rolling wheat fields
and prairies. About 11 percent of the reservation is
covered by Lake Sakakawea, which was formed by
the Garrison Dam in the early 1950s. The lake not
only split the reservation, but also drove the Tribes
from the fertile, protected banks of the Missouri
River to the surrounding windblown prairie. In the
summer, heat encourages residents to take advan-
tage of the cool lakeside, but in winter, long periods
of extreme cold and blizzards can slow travel and
isolate residents. In brief, the size of the reserva-
tion, its geography, and the seasonally intemperate
weather complicate the provision of police cover-
age. The sheer size of the reservation and the
presence of the lake mean that a single routine serv-
ice call to an outlying community can occupy an
officer for a substantial period. Poor winter weather
can isolate individual residences, and even entire
communities, for days at a time.
At the time of our site visits (in 1996, 1997, and
1998), the Three Affiliated Tribes police department
was a BIA-managed “split” department, comprised
of BIA officers and tribal officers funded through
COPS grants. Indeed, leaders of this well-managed
department have relied on COPS officers to play a
critical role in assisting the department in address-
ing its steadily increasing workload. For example,
the increased police coverage these officers provide
helped the department head off a threat by the polit-
ical leadership in an outlying community to organ-
ize its own independently administered police
department. The need for COPS officers correctly
implies that the department has a limited resource
base (its 1998 budget was $1 million). Hiring tribal
officers is one of many adjustments the department
has made to cope with its lack of resources (most of
the other adjustments affect police operations).
Remarkably, these supervision and resource chal-
lenges did not deter the Three Affiliated Tribes
department from developing and using policies and
procedures for essential police practices (such as
background checks of new officers and standard-
ized disciplinary procedures). In fact, at the time of
our most recent visit, the department was develop-
ing new policies and procedures for a community-
oriented bicycle patrol in its most concentrated
population center, New Town. Department leader-
ship was eager to build on such practices to better
address crime in a proactive manner.
Even so, and even though the community exhibited
a higher level of satisfaction with its police depart-
ment than was present at other sites, there was little
congruence between the department’s conception of
its role in the community and the community’s con-
ception of that role. In interviews, tribal members
consistently focused on their desire for police to
employ methods built on tribal values and culture;
they felt that police could play a powerful role in
preserving and extending tribal values and culture
and that, in doing so, the police could more effec-
tively address crime. In this way, tribal members
seemed to be pressing police to expand their
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mission beyond fighting crime and to become an
institution equally concerned with maintaining and
contributing to social order.
The notion may have come to mind—and seemed
immediately logical—because of the existence of
a traditional society with precisely that purpose.
Almost every tribal member we interviewed brought
up the Black Mouth Society, an association of wise
and courageous older males who played a central
role in maintaining social order during pre- and
early reservation life (Bowers 1992; Gilman and
Schneider, 1987). One elder, now in her 90s, recalled
that as a child she was warned that if she didn’t
behave, her relatives and neighbors “would tell the
Black Mouths.” She recalled that a warning was
almost always enough.26
In contrast, most members of the police depart-
ment saw their role primarily in conventional law
enforcement terms. Officers talked regularly about
responding more quickly and efficiently to such
problems as gangs, violence, and substance abuse.
More to the point, the department was organized
and managed to address these conventional prob-
lems. This is to be expected in the context of an
apparently rapidly growing crime problem and sub-
stantial political pressure to respond to it. Indeed,
the Three Affiliated Tribes’ police department had
the strongest orientation to proactive strategies that
we were able to identify in the course of our study.
But department leadership said they were caught
between standard crime control tasks and communi-
ty demands to devote increased resources to preven-
tion, a dilemma made more acute by the department’s
limited resource base.
When we asked departmental and tribal representa-
tives why they had not entered their police function
into a 638 contract, they frequently replied that the
Tribes did not want to get into the “law enforcement
business.” Conceived of in this way, policing was
not a function that the Tribes’ political history and
culture had prepared them to adopt. Policing was
seen as a necessary accommodation to modern reser-
vation life, rather than as a means of maintaining
social order through the assertion of tribal values
and culture (the role played by the Black Mouth
Society). Given that the current 638 contracting
process does not invite a consideration of the police
function in these terms, but focuses instead on
ensuring the provision of a standard menu of police
services, it is not surprising that departmental and
tribal leaders did not view 638 as an opportunity
to reconsider the fundamental role of police in 
community life.
Of course, there were other reasons department
members did not fully support the possible transition
to tribal management. While they recognized that
their current approach to law enforcement distanced
them from the community, they also asserted that in
the volatile political context of tribal life, Federal
employment gave them the job security they needed
to perform their work in an independent, responsi-
ble manner, without the threat of political reprisals.
Such dynamics were evident in a heated dispute
overheard between two officers who were trying to
decide which one should arrest a prominent tribal
official: Should it be the BIA officer, a Federal
employee, who was in danger of only social
reprisals for arresting the official, or should it be the
COPS-funded officer, a tribal employee, who would
be in danger of not only social reprisals but also
economic ones?
Nonetheless, department leaders predicted that the
question of tribal involvement in the “law enforce-
ment business” would come to the fore in the near
future. Tribal leadership already objected to BIA
plans to shift line authority for policing away from
the local agency to the regional level (to the region-
al BIA Law Enforcement Division). They felt that
the loss of local control alone might push them to
638 their police function. If COPS funding was also
eliminated (resulting in a loss of police officers) and
crime problems were ongoing, the Tribes’ reluc-
tance to actively invest in law enforcement would
certainly be tested. 
In sum, the Three Affiliated Tribes face a challenge
common to communities in Indian Country—recon-
ciling policing with indigenous means of social
control. The next challenge is to redesign police
departments as core institutions of tribal government.
As at Flathead, community members’ requests for a




In the view of many researchers, policymakers, and
police professionals, reservation policing is in crisis.
In addition to the examples we describe, a thorough
audit of one of the largest police departments in
Indian Country, performed in 1996 by the BIA’s
Division of Law Enforcement Services, supports
this assertion. The audit identified problems that
were similar to—and in some cases more severe
than—those we found:
● Poor employee morale and high turnover resulted
in a lack of well-qualified and experienced officers.
● Basic departmental management was flawed (for
example, there was little effective direct supervi-
sion of officers and investigative practices were
poor).
● Inadequate budgets, fiscal mismanagement, and
even corruption created serious obstacles to the
effective delivery of important police services
and programs.
● Undue political interference in police operations
inhibited the ability of the police to perform their
duties in a fair and equitable manner and reduced
the credibility of the police in the eyes of the
community.
● These and other problems created widespread
and serious community dissatisfaction with the
police (Naranjo et al. 1996).
A number of special reports, commissions, confer-
ences, and blue-ribbon committees have grappled
with the problems that police departments in Indian
Country face and, in response, have offered a
number of recommendations and proposals. These
include increased funding, tightened management,
clarified reporting relationships, and updated tech-
nology (see Executive Committee 1997; Silverman
1996). Many of these responses are necessary to
improve policing in Indian Country, but they may
treat the symptoms, rather than the disease. Our
research, particularly the information gathered
through the case studies, suggests that many of the
problems with Indian Country policing have more
fundamental, institutional roots than the “typical
fixes” take into account. Further, we argue that
these problems do not originate in the contemporary
administration of policing by tribes. Rather, they
originate in the history and current administration of
Federal Indian policing policy. To better understand
this proposition, we turn next to an extended discus-
sion of the foundations of policing in Indian Country.
Notes
1. Interview at Mescalero Apache, March 1996.
2. As noted, the typical department has approximately
32 employees, 16 of whom are sworn officers. It serves a
large land area with a relatively small population, which
is located in both rural areas and more densely populated,
“semiurban” communities. Like most departments in
Indian Country, the typical department works with a lim-
ited resource base. It is administered either by the tribe
through a 638 contract or by the BIA.
3. Approximately 40 percent of all BIA-administered
departments in our survey reported that they employed
both tribal and BIA officers.
4. The Gila River Indian Community was a prominent
exception to this finding. Before the police department
was 638ed, tribal officers’ salaries were higher than those
of BIA officers due to a 20-percent salary increase given
to all tribal employees in September 1996. Federal retire-
ment benefits had not been matched, however.
5. The grants were designed to facilitate the implementa-
tion of community policing and, as such, were naturally
directed to local police departments. Therefore, Federal
agencies, such as BIA police departments, cannot apply
for COPS funding, and the new officers must be tribal
employees.
6. We note, however, that these numbers are moving tar-
gets. As tribes continue to pursue 638 contracts and self-
governance compacts, departments will fall under tribes’
member-preference guidelines, and the percentages of offi-
cers who are Native and who are tribal members will rise. 
7. Indian Country population estimates cause many of the
problems. For example, Federal figures for 1993 indicate
that departments serving communities with populations of
10,000 to 25,000 had an average budget of $1.6 million
dollars (Reaves 1996, 7). In the mid-1990s the typical
department in Indian Country served a population of
approximately 10,000 residents and had a law enforce-
ment budget of $1 million—or approximately 60 percent
of a comparably sized non-Indian community’s budget.
(When inflation is taken into account, the difference is
even larger.) As we note when describing the typical
department, however, 10,000 may be an overestimate of
the average service population. Then, appropriate budget
comparison changes quite dramatically: If the population
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of the community served by the typical reservation police
department is closer to 6,000, the comparable non-Indian
community’s budget is $540,000, which suggests that
Indian communities have relatively generous budgets.
Furthermore, the ratio of officers to citizens jumps from
1.6 per 1,000 population (16 officers serving a communi-
ty of 10,000) to 2.7 per thousand (16 officers serving a
community of 6,000); this figure is substantially higher
than that of non-Indian communities of comparable size.
Indeed, among the four sites we studied intensively, the
ratio of officers to citizens was 3.3 per 1,000 resident
tribal members. Despite these concerns about the effect
of population estimates on per capita resource calcula-
tions, the discussion in this section relies on the popula-
tion estimate of 10,000—not only because it is supported
by recent important policy pieces in the field (especially
the Executive Committee for Indian Country Law
Enforcement Improvement’s “Final Report”), but also
because it is appropriate to draw attention to the lack of
reliable service population data. Moreover, higher popu-
lation estimates may account for the fact that restricting
the “community served” figure to resident tribal mem-
bers ignores the many individuals who (1) live off but
work on the reservation, (2) travel through the reserva-
tion for purposes of business or pleasure, (3) live sea-
sonally on the reservation, or (4) are full-time but
nonmember or non-Native reservation residents.
8. It is worth noting that this figure (the 1.8–2.0 ratio)
includes both State and local sworn officers. When State
police officers are excluded, the ratio drops to between
1.0 and 1.6 officers per thousand population. We believe
the appropriate staff comparison should include State offi-
cers, however, since small, rural, non-Indian communities
benefit from the services of city, county, and State police. 
9. Theoretically, a low “dollars spent per employee” esti-
mate could reflect tribes’ conscious choice to maximize
police coverage instead of hiring fewer officers and allo-
cating increased funding to critical support functions
(management information systems, training, improved
equipment). Indeed, we speculate that the large size of
the areas policed, as well as the social and political
dynamics unique to Indian Country, compel tribes to
focus on coverage rather than on support functions. For
example, the political pressure outlying reservation com-
munities create as they agitate for increased police serv-
ices seems to result in more police officers rather than
fewer but better-equipped and better-supported officers.
However, the fact that both “officers per 1,000 residents”
and “dollars per employee” are lower within Indian
Country than without suggests that resources are truly
deficient and not only for tribes that have chosen to fund
personnel instead of support functions. 
10. The median ($21,000) falls below the average, but
not so far that the figures in the highest range could be
said to skew the average, making it unrepresentative of
salaries overall.
11. It is often claimed that the rural setting and small
communities typical of Indian Country generate a sort of
informal community policing approach that grows out of
officers’ close relations with citizens and the multiple
demands these close relationships generate. But although
officers might know more about the citizens and neigh-
borhoods they serve than their urban counterparts, and
might occasionally be called upon to perform duties out-
side of those normally carried out by their urban col-
leagues, the department itself is not necessarily organized
and managed to effectively respond to (and draw on)
tribal values, priorities, and resources.
12. Most, but not all, of the Nation’s land holdings
are contiguous. The 10,000-acre Gila Bend Reservation
is northwest of the reservation and is the site of the
Nation’s casino operation. The 71,000-acre San Xavier
Reservation lies to the east near Tucson. Twenty-acre
Florence Village lies north of the reservation, near the
city of Florence. The distribution of land holdings also
complicates police coverage.
13. Although most traditional mechanisms of social order
were focused on the local level, the organization of the
police department was centralized. This made it difficult
for the department to distribute its staff in a manner that
might facilitate leveraging these community resources.
To some extent, the same could be said of the Gila River
Indian Community and its department, which is dis-
cussed in the next section.
14. We attribute the improvements not only to new
departmental leadership but also to strong support for
improved policing on the legislative and executive levels
of tribal government.
15. This estimate is based on interviews; no data to sup-
port this assertion were available, mostly due to a lack of
personnel records.
16. A related problem at that time was that many 
members of the force had less than 12th-grade reading,
writing, and math skills.
17. At the time of the initial site visits, Gila River was
planning to build a new Justice Center, which would
include new adult and juvenile detention facilities. On
May 1, 1998, the Community celebrated the ribbon cut-
ting for the state-of-the-art juvenile facility (though it
would not be occupied for some time, due to staffing
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difficulties). On December 4, 1999, the dedication cere-
mony was held for the main criminal justice facility.
18. Although the dispatchers’ logs and the incident
reports that officers did complete were filed in an orderly
fashion, officers did not always turn in reports. Also, in at
least one department report to the BIA, the numbers did
not match other data department leaders had provided
(e.g., number of homicides), nor were they internally
consistent (the number of crimes cleared sometimes
exceeded the number of crimes reported).
19. One useful, but short-lived, byproduct of his prepara-
tions for 638ing arose from the inventory he conducted
on the vehicle fleet. During the inventory, officers could
not take their cruisers home at the end of each shift, so
they needed to report to headquarters to begin their next
shift. This allowed each shift to start with a roll call,
improving day-to-day communication. However, it was
expected that as soon as the inventory was complete, offi-
cers would once again be able to take cruisers home, and
the roll calls would end.
20. With the Hell Gate Treaty of 1855, 12 Stat. 975, three
groups were consolidated onto the Flathead Reservation:
“Flatheads,” Pend d’Oreilles, and Kootenais. The
Flatheads and Pend d’Oreilles are both Salish peoples,
with similar languages but somewhat different cultures.
The Kootenais are a non-Salish people, with both a dif-
ferent language and a different culture.
21. At the time, official detention capacity is 20, but the
daily average for adults was 12.
22. Cover memorandum on the “Memorandum of
Agreement Between State of Montana, Flathead County,
Lake County, Missoula County, Sanders County, City of
Hot Springs, City of Ronan, Town of St. Ignatius and the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Nation,” dated October 12, 1994, notes Lake County’s
decision not to sign. Additionally, the city of Polson,
the county seat of Lake County, entered into a separate
agreement with the Tribes, but Lake County also
declined the opportunity to enter into a similar special
agreement.
23. “Memorandum of Agreement,” above.
24. At least some of this respect arose from the fact that
Flathead officers usually attended the state police acade-
my, where they received the same training as all the other
officers—an equivalence that facilitated both cooperation
and cross-jurisdictional activities.
25. Much police concern and attention is given to traffic
problems on U.S. Route 93, which bisects the reservation
from north to south. At the time of our visits, the only
limit on speed during the day (except in business districts)
is that motorists drive in a “reasonable and prudent” man-
ner; the road is generally only one lane in each direction;
cars are turning onto and off of the road as it changes
from high-speed to commercial district; and the highway
serves local residents, commuters, truckers, and tourists
alike. DUIs are a tremendous problem, and fatalities are
not uncommon. Traffic-related activities deflect a great
deal of police time from other problems.
26. Interview with Cora Baker, May 1998.
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Chapter 5. Federal Policy and Policing in
Indian Country
This section examines the history of reservation
policing and how that history interacts with current
Federal policies to influence the effectiveness of
tribal police. A core issue that emerges is the inade-
quacy of Federal policy to promote the ability of
Indian nations to design and exert meaningful con-
trol over their own policing institutions. This failure
is sharpened when contrasted with findings from
research in Indian Country on the characteristics
of effective governing institutions: Governing 
institutions are more effective when they are self-
determined and when they reflect, in a functionally
meaningful way, a tribe’s underlying cultural norms
and values. Indeed, self-determined institutions are
more likely to provide this match between institu-
tional design and citizens’ jointly held social, cultur-
al, and political expectations and values.
The History of Reservation Policing
When the reservation system was established in the
early 1800s, law enforcement was mostly provided
by Federal troops, whose responsibilities reflected
the U.S. Government’s interest in limiting Indians’
ability to interfere with the economic pursuits of
non-Indian settlers. For example, soldiers were
responsible for maintaining levels of order sufficient
to prevent violent activity from spilling beyond
reservation boundaries,1 for enforcing the laws and
policies that restricted tribes to reservations, for pro-
hibiting a wide range of traditional activities that
were viewed as immoral or criminal, and for over-
seeing the rationing of food and other supplies.
(It was not until passage of the Major Crimes Act
in 1885 that crimes whose effects were not felt out-
side of reservation boundaries—that is, crimes by
Indians against Indians—drew the official attention
of the Federal Government.) In short, Indian com-
munities were policed by the military arm of a colo-
nial government (Barlow 1994; Peak 1989; Wachtel
1980, 13).
Official U.S. Government permission for Native
Americans to participate in the policing of reserva-
tions was first granted in the 1860s. Over the next
20 years, a wide variety of policing arrangements
evolved: About one-third of all reservation police
forces consisted primarily of tribal members; others
included a mix of tribal members, Indians from
other reservations, and non-Indians (Knepper and
Puckett 1995). Significantly, Native representation
on these police forces should not be interpreted as
a sign of increased control by tribes over their own
affairs. The U.S. Government, not tribes, supervised
a majority of the forces, and police continued to act
in its interest.
Indians themselves viewed the Native Americans on
these forces as agents of the U.S. Government, and
the officers were required to emulate non-Indians.
They “were expected to set an example by wearing
white man’s attire, cutting their hair, practicing
monogamy and taking an allotment. Their duties
included determining whether a fellow tribesman
was working enough to merit his sugar, coffee, and
tobacco rations” (BIA 1995b, 24). Indeed, as one
U.S. Indian agent is reported to have remarked,
“The police are looked upon as the common foe,
and the multitude are bitterly opposed to them”
(Hagan 1980, 49–50). Furthermore, one reason trib-
al members were favored as police officers by the
U.S. Government was that they were more adept in
dealing with traditional leaders than were Federal
troops (Meissner 1995). In this sense, the increased
representation of Native Americans on reservation
police forces was motivated primarily by the tacti-
cal advantage their knowledge and experience pro-
vided the Federal Government in maintaining an
orderly reservation system, rather than by a recog-
nition that tribes should be accorded increased
rights to self-determination (Barlow 1994; BIA
1995b; Hagan 1980).
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The historical record regarding reservation policing
from the turn of the century through the 1950s is
limited. The General Allotment Act of 18872 trans-
ferred nearly 90 million (of an original 138 million)
acres of Indian land to State and Federal jurisdic-
tion, and by the 1920s most reservations had only
one or two officers. The number swelled briefly
during Prohibition, but with the end of that era,
the budget for and number of reservation police
dropped once again (Deloria and Lytle 1983). In
1956, for example, the ratio of police to residents
on Indian reservations was 2 per 5,000 compared
to a ratio of 10 per 5,000 in the country as a whole
(BIA 1995b, 64). The BIA organized this small
nucleus of officers into the first modern reservation
police forces (Wachtel 1982, 112).
During the first 60 years of the 20th century, tribes
themselves supported at least some of the law
enforcement presence on reservations. Even so, the
support was grudging. For example, many accounts
of reservation life during the period allude to the
role of reservation police in forcibly removing
children from their families and sending them to
Federal boarding schools, which were infamous for
their hostility to Native culture. We received first-
hand accounts of these activities in our research at
the Fort Berthold and Flathead reservations; the
phenomenon is also documented in research litera-
ture (Gilman and Schneider 1987).
During the late 1960s and the 1970s, Indian activ-
ism (including the occupation of BIA offices in
Washington, D.C., and the siege of Wounded Knee),
drew new attention to the problems of crime on
reservations. This attention generated efforts to
increase funds for policing and to professionalize
police departments and other components of the
Indian criminal justice system. In this period, the
number of police in Indian Country increased 
significantly and Congress appropriated funds to
establish the BIA Law Enforcement Academy (BIA
1975). These changes had two important results for
Indian police management and policy—results with
long-lasting implications. First, efforts to organize
and manage the rapidly growing police presence in
Indian Country were based on the “professional”
model of policing, the dominant approach to non-
reservation (municipal) policing in the 1960s and
1970s (BIA 1975, 83, 91). Second, the influence
of the BIA Division of Law Enforcement Services
over reservation policing greatly increased.
The professional model is characterized by a cen-
tralized organizational hierarchy (with military-style
ranks and structure), insulation between the police
and community and political leaders, and a narrow
focus of the police function on crime fighting (and
away from other problem solving). The activities of
police operating within this model include preven-
tive patrol by automobile, rapid response to central-
ly dispatched calls for service, and crime control
through the apprehension and incapacitation of
offenders (Kelling and Moore 1988).
In part, the professional approach evolved as a
result of new technology. Automobiles, two-way car
radios, dispatch capabilities, and early computers
made it possible to respond to emergencies. But the
professional approach was also a reaction to the
“political” policing that had previously dominated
in America’s cities, in which police were so closely
linked to neighborhoods and local politicians that
they were virtually an adjunct to local political
machines.3 Police operating within the political
model were thoroughly integrated into neighbor-
hood and community life, knew neighborhood resi-
dents, understood community norms and customs,
and were able to rely on community connections in
providing services, preventing crimes, and solving
crimes; however, the approach had substantial down-
sides. Intimacy with the community, closeness to
political leaders, and a decentralized organizational
structure gave rise to numerous forms of corruption.
As a result, architects of the professional model
sought to reform policing by severing the close link
between police and citizens and insulating the police
from political pressure. In combination with new
technology, this new attitude about what police offi-
cers should be doing led to the elimination of neigh-
borhood foot patrols and the demise of personalized
responses to community crime and safety problems.
As noted, the second important result for reserva-
tion police policy and management was the growing
prominence of the BIA Division of Law Enforce-
ment Services. During the long period from the turn
of the century to the early 1960s, responsibility for
reservation policing had (by virtue of neglect) fallen
to the tribes and, to a lesser extent, a variety of
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Federal entities. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
however, law enforcement services rapidly came
under the authority of the BIA. Both the increased
presence and the professionalization of police on
reservations were driven by the BIA through a
series of requests to Congress for increased funds.
Consequently, it secured and institutionalized pri-
mary control over Indian police policy and manage-
ment (Wachtel 1980).
As a result of these two factors, not only did tribes
have less direct control over general police policy,
but because of the influence of the professional
model, Indian communities were also further dis-
tanced from the police departments serving them. In
fact, these factors preserved the legacy of police as
an occupying army—Federal agencies imposed both
the design and administration of policing on Indian
nations with little regard for indigenous mecha-
nisms of social control, just as they had in the late
19th century.
The Contemporary Problem
Ironically, at the same time that the BIA Division
of Law Enforcement Services was growing in
prominence and the professional model of policing
was in ascendance, the movement toward sover-
eignty was the dominant political force in Indian
Country. During the late 1960s and early 1970s,
Indians worked intensively to acquire increased
levels of self-determination and self-governance.
As a result of their advocacy, tribal governments
acquired the power to legislate, regulate, and adju-
dicate public policy on their reservations. Tribal
governments came to include more powerful legis-
latures and courts; to possess taxation, economic
development, and environmental regulatory authority;
and to provide infrastructure and public services
(Cornell and Kalt 1993, 7; O’Brien 1989, 197–254).
In large part, tribes acquired increased control of
these governmental functions through PL 93–638,
the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, which, as noted above,
allows tribes to contract with the Federal Govern-
ment to regain management control over programs
otherwise administered by the BIA and other
Federal agencies.
Policing services were not exempt from this move-
ment. But despite PL 93–638 (and the accelerated
pace at which tribes are contracting with the U.S.
Government to deliver their own police services),
police policy in Indian Country is still driven, both
directly and indirectly, by Federal agencies rather
than by tribes.
This arrangement has advantages. For example,
employees of departments that are still managed
by the BIA are Federal employees and, as such,
are provided with job security, livable salaries, com-
petitive retirement packages, and protection from
undue political pressure in the uncertain political
environment typical of many tribes. These benefits
and protections help attract qualified candidates
to the field and help police officers carry out their
duties. Another advantage of Federal involvement
is the provision of free training for police officers
and criminal investigators at the BIA police acade-
my in New Mexico, training that has improved
the overall quality of policing in many reservation
departments. The improved quality of criminal inves-
tigation under the leadership of the BIA Division
of Law Enforcement Services is yet another bene-
fit. Nonetheless, U.S. Government policy has cre-
ated a number of problems for policing in Indian
Country—in departments under both BIA and 638
contract administration.
Multiple Lines of Authority Decrease
Accountability and Create Tribal 
Capacity Vacuums
A key aspect of the BIA management structure is
control over policing, which occurs through two
separate administrative paths (illustrated in exhibit
7). The first path governs the patrol function of
BIA police departments. Patrol officers are super-
vised by the department’s commanding officer
(usually a police captain). Until recently, this offi-
cer was supervised in turn by the local BIA super-
intendent, who was responsible for policing and all
the other BIA programs run through the agency4—
and so on up to the highest levels of BIA adminis-
tration in Washington, D.C. (Now, BIA police
captains report directly to the BIA Division of Law
Enforcement Services, which is headquartered in
New Mexico.) The second administrative path
governs the investigative function, over which the
department’s commanding officer does not have
line authority. Instead, line authority for this func-
tion lies directly with the BIA Division of Law
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Enforcement Services. Neither path allows super-
vision by or accountability to representatives of the
tribal community. This complicated management
structure has several implications:
● Until recently, the patrol and investigative func-
tions in the same police department were under
the authority of different departments within the
BIA.
● BIA police departments’ commanding officers do
not have line authority over their own criminal
investigators.
● Authority and accountability for BIA police man-
agement and policy are diffused among many
individuals and bureaucratic entities (although
policy changes have made the group less diffuse
than before).
The justification for placing both patrol and crimi-
nal investigation under the authority of the BIA
Division of Law Enforcement Services is sound:
Supervision of both functions is within a single
division of the Bureau that has substantial expertise
in law enforcement. However, the arrangement is
not without difficulties. Local BIA police captains
still do not have line authority over their criminal
investigators. Many tribal leaders and BIA superin-
tendents we interviewed were concerned that the
Division of Law Enforcement Services seated in
New Mexico might know less about and be less
responsive to tribal needs, resources, and priorities
than the superintendents. Furthermore, the arrange-
ment is roughly analogous to having city police
departments supervised by State or Federal authori-
ties—a degree of external control that is contem-
plated only in those rare instances when a police
department is either so corrupt or so poorly man-
aged that it must be placed in receivership. In sum,
the potential for accountability problems persists.
The complexity of the overall management structure
also requires tribes to exert political pressure and
build their cases for new policies with a wide vari-
ety of overseers. We found that tribal criminal jus-
tice planning bodies often allocated more of their
limited resources to lobbying oversight agencies (to
getting authority) than they did to exercising author-
ity in the service of sound strategic planning. Thus,
even when tribes devote increased energy to polic-
ing, this energy is not used efficiently to develop










Exhibit 7. BIA Supervisory Paths Through 1997
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even those tribes intent on improving policing have
difficulty knowing where to start, which political
players to engage to further tribal aims and how to
address the many substantive planning challenges.
As described in chapter 4, this was a problem for
the Gila River Indian Community as it pursued a
638 contract. Both of these results are examples of
tribal capacity vacuums.
Jurisdictional Complexities Prevent 
Strategic Planning
The Major Crimes Act of 1885, which places 
jurisdiction for most serious crimes with Federal
agencies, also works to diffuse authority and
accountability for criminal justice policy and man-
agement in Indian Country. The Act arose from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Crow Dog
(109 U.S. 556 (1883)). In Crow Dog,the Supreme
Court held that the U.S. District Court of South
Dakota lacked jurisdiction over a Sioux Indian
who already had been punished by his tribe for
killing another Indian. Congress, which considered
the punishment far too lenient, responded to the
Supreme Court’s decision by quickly passing the
Act. As its title implies, the Major Crimes Act
granted the Federal Government jurisdiction over
a number of crimes committed on Indian reserva-
tions, including murder, kidnapping, rape, and rob-
bery. It now also covers arson, assault, maiming,
larceny, receiving stolen property, manslaughter,
attempted homicide, conspiracy to commit murder,
and statutory rape (U.S. Code, Title 18).
Besides the obvious loss of sovereignty, an impor-
tant implication of Crow Dogis that the develop-
ment of comprehensive, tribally driven crime
strategies—such as those relating to serious youth
violence, drug-related crime, child abuse, domestic
violence, or sexual assault—now depends on shared
priorities or the sustained attention of Federal
agencies, since so many of these crimes fall under
Federal jurisdiction. Not only must tribes engage
the BIA in developing responses to crime, they
must also engage the FBI, the U.S. Attorney’s
Office, and the Federal courts. When control of
policy and management is so divided, tribes feel
they have neither the opportunity nor the obliga-
tion to develop their own approaches to policing.
The 638 Process Diverts Tribes From the
Consideration of Community Priorities 
and Goals
Theoretically, the 638 contracting process should
provide tribes with the opportunity to design police
departments and implement policing procedures
that are well matched to tribal needs, resources,
values, and priorities. In practice, however, this has
not been the case, and examples of tribes that have
used this opportunity to carefully consider the
police function are exceedingly rare, for several
reasons. First, as detailed above, tribes enter the
process without adequate planning capacities and,
therefore, are unable to use 638 planning as a
means of furthering their own goals. Second, the
contracting process is focused on implementing
policing on the most basic level. From the Federal
Government’s standpoint, the contract must address
basic operational, organizational, and personnel
issues and must provide a stream of funding to
support these functions, so that the core police
services once provided by the BIA can now be pro-
vided by the tribe. But neither the contract process
nor the contract itself focuses on building planning
capacity on the tribal level, strategic planning on
the departmental level, or systematically consider-
ing tribally driven criteria (such as resources,
needs, values, and priorities) in designing a depart-
ment that functions as a core institution of tribal
government.
These issues were clear impediments in two of the
communities we visited. As noted above, over the
course of 3 or 4 years of planning, Gila River Indian
Community’s government had charged several bod-
ies with the planning task for contracting, including
the Law Enforcement Commission and, finally, a
special planning committee headed by the assistant
community manager. Concordant with the Federal
Government’s focus on operational, organizational,
personnel, and funding issues, these groups had few,
if any, members with policing expertise; saw the
638 contract primarily as a stream of funding to
acquire, rather than as an opportunity to plan how
the Community itself hoped to be policed; and did
not provide for an ongoing strategic review of the
department’s progress toward Community goals.
Similarly, the Three Affiliated Tribes’ government
had long declined to enter into a 638 contract,
largely because they did not see the 638 process 
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as an opportunity to regain traditional methods of
social control, but rather as a means of entering
“the law enforcement business.”
Federal Management and the Influence of the
Professional Model Discourage Community
Partnership
While the lack of planning capacity hampers the
development of effective police institutions, the
continued control of police policy and management
by the Federal Government (for tribes with BIA
departments) and the lingering effect of the profes-
sional model of policing (for tribes with departments
under 638 contracts) generate a more fundamental
flaw in policing in Indian Country. To better under-
stand this flaw, we consider the underlying philoso-
phy of policing in a free society.
Specifically, communities grant police tremendous
power—the power to detain, to arrest, and even to
use deadly force. Communities do this because they
rightly place a high value on what police do in pro-
tecting freedom and keeping communities safe.
This is a contract between communities and police
(Goldstein 1977). But Native American communi-
ties have not participated in designing their own
police institutions and then consented to be policed
by those methods. Departments administered by
the BIA are not agents of tribes but of the Federal
Government and, as such, have no incentive to ask
the communities they serve for legitimacy or for
authorization of the police function. Even those
departments operating under self-determination con-
tracts adopted—as a byproduct of the contracting
process—the organization and methods of the pro-
fessional era of policing. They look primarily to
the law and to external professional standards for
authorization, rather than to the community. This
has created a significant gap between tribal police
and the communities they serve, a gap that is 
reflected in mismatches between police and 
community priorities and between police methods
and tribal norms and values.
Several examples may illustrate what this means.
The first comes from Tohono O’odham, where we
found that one of the most successful strategies
for reducing youth violence was formulated by the
local Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.)
officer.5 This program had an especially productive,
though unintended, result. It gave the D.A.R.E.
officer an opportunity to simply talk with students.
To an outsider, the long meetings and discussions
typical of the Tohono O’odham can seem unproduc-
tive, but for the D.A.R.E officer, this culturally
appropriate activity helped him build strong relation-
ships with youth. In fact, many of the tribal mem-
bers we spoke with described the ideal O’odham
officer as one who simply talked—talked with peo-
ple to understand their motivation for committing
crimes, to find a solution to problems, and to quietly
but firmly persuade those involved to implement
that solution. Significantly, however, few members
of the police department looked on this activity as
falling within the definition of “real” police work,
although they pointed to interventions the D.A.R.E.
officer had developed as among the most effective
crime prevention strategies present on the reserva-
tion. Because vestiges of the professional model of
policing determined Tohono O’odham police offi-
cers’ methods, the fact that this officer’s approach to
problem solving had a strong fit with tribal norms
and values had gone largely unrecognized.
At the Flathead reservation, several communities
had called upon the police for an increased pres-
ence, in one case to control drug marketing and in
another to prevent cars from speeding along the
side roads on which children walked to school. In
the first instance, residents used 911 to complain
about the drug-marketing activity, but the police
response proved inadequate—a squad car either
arrived on the scene too late or arrived only to
break up a single deal, and these responses did not
affect violator behavior. The local Indian housing
authority finally addressed community concerns by
hiring as a resident manager a tribal officer who had
been detailed to the Federal drug enforcement task
force. Besides prominently parking a police vehicle
outside his home (which was near the usual site of
drug-selling activities), the officer organized com-
munity meetings. The group of resident activists
that emerged from these meetings organized a
Neighborhood Watch, neighborhood cleanups, and
a storage-shed building day. With these interven-
tions, the community transformed itself from being
the least desirable housing project on the reservation
to one of the most desirable.
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In the second instance, community members also
organized meetings, but they were more effective
on the political level. Council members, the Tribal
Chairwoman, and other members of the executive
branch explicitly asked the police to become more
involved in that particular town and with the 
community in general. In a Council meeting we
attended, one Council member admonished the
police chief, “We don’t want you just picking up
more people on Highway 93.”6
In discussions with us, the Chairwoman explained,
“The Council would like to see more community
involvement and partnership, so people don’t just
see [the police] in times of crisis. Instead of just
traffic [enforcement], we’d like to see more focus
on community participation—a presence in the
community, talking to people, assisting them,
[involving themselves] in education and community
activities.”7 To their credit, the Confederated Tribes’
police officers and police leadership told us both
of these stories; however, they stressed that doing
more to meet community requests for involvement
was beyond their official function. Again, police
responsiveness was constrained by the professional
model of police work and by the fact that, custom-
arily, Indian police departments are not organized
and managed to turn to the community for authori-
zation and direction.
More generally, we found at most sites that tribal
citizens rely increasingly on police and on the courts
to settle disputes and problems that not so long ago
might have been mediated by neighbors, elders,
tribal leadership, or other traditional means. These
problems—disputes between neighbors, family
quarrels, abandoned and disorderly properties, and
unsupervised youth—are more closely linked to the
quality of community life than they are to conven-
tional definitions of crime. Police cited the rapidly
increasing burden on 911 systems as the product of
this phenomenon, and tribal criminal and civil attor-
neys complained that their caseloads have ballooned
beyond reason. On the one hand, police protest that
the community demands that they solve too many
problems that are not really crimes. On the other
hand, citizens complain that police do not respond
to the real needs of the community.
It is probably unjust to blame such conflicting
expectations solely on police policy. The erosion of
traditional culture has also contributed to the prob-
lem. The mechanisms of social control that might
be brought to bear on noncrime problems are sim-
ply fewer and weaker; thus tribal communities ask
more of their police. Yet even this has a connection
to Federal policy (although this time to broad policy
objectives, not policing policy specifically). Through
at least the 1960s, Federal procedures exacerbated
the loss of cultural knowledge, discouraged commu-
nity problem solving, and helped create an expecta-
tion that someone else should deal with difficult
problems. For example, individuals with substance
abuse problems were sent to off-reservation treat-
ment centers; economically productive adults were
offered relocation to job-rich urban areas; housing
programs aimed at nuclear families separated
extended family groups; children were sent to dis-
tant boarding schools; and, even after the general
demise of boarding schools, children were removed
from poor families and placed in long-term off-
reservation foster care. As a result, culturally appro-
priate means of social problem solving have been
displaced, and incentives to adapt those methods
to contemporary times and current problems have
been suppressed.
In many tribal communities, residents have no
one to turn to for help with a wide range of issues
except their law enforcement agencies. A telling
example came from the Director of the Juvenile
Detention and Rehabilitation Center in the Gila
River Indian Community, who told us that she (and
the tribal police) regularly received phone calls
from parents requesting that the police arrest, and
the juvenile facility house, a problem child. Because
these parents had little experience of being parented
themselves, she concluded, their own parenting
skills were extremely limited.
However, when tribal members do turn to the police
with their problems, they encounter organizations
whose priorities have been shaped by a model of
policing that limits responses to a narrow band of
strategies and attention to a narrow band of crime
problems. For example, the acting Pima Agency
Superintendent at the time of our first site visit (the
nominal head of the then-BIA police department)
stated, “Law enforcement is law enforcement”—a
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claim that seems to exempt Indian police depart-
ments from adapting their strategies, policies, and
procedures to local needs. As a result, disputes, con-
flicts, and problems that police and citizens see as
each other’s responsibility can continue to simmer
and, eventually, escalate into real crimes. In addi-
tion, as tribal members conclude that the police are
insensitive and unresponsive to community needs,
support for the police diminishes. This, of course,
further isolates police and communities from each
other, and, in its worst form, the isolation develops
into barely concealed hostility.8 Partnership is not
possible in such an atmosphere.
Research on Effective Governing
Institutions in Indian Country
A substantial body of research suggests a roadmap
for understanding and beginning to remedy the prob-
lems with policing that are rooted in Federal policy.
Beginning in the 1970s, given the opportunity of
increased self-determination offered by PL 93–638,
a handful of Indian nations embarked on successful
paths of social and economic development. Research
by the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
Development indicates that the common denomina-
tor among these successful tribes was an effective
government—one that was capable of both deter-
mining and implementing the policy priorities of
the community.
Data from the last U.S. Census (exhibit 8) illustrate
the diversity in reservation performance that under-
lies the Harvard Project research. On paper, the
Crow are one of the wealthiest societies in the
world. They own vast coal resources, extensive
timber supplies, rich wheat-growing land, and
arguably the best grazing grass in the West. In the
last decade, they have also received significant infu-
sions of financial capital—totaling well over $100
million—through a number of highly remunerative
legal settlements. The Tribe’s emphasis on educa-
tion gives it a rate of high school graduation that is
well above the average for Natives living on reser-
vations. Yet, the community’s physical, financial,
and human capital generates a negligible annual
return, and the reservation unemployment rate is in
the 80–90 percent range.9 By contrast, some tribal
communities have been booming economically
and making rapid social progress. For example,
the Mississippi Choctaw’s home in Philadelphia,
Mississippi, is hardly rich in natural resources, but
the Tribe is now one of the largest employers in
Mississippi. More than 3,000 non-Indians commute
daily to work in the Choctaw’s manufacturing, serv-
ice, and public-sector enterprises.10 All other things
equal, the different outcomes these two nations have
experienced can be attributed largely to differences
in government effectiveness. 
The Harvard Project’s research shows that one indi-
cator of a tribal government’s ability to effectively
make and implement decisions is whether or not it
has increased control over its own institutions (seiz-
ing de facto sovereignty, and not merely de jure).
Stability, the separation of powers, and competent,
respected bureaucracies are further indicators of a
tribal government’s effectiveness. The research also
indicates that an alignment between the form and
powers of a government’s contemporary institutions
and the form and powers of its prereservation insti-
tutions is most likely to create this stability, respect,
and legitimacy. Yet that match between present and
prereservation political systems is not typical: The
U.S. Government created the 20th-century govern-
ments of most tribes, overriding indigenous institu-
tions. In cases where tribes were fortunate enough
to avoid imposed constitutions or where, fortuitous-
ly, the imposed structure is well matched to pre-
reservation forms, tribes are performing well; but
where the match is poor, tribes are struggling.11
With reference to Indian policing, the first impor-
tant lesson from this research is the effect of
increased tribal control over tribal institutions.
Only those tribes that have acquired meaningful
control over their governing institutions—that have
increased their actual sovereignty—have experi-
enced improved local economic and social condi-
tions. The research has not found a single case of
sustained economic development where the tribe is
not in the driver’s seat. While tribal-BIA relation-
ships in thriving Indian nations range from coopera-
tive to contentious, they are all characterized by a
demotion of the BIA (and of other Federal agen-
cies) from decisionmaker to advisor and provider of
technical assistance. The reason sovereignty is cru-
cial to successful development is clear: As long as
the BIA (or any other outside organization) has
decisionmaking authority, the actions, policies, and
procedures of tribal government will reflect out-
siders’ agendas. For example, the BIA’s bureaucratic
Adults With Income Above BIA Poverty Line 1989 Unemployed Rates
Percentage Point
Reservation Change, 1977-1989 a 1989 Percentage BLS-style calculation b Total c
Flathead 16 39 11 41
White Mountain Apache 12 33 10 21
Cochiti Pueblo 10 43 52 22
Mescalero Apache 9 18 26 58
Mississippi Choctaw 9 36 50 27
Muckleshoot 6 16 61 57
Pine Ridge Sioux -1 21 56 73
Passamaquoddy -3 19 51 66
San Carlos Apache -7 16 90 62
Rosebud Sioux -10 4 46 93
Lummi -11 19 45 58
Hualapai -11 11 61 74
Yakama -12 20 67 63
Crow -12 11 48 78
Northern Cheyenne -15 29 40 55
All Reservation Indians -1 24 40 48
a. BIA poverty level was $5,000 in 1977 and $7,000 in 1989.
b. The “BLS-style calculation” of the unemployment rate measures adults looking for employment but not finding it.
c. The “total” unemployment rate measures the percent of the tribal workforce not working.
Sources: The table is from Cornell and Kalt (1992, 4). Data are from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (1989).
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standards of success (protecting a budget, expand-
ing authority) will tend to be given more weight
than tribal standards, and results that meet these
external standards will be considered successful
even if they lead to lost opportunities, failed poli-
cies, or other bad outcomes for a tribe. Without trib-
al sovereignty over the institutions of government,
there is an injurious separation between the recipi-
ents of policy benefits and the bearers of policy
costs. An important study of tribes’ timber harvest-
ing enterprises—some operated directly by the
BIA, others by tribes themselves under PL 93–638
contracts—provides hard evidence of this claim.
When tribes replaced the BIA administration of
forestry enterprises with their own management,
institutional and economic performance improved.
As predicted, tribes operated their timber programs
more efficiently than the BIA and received better
prices for the products sold (Krepps and Caves
1994; also, Krepps 1992).
As discussed, the Federal policies that regulate
Indian policing have the twin effect of reducing
tribal control and diffusing accountability for insti-
tutional performance. In our interviews, tribes regu-
larly blamed Federal agencies for the poor state
of policing in Indian Country; not only were the
resources provided by Federal agencies inadequate,
but it also appeared that Federal policies were 
driven by a misreading of tribes’ real needs and 
priorities. On the other hand, representatives of
Federal agencies expressed skepticism about the
ability and intention of tribes to develop and man-
age effective police departments.
Exhibit 8. Indian Nations’ Diverse Economic Performance
Form of Cultural Match to Sustaining Significant 
Reservation Government Governmental Form? Economic Development?
Cochiti Pueblo Theocracy Yes Yes
Crow Athenian democracy No No
Flathead Parliamentary Yes Yes
Hualapai Strong chief executive No No
Mescalero Apache Strong chief executive Yes Yes
Muckleshoot Parliamentary Yes Yes
Northern Cheyenne Strong chief executive No No
Pine Ridge Sioux Strong chief executive No No
Rosebud Sioux Strong chief executive No No
San Carlos Apache Strong chief executive Unknown No
White Mountain Apache Strong chief executive Yes Yes
Yakama Athenian democracy No No
Notes: “Parliamentary” refers to governments in which the tribal chief executive is selected by the representative tribal council. “Strong chief executive”
refers to governments in which the tribal chief executive is directly elected by the tribe’s citizens. “Theocracy” indicates that the tribal religious leader or
leaders appoint the key tribal authorities and establish central tribal policies. “Athenian democracy” refers to a system in which democratic authority  
is vested in a tribal council, which is itself composed of all adult members of the tribe.
Source: Table derived from Cornell and Kalt (2000, 464).
demonstrate the ability to responsibly manage
its own criminal justice institutions. But Harvard
Project research indicates that this reasoning is
backward. Sovereignty brings with it accountability:
Being in charge makes tribal leaders and tribal citi-
zens realize that their own resources and well-being
are at stake (Kalt 1997).
The second important lesson for Indian policing
from the Harvard Project research is the importance
of cultural match. Exhibit 9 summarizes the general
research findings. For each Indian nation listed, it
presents the contemporary form of government,
whether or not this structure matches prereservation
form, and whether or not the reservation economy
is growing. For example, the economically pros-
perous community of Cochiti Pueblo has never
given up its traditional theocracy and has no written
constitution. At the other extreme, modern Crow
government bears little or no resemblance to the
hierarchical and two-branch governmental structure
of prereservation Crow society, and economic con-
ditions on the Crow reservation, as discussed above,
are dismal. While this list is not exhaustive, the pat-
tern is strong enough to suggest that match matters.
A consonance between present and prereservation
The truth is a mixture of these impressions. The
very fact that power is shared between tribal and
Federal authorities allows each to avoid their more
appropriate roles and, thus, to perpetuate poor
policing. By contrast, if police perform poorly in
the typical American city, the citizenry signal their
leadership that performance must improve. If condi-
tions do not change, elected officials and police
executives are at serious risk of being replaced. In
Indian Country, this direct line of accountability and
control is often absent. As in other areas of Indian
policy, it is both appropriate and beneficial for tribal
political and police department leaders to take on
those tasks; the more appropriate Federal roles are
to provide advice, technical assistance, and financial
aid and to support effective local policing efforts.
An additional observation that emerges from this
line of inquiry concerns timing. The legal and de
facto sovereignty of tribes has been subject to con-
stant challenge, and it is frequently asserted that if
a tribe wishes to be sovereign, it must first establish
a sound, nondependent economy. A similar asser-
tion is often made with regard to policing: If an
Indian community wants greater authority over
criminal justice administration, it must first
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Exhibit 9. Cultural Match
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institutional forms confers legitimacy on the methods
and outcomes of government decisionmaking and
channels political energy in productive directions.
Two examples from business and government
relations illustrate the dynamics of cultural match.
These examples highlight the aspect of government
structure that appears to be most important for insti-
tutional legitimacy and effectiveness: coherence
between institutional rules and citizens’ jointly held
expectations about who should hold authority, how
it should be exercised, and what the decisionmaking
structure should be.
The central government of the Oglala Sioux Tribe
of the Pine Ridge Reservation has sometimes tried
to launch tribally owned businesses, which are rela-
tively common in Indian Country. Yet in Lakota
political culture, allegiance to authority is located
at the subtribal level of the reservation’s districts
(political divisions that more closely replicate the
quasi-autonomous family bands, or tiyospaye,of
prereservation days). Time and time again, when a
financial or management crisis arises for a business
promulgated by the central government, the lack of
connection to appropriate authority structures causes
oversight mechanisms to fail, support for the enter-
prise to wither, and an eventual business failure.12
Among the White Mountain Apache, the formal
role of the Tribe’s chief executive includes being
the lead negotiator of external agreements with
businesses and other governments. When a dispute
arose between the Tribe and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (USFWS) about appropriate means
for species protection, the Tribal Chairman gathered
a team of advisors and negotiated directly with the
USFWS on behalf of the Tribe. Today, because cul-
tural norms support this activist, “presidential” lead-
ership role (in fact, the Apache word for “leader” has
been variously interpreted as “our smart one,” “he
who directs,” or “he who convinces us”) (Cornell and
Kalt 1995, 420),13 tribal politicians, wildlife biolo-
gists, enterprise managers, and citizens are willing
to exert together the effort required to make this his-
toric agreement work (“Tribe, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Sign Historic Agreement” 1994; Wald 1995).
To reiterate, these positive and negative outcomes
result from matches and mismatches between indige-
nous and imposed norms and values. Unless there is
a match between these factors, the imposed norms
and values will consistently generate conflicts with
customary ways of doing business across social,
political, and economic dimensions of reservation
life. We observed the same effects with respect to
policing. The police officer at Tohono O’odham or
Gila River who aggressively confronts a suspect not
only will have offended longstanding tribal norms,
but also will have failed to draw on them in the
service of obtaining the suspect’s compliance. By
contrast, the police officer at Turtle Mountain or
one of the Lakota tribes who fails to confront a sus-
pect is guilty of the same error. To the extent that
the ethos of the organization in which these officers
work mandates or otherwise perpetuates such con-
flicts, both public support for and the effectiveness
of the organization are diminished.
A final note about cultural match deserves attention:
It is important not to be naive about the possibili-
ties. While research shows the potential that match
has to contribute to institutional success, there are,
unfortunately, no guarantees that prereservation
institutions will be effective in a contemporary set-
ting. A society might find itself with institutions that
are firmly grounded in cultural norms and yet con-
front an environment that renders those institutions
ineffective. If old forms cannot be adapted to mod-
ern problems, a new institution will be necessary.
Then, the challenge to the group is to design one
that both makes cultural sense and works. Building
a legitimate institution that can meet contempo-
rary challenges is the overarching goal.
In summary, two lines of evidence, one based on a
careful examination of the impact of Federal policy
on Indian policing and the other based on the effec-
tiveness of governing institutions in Indian Country
generally, support this conclusion: The ongoing
dominance of the BIA and other Federal agencies
on policing in Indian Country has diffused account-
ability for Indian policing, limited tribal capacity to
improve policing, deterred tribes from strategic and
long-term planning, discouraged community priori-
ty setting, and prevented tribal communities and
police departments from aligning their priorities,
values, and resources. The severity of these issues
varies across tribes and, individually, their influence
may appear subtle. In combination, however, they
have a powerful negative effect on the overall quali-
ty of policing in Indian Country. Moreover, they are
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concerns that an examination of Indian policing
based only on crime trends, management issues,
and budget constraints fails to bring into focus.
Notes
1. Hagan (1961, 1980) and Peak (1989), for example,
both note that reservations were extremely violent places,
where natural mechanisms of social control were disrupted
and armed bands preyed on the weak. 
2. 24 Stat. 388, also known as the Dawes Act (see Canby
1998, 22).
3. Kelling and Moore (1998) coined the phrase “political
model.” Fogelson (1977) discusses the alliance of police
with urban political machines (chapter 1).
4. An “agency” is the smallest BIA administrative unit.
Most large Indian nations have a dedicated agency;
smaller nations are grouped together or attached to an
agency that primarily serves a larger nation. This struc-
ture adds to the problems cited in the text—in multitribe
agencies, authority over a single tribe’s patrol function
quickly devolves to a tribal outsider whose interests and
responsibilities are extremely diffuse.
5. Project D.A.R.E. is a school-based substance abuse
prevention program that is taught by specially trained
police officers in schools across the United States and
in other countries.
6. Meeting of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribal Council, July 16, 1997.
7. Interview with the Chairwoman, Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, July
18, 1997.
8. For example, on ride-alongs we saw officers “patrol”
by driving through the front and back yards of homes,
shining their floodlights into residents’ porches, kitchens,
and living rooms.
9. As in the final column of exhibit 8, this rate has been
adjusted to account for those who are unemployed but
have stopped actively seeking a job.
10. It may be tempting to credit such phenomenal growth
to gaming, a niche market opportunity available to Indian
nations because of their political sovereignty. But the
example of the Mississippi Choctaw is telling: Econo-
mic growth started in the 1980s, long before July 1994,
when the Tribe opened its casino. Furthermore, Harvard
Project research is general enough to suggest that
although gaming may contribute significant financial
capital to some Native economies, even casinos thrive
only when they are underwritten by the basic supports of
effective governance.
11. This point is based on research by Stephen Cornell
and Joseph P. Kalt, especially Cornell and Kalt (1995).
The independent variable “match” was derived by com-
paring tribes’ immediate prereservation governmental
systems (as documented in ethnographic sources) with
their current systems. Prereservation Indian societies
can be characterized as self-governing societies that had
passed the tests of environmental adaptation to that point
in time; thus, the indigenous, diverse cultures of the
tribes were embedded in their political systems.
12. One dramatic example of this dynamic is described in
“Nebraska Sioux Lean Beef,” a teaching case study about
a meat-packing plant (Jorgensen 1990).
13. Original sources of quotes are Grenville Goodwin,
The Social Organization of the Western Apache
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); Morris E.
Opler, “Lipan Apache Culture,”Southern Journal of
Anthropology9(1953): 92–95; and Tribal Cultural
Director, White Mountain Apache Tribe, personal 
interview, 1987.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and
Recommendations
The preceding chapters demonstrate that the task of
policing in Indian Country is difficult and complex.
Reservation police confront significant crime prob-
lems and an array of related social concerns. They
struggle under the pressures of limited resources,
answer to multiple authorities, and function within
a complicated jurisdictional web. Departments fre-
quently operate without strategic direction from
their tribal governments and lack methods for com-
municating directly with their service population,
deficiencies that limit their knowledge of and ability
to address community goals. Consequently, it can
be difficult for police in Indian Country to generate
community support for—let alone partnership in—
their activities. These problems, concerns, and chal-
lenges have a substantial effect on the quality and
effectiveness of policing in Indian Country.
We argue that many of these issues are linked in
important ways to Federal policy. Certainly, there is
strong evidence of long, cumulative negative effects
of Federal policy on the practice of policing in
Indian Country. The historical record shows how
Federal policy created a system that served the
interests of the U.S. Government and nontribal citi-
zens and failed to promote the ability of Indian
nations to design and exert meaningful control
over their own policing institutions.
Reversing this failure through the creation of more
indigenous policing institutions may give Indian
police departments purchase on many of the prob-
lems they face. Two important bodies of research
and experience inform this conclusion and the rec-
ommendations to tribal and nontribal policymakers
that follow from it. The first body of information,
discussed in depth above and summarized below,
demonstrates the influence that appropriate and effec-
tive governing institutions have on the successful
development of reservation societies (recognizing
that police constitute a governing institution of cen-
tral importance). The second body of information,
which describes the experiences of communities
whose police departments practice “community
policing,” is introduced below. These two distinct
bodies of research—with strikingly similar conclu-
sions—provide critical lessons for building a foun-
dation for policing in Indian Country, a foundation
that ensures strong public support for the police
function and that effectively leverages a wide range
of resources (not just funding, but political, social,
and cultural capital as well) in the service of
addressing crime.
Before proceeding, we highlight an important
aspect of our work: While we are critical of past
Federal policy, we assert that Federal agencies can
play a useful future role in assisting tribes as they
build a new foundation for policing. Many Federal
agencies are directing increased attention and con-
siderable resources to efforts to better protect tribal
communities from crime and to better support tribal
criminal justice agencies.1 The BIA has made sub-
stantial progress in improving training and practice,
especially with regard to the investigative function.
Police professionals within the BIA’s Division of
Law Enforcement Services possess significant
resources in terms of experience and expertise.
Many processes already in place, such as the 638
contracting process, could be modified to assist
tribes as they undertake efforts to fundamentally
rethink policing. The following recommendations
suggest how these resources can best be used to
improve policing in Indian Country.
Reprise of Research on Effective
Governing Institutions
Research on Indian economies indicates that eco-
nomic and social problems can be solved only if
tribes first focus on building strong and effective
governing institutions. This task properly begins
with increasing tribal control of institutions, an
activity that has been part and parcel of tribes’ drive
for substantially increased sovereignty—which has
itself been the dominant political force in Indian
54
Country over the last three decades. Thus, it is no
coincidence that many of the tribes that have been
most active in reclaiming sovereignty are also those
that have most successfully combated the problems
of poverty.
The research on Indian economies further concludes
that institutional design affects institutional effec-
tiveness. Strong and effective governing institutions
reflect the values and priorities (the culture) of the
community. This match increases the probability
that the population will support the methods and
outcomes of government action.
In general, Indian policing has continued on a tra-
jectory outside of the national movement toward
increased tribal sovereignty.2 Likewise, the idea that
institutions might be tailored to fit tribal conceptions
of the appropriate methods for social control is not
common among Indian police and policymakers.
Yet if tribes took greater control over the manage-
ment and design of policing, it is likely that, as in
the economic sphere, their criminal justice institu-
tions would become more effective. Parallel to the
research findings on Indian economies, some of the
major benefits of greater self-determination and cul-
tural match in policing might include the following:
● Focused accountability.
● Increased likelihood of a consonance between
the capabilities of policing institutions and the
demands made on them by the social, cultural,
and political environments in which they operate.
● Increased public support for the police mission.
The Possibilities for Community
Policing in Indian Country
“Community policing is a problem-solving partner-
ship between the police and the community that is
incorporated throughout a police department’s cul-
ture and operations. In community policing, the
police and the community collaboratively analyze
problems, set operational priorities, and implement
strategies appropriate for the resolution of each
problem” (Michaelson, Kelling, and Wasserman
1988). In other words, because community policing
is a method by which communities lend their
authority to the police enterprise, see their norms
and values (their culture) reflected in the police
mission, and employ their considerable formal
and informal resources to address crime and other
social concerns, it gives rise to institutions that
have the important characteristics cited above—
self-determination and cultural appropriateness.
Experience and research show that the community
policing strategy enhances the capacity of police
to address crime and to help communities become
strong, independent, and resourceful. It leads to
more effective policing (see, for example, Sparrow,
Moore, and Kennedy 1990; Perspectives on Policing
1988–1993; Moore and Poethig 1998). In sum, the
growing body of experience and research on com-
munity policing is remarkably congruent with the
findings on effective governing institutions in Indian
Country. We conclude that community policing pro-
vides a framework that tribes might use to design
and implement Native approaches to policing—
approaches that should improve the quality of polic-
ing in Indian Country and, rather than perpetuate
an inappropriate Federal structure, enhance tribal
nation building.
A department practices community policing by
supporting police officers in the activities that
communities most demand of them, not only in
the narrow band of activities that constitute reactive
crime fighting. Departments implement community
policing by promoting a broader definition of the
police function than is permitted in the professional
approach. In this definition, an improved quality of
community life becomes a desirable outcome of
good police service, which means that such activi-
ties as order maintenance, conflict resolution, and
problem solving become acceptable and important
police duties.
The results of this broader definition are significant.
For example, practices that bring police into close
contact with the public have always been politically
popular, but research shows that they are advanta-
geous in other ways as well. They contribute to
community life, reduce fear, increase citizen satis-
faction with police, improve police attitudes toward
citizens, and increase the morale and job satisfac-
tion of police (Trojanowicz 1982). Similarly, police
activities that both engage citizens in solving prob-
lems and provide citizens with new tools (such as
conflict resolution capacities) contribute to commu-
nity strength, independence, and resourcefulness
(Goldstein 1990). Establishing and following 
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practices with these wider effects is a central task
of the community policing approach.
The broader definition of the police function also
helps align police priorities and values with those
of the community (which, as we have seen, is rarely
the case in Indian Country). In large part, the align-
ment occurs as the source of authorization for police
activities shifts from professional or bureaucratic
standards to the citizens being policed. Where com-
munity policing is already practiced, police have
realized that ambiguity inevitably surrounds the
new kinds of police activity and that, to make their
interventions effective, they must regularly seek
authorization from citizens. Police departments have
learned that professional or bureaucratic authority—
especially that which tends to isolate police and
insulate them from community or neighborhood
influences—decreases as citizens contribute more
to defining problems and identifying solutions. In
this sense, community policing relies on an intimate
relationship between police and citizens, a relation-
ship that is determined less by past practice than
by the particular attributes of the community to be
policed. The tight linkage between police action and
citizen authorization is also a locale-specific appli-
cation of a broader idea in law enforcement that
“behind the badge is the Constitution.” That is, to
be legitimate in the eyes of citizens, the actual ways
in which police maintain order, resolve conflicts,
and solve problems must themselves uphold the
priorities, norms, and values of the community.
Police departments implementing community polic-
ing have found that community concerns are often
important indicators of ongoing, underlying prob-
lems that might escalate into crimes if ignored.
Today, community policing’s problem-solving
approach and attention to order maintenance are
widely recognized as playing important roles in
communities’ efforts to rebuild their neighborhoods
and in increasing the quality of community life.3
The non-Native experience with community polic-
ing and data from our site visits suggest that com-
munity policing has great promise in Indian Country.
For example, many tribal citizens rely increasingly
on their police departments to settle disputes, con-
flicts, and problems that police themselves do not
consistently treat as legitimate crime problems. The
overarching lesson of community policing is that if
reservation police were to pay attention to these
problems and were to use credible tribal approaches
as remedies, they would become more effective
problem solvers, more respected by tribal citizens,
and better able to “nip in the bud” problems with
the potential to escalate into more serious crimes.
Despite the success of community policing, it is
not a wholesale prescription for transforming police
departments and eliminating crime. Nonetheless,
we conclude that, by changing the foundation on
which policing occurs, community policing is the
appropriate first step for improving policing in
Indian Country. For any given Indian nation, the
systems that animate and guide policing—such as
the organizational structures of the police depart-
ment and overall criminal justice system, the tribal
personnel and training systems, the local manage-
ment information and control systems, and the tribal
agencies that conduct strategic planning—can be
linked to a vision of policing shaped by that
nation’s needs, beliefs, priorities, and resources.4
The tribe’s policing institutions would then become
more indigenous (or self-determined), more likely
to build upon and reinforce important cultural
norms and values, and more valuable to the
community.
Changing an Indian police department’s policies
and procedures is one practical way that this linkage
between policing systems and tribal priorities might
occur. Depending on the dispatcher’s assessment of
a call, for example, a local elder or other accepted
authority could accompany the responding officer;
in many instances, the officer might be there only to
support the elder’s authority (or vice versa). Such an
effort would simultaneously lend credibility to the
modern police function and show respect for impor-
tant tribal traditions. Similarly, if a tribal value is to
talk things out (as in O’odham culture), new poli-
cies and procedures might specify situations in
which this approach would be appropriate and offer
guidelines for ensuring that such conversations were
effective.5 Different policies and procedures could
be developed for cultures in which the direct, physi-
cal assertion of authority is appropriate (the Turtle
Mountain Chippewa might fit this description); the
challenge would be to develop guidelines that made
the physical exercise of authority controlled and
also effective in maintaining order.
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Another approach might be to modify both the
organization of a department and its personnel sys-
tem to reflect tribal culture. In many of the inter-
views we conducted at Fort Berthold, interviewees
mourned the decline of the Black Mouth Society, an
association of respected, mature men who histori-
cally acted as the police for these tribes. A practical
arrangement that would strengthen important tradi-
tional values, draw on the cultural power of the
Society for greater authority, and still meet modern
needs might be a two-tier department in which
junior officers serve an apprenticeship under the
supervision of tenured, highly experienced, and
well-qualified senior officers (in effect, a Black
Mouth Society) (Bowers 1992; Gilman and Schneider
1987; Lowie 19036). The selection, promotion, and
evaluation of officers could be geared not only to
their ability to carry out the conventional functions
of policing (conducting good investigations, driving
safely, making arrests), but also to their fitness to
serve as members of the Society.
In reflecting on this description of community polic-
ing and its possible application in Indian Country,
we emphasize that the model is not a tactic or set of
tactics but, rather, a process by which police work
with communities to establish shared priorities, to
support community efforts to address crime, and to
obtain the authorization of communities to act on
their behalf. Thus, a department practicing commu-
nity policing is characterized not merely by a set of
general tactics, such as neighborhood foot patrols or
stable geographic beats, but by the fact that it has
found multiple (and usually locale-specific) ways to
encourage officers to pay attention to citizens’ prior-
ities and values, to respond to the fears citizens feel
in the face of certain social problems and crimes,
and to employ programs that emphasize collabora-
tion between citizens and police. Even so, the confu-
sion between tactics and process (sometimes called
strategy or philosophy) has discouraged police in
Indian Country from moving beyond the profession-
al approach to using the community policing
approach in the manner we describe. On numerous
occasions, police leadership and policymakers
working in Indian Country informed us that staff
shortages coupled with the tremendous distances
characteristic of western reservations—that is,
obstacles to tactics—make community policing an
impractical goal. In our view, however, community
policing can be implemented in practical ways that
do not compromise the effectiveness of police. It
should not require excessive funds and should not
reduce a department’s ability to carry out its mis-
sion. Instead, existing departmental values, priori-
ties, and resources can be reoriented to community
values, priorities, and resources. Misunderstandings
about the requirements of community policing should
not be allowed to stand in the way of its implemen-
tation (see Kennedy 1993; Sparrow 1988).
What the Federal Government Can Do
We recommend that the Federal Government pursue
a more fully developed and more cohesive policy of
self-determination in Indian policing. This approach
requires amending several important Federal pro-
grams and activities, including the 638 contracting
process, the way various agencies invest in policing
in Indian Country, the training of BIA and other
Indian Country police, and the administration of law
enforcement within the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Our specific recommendations follow.
The Federal contracting process is a crucial program
to which changes should be made. Contracting
should be about more than gaining control of a
stream of money, and we therefore think that the
process should emphasize not only tribal manage-
ment (the present focus) but also organizational
planning. Because contracted police departments
do not need to replicate the BIA departments they
replace, the contracting process should encourage
tribes to rethink the way policing occurs. To do this,
the Federal Government may need to invest directly
in qualitative change. One possibility is to offer
police department and political planners incentives
to explore the specific implications of community
policing for their department, tribal government,
and nation and to pursue organizational change
based on the findings. Yet, any amendments to PL
93–638 policy should avoid making the require-
ments for contracting more stringent. We believe
that tribes can think best about policing when they
control policing; thus, Federal contracting policy
should offer assistance in ways that both improve
policing and promote sovereignty.7
Contracting is only one channel by which the
Federal Government invests in Indian Country
policing. Indeed, many departments and agencies 
of the Federal Government invest in Indian Country
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policing, and the way they do so is important. Past
investment activities have tended to have an ad hoc
quality, and while many have had positive effects, a
more coherent investment policy could increase the
usefulness of future spending.
We propose that two related principles guide
Federal spending (regardless of the department or
agency initiating the funding) on policing in Indian
Country. First, investments should strengthen tribal
managers’ ability to think in new ways about polic-
ing. That is, investments should encourage both
departmental and political managers to address
critical questions:
● How does and how should policing promote
the nation’s goals to be more resourceful and
independent?
● What policing strategies are particularly effective
at accomplishing this?
● What tribal norms and values should be embodied
in tribal policing practices?
● How can tribal political and police department
leaders ensure that this happens?
Second, investments should strengthen tribal capacity
to form and administer police departments that are
more self-determined. As noted with respect to con-
tracting, investments should not only assist tribes
financially, but also increase their organizational and
strategic capacity to oversee reservation policing.
Funding is particularly vital to help tribes reform the
organizational structure of their criminal justice
systems (so that, if desired, they can become less
compartmentalized), rewrite police policies and pro-
cedures (to create a culturally and task-appropriate
set), professionalize personnel systems (including
recruitment, training, and promotion requirements),
and develop strategic planning entities.
Two examples reveal how investments that do not
accord with these principles may misdirect police
department and political policymakers. The first is
Federal spending on technology. While the need to
improve the collection and management of informa-
tion in Indian Country police departments is pro-
nounced, a warning is in order. The statistics that
such systems generate emphasize only one part of
the police mission—fighting crime. Other roles that
police might play in promoting community values
and ensuring order and security are deemphasized.
In other words, isolated investments in policing tech-
nology can lead departmental and political leaders
away from the challenge of thinking in new ways
about policing. Tribes and Federal policymakers
with an interest in community policing (or any other
approaches that generate new police roles and respon-
sibilities) must bear this outcome in mind and, if
possible, support investments in technology by fund-
ing activities that help connect the information sys-
tem to the tribe’s other important policing goals.8
A second example is the response of national-level
law enforcement authorities to reports of rising
crime in Indian Country: They have called for the
assignment of more Federal officers to Indian
Country. These officers are already making their
presence felt. They are members of Federal drug
enforcement and antigang violence task forces,
Border Patrol officers, agents of the U.S. Attorney’s
Office, and FBI agents. While many Indian police
departments want the additional resources that an
increased Federal presence brings, many Indian
communities see this increased presence as a further
loss of sovereignty (or even as an occupation). From
the standpoint of self-determination, such fractionated
injections of resources prevent tribes from develop-
ing truly comprehensive responses to their social
disorder and crime problems, especially as they are
complicated by offense and geographical jurisdiction
issues. It would be better to spend the same money
on Indian policing directly—so that a tribe could
develop its own targeted strategy for dealing with its
particular problems—and to have similar officers
and agencies available to serve as professional advi-
sors and partners in the implementation of tribally
driven anticrime programs. The principles we pro-
pose push investment in this more fruitful direction.9
Our final comment on investment is that increasing
the impact of the current flow of funds to Indian
Country policing should not become an argument
for freezing or limiting investment. On the contrary,
we believe that funding should increase. In part,
this is because police in Indian Country operate
with a limited resource base relative to the crime
problems they face. It is also because of long-term
underinvestment in the reservation criminal justice
system overall.
58
Federal policy concerning the training of police
officers serving Indian Country must also change.
Most of the training that tribal police receive is pro-
vided through State police academies, which have
little focus on either community policing or the
important economic, geographic, social, and cultur-
al features of policing in Indian Country. These
deficits might be eliminated by adjusting the current
curriculum at the federally administered Indian
Policing Academy in Artesia, New Mexico, to sup-
port the vision of tribal policing offered in this paper
and by expanding the number of academies to ade-
quately serve all of Indian Country. At the same
time, we acknowledge that municipal, county, and
State police are often more comfortable working
with Indian police (and vice versa) if they have all
attended the same training academy. If tribes con-
tinue to choose to send their police to State acade-
mies, the Federal Government could fund additional
training in the self-determined approach to reserva-
tion policing we describe. These courses could be
included in the curricula of State training acade-
mies or could simply be coordinated with the State
offerings. They must, however, be more than minor
postscripts to State curricula; they must provide
substantive training that is appropriately tailored
to the demands of policing in Indian Country.10
A final Federal policy that deserves careful consid-
eration (and possible amendment) is the central-
ization of authority over all BIA law enforcement
functions in Area Offices and the elimination of
any agency-level control. While this reorganization
eliminates the separate lines of authority over crimi-
nal investigation and patrol that we criticized earlier
and might increase the professionalization of police
management within the BIA, tribes appear to appre-
ciate access to a local reporting structure. In fact,
loss of local authority was an explicit issue for two
of the four tribes that we studied in depth. At Gila
River, key tribal administrators protested central-
ization, and their objections led to the early and
untimely departure of the acting BIA police captain
charged with preparing the department for contract-
ing. At Fort Berthold, centralization led many com-
munity members to agitate for contracting. It may
be better for Area Office policing supervisors—
experienced officers themselves—to shift their
focus from managing policing for noncontracted
tribes to serving as professional advisors to all area
tribes, so that they become real partners in the
process of rethinking reservation policing and
implementing new, tribally driven efforts.
What Tribes Can Do
Our primary recommendation to tribes has been laid
out earlier: They should pursue real self-determination
in Indian policing. This is a process in which Indian
nations seek both the financial and organizational
capacity to oversee policing; find ways for the
community, tribal leadership, and police to think
strategically about policing; and weave culturally
appropriate methods into policing. Significantly, the
community policing philosophy advocates a similar
process. According to this approach, reservation
police and the tribal community “together analyze
problems, set operational priorities, and implement
strategies appropriate for the resolution of each prob-
lem” (Michaelson, Kelling, and Wasserman 1988).
Thus, our correlate recommendation is that Indian
nations strive to implement their own versions of
community policing. We have a few additional rec-
ommendations for tribes, which may increase the
effectiveness of new policing approaches. These
recommendations concern tribes’ commitments to
fairness and impartiality and their responsibility
for training.
First, we recommend that tribes commit them-
selves to developing impartial police departments.
Typically, reservation police are indicted for not
having this characteristic. In some cases, political,
clan, and family relationships influence police prac-
tice and policy. Many interviewees claimed that
ties of this nature between suspects and department
members often influenced the disposition of crimes.
In other cases, political dynamics drive the manage-
ment of departments. For example, corrupt tribal
governments co-opt police departments to protect
illegitimate activities and enterprises from scrutiny
or prosecution. Cases of nepotism in hiring and pro-
moting police officers and staff are also in evidence
(see Naranjo et al. 1996). Of course, these problems
are similar in character and frequency to those that
plague small and large police departments outside
of Indian Country. For them, one important solu-
tion has been to develop and publicize sound 
personnel policies—eliminating or minimizing
nepotism, for example—so that the department
can maintain its credibility among citizens and
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with other government agencies. Tribes would 
benefit from similar policies.
Second, we recommend that tribes themselves take
an active role in training police officers. If the goals
of tribal policing include preserving and promot-
ing important tribal norms and values, the training
officers receive at State or Federal academies is
insufficient. Local police training and education is
necessary to give officers a better understanding of
the government and culture of the tribe they serve
and a better idea of how policing gives meaning to
those principles. Tribe-specific research, preferably
conducted by tribal members and tribal police
themselves, is the only real way to meet this goal—
although the Federal Government could productively
support this process in a number of ways, such as
direct financial support or various forms of techni-
cal assistance.
Conclusion
Our core conclusions and recommendations focus
on a fundamental issue: Tribes, with the support of
the Federal Government, must reconsider the foun-
dations of policing on American Indian reservations.
Our supporting recommendations grow out of this
fundamental issue and are relatively simple. First,
the lessons drawn by tribes, academics, and policy-
makers from the research on and accumulating
experience in community policing and the design
of effective governing institutions in Indian Country
can productively inform the development of Federal
policy. Second, this same evidence and experience
provide the necessary starting points for tribes as
they undertake the task of rethinking policing. We
do not recommend that Federal and tribal policy-
makers direct their full attention and resources to
increased funding for reservation police departments,
the development of specialized crime-fighting task
forces, and improved technology. Although these
activities have both appeal and short-term poten-
tial, in the long run, they will add little to the ability
of Indian police departments and tribal communities
to independently address the substantial problems
they face.
In conclusion, neither community policing nor the
research on the design of effective governing insti-
tutions in Indian Country offers a wholesale pre-
scription for transforming police departments and
eliminating crime. Instead they provide a frame-
work for linking research and action in designing
approaches to policing that both make cultural
sense and work. The overarching goal is the cre-
ation of legitimate policing institutions that are
capable of meeting contemporary challenges
(which may be as divergent as neighborhood dis-
putes, family violence, and the manufacture and
sale of methamphetamines).
Two possible misinterpretations of this statement
deserve mention. In recommending that tribes
rethink policing in the context of culture, we are not
recommending that they reflexively resurrect dor-
mant prereservation methods of social control and
policing, nor are we giving a blanket endorsement
to the restorative justice policies now popular in
many Indian (and non-Indian) jurisdictions (Young
1995). Rather, our advice to tribes is to create
workable, nation-specific policing institutions and
approaches that are informed by traditional cus-
toms. The workability criterion means that the
policing policies and practices individual tribes
develop must recognize the reality of day-to-day life
and politics in Indian Country and must be capable
of getting things done in this “real world.” Police
department and political leadership should not be
left vulnerable to charges that they have failed to
address modern crime problems (ranging from gang
violence to driving while under the influence of
alcohol). Our argument is simply that basing polic-
ing activities on a cultural foundation is a powerful
means of establishing legitimacy, and that when
policing activities are viewed by the population as
legitimate, the police may become more effective.11
The nation-specific criterion highlights the problem
with implementing restorative justice approaches
across the board. Anthropological evidence makes
clear that while many Native American cultures
employed such approaches to ensure adherence to
social norms, many others employed strikingly
authoritarian, retributive methods of social control.
In sum, establishing culturally appropriate policing
means that, on a tribe-by-tribe basis, Indian nations
must make a substantial investment in identifying
social norms relevant to policing and the function
and influence of these norms in contemporary life.
We feel that this can be accomplished only as tribes
make a strong, sustained commitment to fundamen-
tally rethinking their approach to policing.
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Finally, we note that the ultimate success of rethink-
ing policing—with an eye toward increased self-
determination, cultural appropriateness, and Native
approaches to community policing—depends on
research. The agenda must include research that
helps identify the appropriate process for undertak-
ing this initiative on a tribal level (perhaps using
lessons learned from successful constitutional reform
efforts) and research that helps practitioners under-
stand how the approach we advocate can be recon-
ciled both with the contemporary thicket of State
and Federal jurisdictional issues and with PL 83–280.
Besides the cultural research noted above, tribal-
level research that focuses on strengthening tribal
managers’ ability to think in new ways about policing
and on helping tribes’ political and police department
leaders ensure change will be particularly important.
Notes
1. See, for example, Executive Committee for Indian
Country Law Enforcement Improvements (1997);
National Institute of Justice Strategic Planning Meeting
on Crime and Justice Research in Indian Country, Portland,
Oregon, October 14–15, 1998; and Summit on Charting
the Future of Justice in Indian Country, Washington,
D.C., October 28, 1997.
2. This is despite the fact that policing institutions are
of such central importance to government that indige-
nous administration should be a top priority for tribes.
On a fundamental theoretical level, the gift of people to
their sovereign government—and the defining right of
government—is the right to wield coercive power over
the citizenry. It is impossible to be truly sovereign with-
out exercising real self-determination in policing. See
Hobbes (1651, especially chapter 17). 
3. Examples of successful initiatives are found in Sparrow,
Moore, and Kennedy (1990); Kelling and Coles (1996);
and Braga et al. (1999).
4. Again, it is important to note that critical elements
of policing are determined by the particular (or unique)
attributes of a community and, therefore, that community
policing in Indian Country may look dramatically differ-
ent from tribe to tribe.
5. Many writers stress the importance of talking things
out in O’odham culture. Several sources are Joseph,
Spicer, and Chesky (1949); King and Jones (1974,
125–136); Teague (1993); and Underhill (1940, 1969).
We observe, however, that although both the Tohono
O’odham and Akimel O’odham have similar cultural
roots, their recent history is quite different. Thus, the
two communities might find markedly different ways to
incorporate cultural values into their policing methods;
the differences would not imply that one group was less
“Indian” or less “O’odham,” but would simply reflect
modern cultural differences. 
6. Also Cora Baker interview, above, note 29, chapter 4.
7. In the current political climate, this will be much
more difficult than it sounds. Since the autumn of 1998,
Congressional budget battles have slowed the imple-
mentation of new 638 and self-governance contracts.
Preventing contracting—either through overly strict
contracting requirements or a lack of funds—does
Indian policing no good. In fact, it perpetuates the nega-
tive influence of Federal policy on policing, by allowing
community needs and concerns to fester, department
management and facilities to deteriorate further, and
“catch as catch can” programs (drug enforcement or
anti-gang violence programs, for example) to take the
place of comprehensive strategic planning. 
8. With regard to management information systems,
additional caveats are important. First, increasing the
availability of automated call management and manage-
ment information systems does not change the fact that
much of the data collected by these systems is of poor
quality. The data can be improved only by breaking down
the social and cultural barriers that exist between police
and many tribal communities, and thought should be
given to this problem. Second, automated information
systems will provide needed information to tribes, but
the technology and training that accompany these sys-
tems must recognize that the typical department in Indian
Country is much smaller than its urban and suburban
counterparts. These small staffs could be easily swamped
by demands expressed through 911 systems, inhibiting
their ability to do sound proactive planning. On the other
hand, small departments will benefit greatly from sys-
tems that enable them to identify the truly high-priority
calls and to focus on the underlying problems driving
crime. Third, both police personnel and tribal leadership
must be educated on how to best use the data in the
service of broad tribal goals.
9. The COPS program also places federally funded offi-
cers in Indian Country, but because the tribe has great
flexibility in how it uses these officers, the program is
less likely to divert police and tribal policymakers from
their most important tasks. As noted in chapter 4, the
problems with the COPS program are much different in
nature: Its restrictions on Federal employment create a
dual authority structure in BIA-managed departments and
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further complicate oversight issues; the lack of training
and equipment funds in COPS grants may create a group
of officers with inferior capacities; and the statute’s sun-
set clause and lack of specific phase-out provisions will
severely test the already limited resources of Indian
police departments and, thus, have a larger impact in
Indian Country than elsewhere. 
10. Notably, this discussion also implies that State-level
changes in training will be necessary. Whether or not
tribal police attend State academies, those institutions
must inform their students of the appropriateness of
Indian self-determination over policing and of the profes-
sionalism of Indian police. Police graduating from State
academies must be prepared to work with all of their
colleagues—in-State, out-of-State, Federal, and tribal.
11. Of course, the opposite configuration also presents
a problem. Workable but illegitimate institutions are as
unhelpful as legitimate but unworkable ones. If a depart-
ment makes a limited set of cosmetic changes that leave
in place old ways of doing business—no matter how
functional—it will not succeed in better aligning the
efforts of police departments with community priorities. 
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Appendix A. Study Methodology
Research for this study included four components:
● A review of relevant literature.
● Brief visits to several Indian police departments
and the Indian Police Academy in Artesia, New
Mexico.
● Intensive site visits to four reservations.
● A two-part survey distributed to Indian police
departments.
Each study component is described below.
Literature Review
Several areas of literature provided background and
context for the primary research. These included
American Indian issues, policing, sociology, and
anthropology. For all areas, both historical and cur-
rent materials ranging from academic works to local
newspaper articles were found to be relevant.
American Indian topics included history, the history
of policing on Indian reservations, culture, econom-
ic development, governance, sovereignty, and mate-
rials specific to the four tribes studied in depth.
Policing topics included the history of policing, com-
munity policing, rural policing, and the organization
and management of police departments. The sociol-
ogy review focused on rural sociology. The anthro-
pology review focused largely on Native American
anthropology, but also included some literature
related to social control and the development of
modern legal systems in indigenous societies. The
scope of the literature search is reflected in the ref-
erences at the end of this report.
Brief Visits to Several Police
Departments
We made brief visits to several tribes and their police
departments to inform our selection of departments
to be studied in depth. These brief visits were also
useful as a means of understanding possible survey
issues. Members of the research team visited 10 tribes
across the Southwest, the Northwest, the East, and
the Northern Plains. The team also visited the Indian
Police Academy in Artesia, New Mexico, to under-
stand the training the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
provides to police officers.
Indepth Study of Four Police
Departments
We studied four departments and the tribal contexts
in which they operate in depth to gain a richer
understanding of the diverse and complex ways in
which Native communities cope with their policing
challenges. Many aspects of reservation policing
were difficult to understand or even know about
without intensive onsite research. For example, we
used this method to clarify the details of organiza-
tional process and structure. Likewise, because it
allows investment in relationships, we expected the
site-visit approach to provide data on community
members’ more closely guarded opinions (such as
their honest perceptions of their police departments).
Data from the four indepth studies are integrated
throughout this report and are at the core of its dis-
cussion and analysis.
Like the brief site visits, intensive onsite research
was an important precursor to survey work. Because
information about the practice of policing in Indian
Country is so limited, onsite work helped define
the topics on which broad-based survey data were
needed. Similarly, the substantial variation in jus-
tice administration, jurisdictional arrangements,
and socioeconomic conditions that exist in Indian
Country suggests that only some quantitative data
comparisons are meaningful; intensive study helped
focus the survey on those that are.
Our site-selection strategy was to choose Indian
nations that varied on as many relevant dimen-
sions as could be captured in such a small sample.1
The most important dimensions on which we sought
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significant variation were crime problems and other
policing challenges, culture, economics, geography,
and the management and administrative structure of
the police departments.2
We chose Tohono O’odham and the Gila River
Indian Community (both in Arizona) because they
have similar cultural backgrounds but distinctly dif-
ferent geographical and economic settings. Both are
O’odham nations located in their traditional home-
lands. We anticipated that, as southwestern tribes
near the Mexican border, they might share some
important regional challenges, including the prob-
lems of illegal immigration and drug smuggling.
Nonetheless, we expected the overall problems to
vary substantially between the tribes because the
Gila River Indian Community is greatly subject to
the social and economic influence of a major city
(Phoenix) and Tohono O’odham remains more 
isolated, more traditional, and more economically
distressed.
Besides these contrasts, we were interested in com-
paring the policing challenges and approaches of
tribes in different regions. Early investigation sug-
gested that Indian nations in the Northern Plains
have been generally (although not universally) more
assimilated than tribes in the Southwest and that in
some cases they suffer from more crime—particu-
larly more violent crime—a combination that,
according to some policing professionals, makes
them much more difficult to police.3 Indeed, the
way these factors combine with political dynamics
and influence the administration of some otherwise
interesting police departments caused us to rule out
certain candidates for intensive study. The sustained
involvement in these departments necessary for the
study could not be assured. The sites selected for
indepth study on the Northern Plains were the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation (in Montana) and the Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation
(in North Dakota).
Finally, one of the most important differences
between tribes is the management structure of
their police departments. While the possibilities
are covered in more detail in chapter 2, an impor-
tant distinction among many Indian communities is
whether policing services are provided by the BIA
or by the tribe itself. If a tribe opts to manage the
police department itself, it can either self-fund or
contract for funding from the BIA. In the latter case,
money that would have been used by the Federal
Government to provide policing services is passed
on to the tribe.
Our sample of four sites includes important com-
parisons and contrasts along this management and
funding dimension. At the outset of our study, the
Gila River Indian Community had a BIA-managed
department to which it had added a number of trib-
ally funded officers. By the end of the study period,
it had assumed management responsibility from the
Federal Government using a contract under Public
Law 93–638, which is the most common arrange-
ment for replacing the Federal management of polic-
ing services in Indian Country.4 Tohono O’odham
operated under a “638 contract” throughout the peri-
od. Similarly, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes have operated for many years under a self-
governance compact (in practical terms, this means
they have greater control over the way the depart-
ment is funded and structured than do tribes operat-
ing under 638 contracts). Finally, the Three Affiliated
Tribes’ police department is BIA-administered (at
the time of this research, the Tribes had no intention
of changing their arrangement). The contrast between
the last two cases may be especially important; some
observers suggested that the departments were
among the best in Indian Country, although they
work under management structures that are osten-
sibly nearly as different as possible.
We restricted our study to four sites for several rea-
sons. First, we hoped to study both the departments
and the tribal contexts in which they serve. Doing
both well required a fairly small study sample.
Second, in a few cases, it took substantial time
onsite (a few days to approximately 2 weeks of staff
time) to obtain approval to conduct the study. This
time was productive from a research standpoint—
offering much insight into tribal politics and cul-
ture during the process—but it was time consuming
and limited the number of communities we could
approach for indepth involvement. Finally, the
increased time spent at each site allowed the forma-
tion of relationships, which produced critical infor-
mation and insight into the way tribes policed.
Clearly, it would be productive to study additional
sites, especially given the diversity of policing
arrangements and social, cultural, and economic
settings in Indian Country.
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Although we spent considerable unstructured time
at each site, our research was guided by a systemat-
ic list of individuals and groups we wished to inter-
view and activities we wished to observe. Interview
prospects included the following:
● Formal and informal tribal political leaders from
both the “national” (central tribal government)
and “subnational” (district or village) levels.
● Representatives of the tribal criminal justice sys-
tem, especially those from the police department,
correctional system, probation office, judiciary,
prosecutors’ office, and the defense bar.
● Health and social service providers working for
both tribal and Federal agencies.
● Consumers of police and criminal justice servic-
es, particularly individuals and families who had
been through the criminal justice system, youth
groups, and residents of high-crime areas.
● Representatives of important historical and cul-
tural practices, such as elders and traditional
healers.
The activities we sought to observe included rou-
tine police activities, especially through ride- and
walkalongs with the police; the operation of the
broader criminal justice system (court proceedings,
jail conditions, etc.); and important community
meetings, such as legislative sessions, village or
district meetings, school board meetings, elders’
meetings, youth council or club sessions, and
(where possible and appropriate) cultural activities.
Surveys
Although survey-based research addresses a narrower
range of issues, the payoff compared with indepth
site research is the ability to collect data from a
larger sample of communities. Such data put infor-
mation from the smaller, intensive study sample into
perspective; they should help both researchers and
tribes understand what is typical and what is not.
To maximize the response rate and stretch our
resources, we worked with Eileen Luna (Assistant
Professor, American Indian Studies) at the Univer-
sity of Arizona (Tucson) in the survey effort. The
University of Arizona mailed the first questionnaire
(part I of the survey) to more than 200 departments
in the continental United States, regardless of size.
This distribution was intended to be comprehensive,
including all departments whose primary responsibil-
ity is to police Indian Country.5 Harvard University
mailed the second questionnaire (part II)—which
was longer and more indepth than the first and
included some organizational questions—to 67 large
tribes (but only 66 departments, since two of the large
tribes share a BIA department). These nations are
the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
Development’s usual study sample, a group for
which the Project possesses substantial background
data. In general, these larger nations set the practice
standard for Indian Country in terms of business
activity, government and administrative function,
and political rights.6 Because of their probable
greater importance, our greater familiarity with
them, and our access to better data about them over-
all, we made a concentrated effort to increase the
response rate among these tribes. All data that we
report from both questionnaires of the survey refer
to this smaller study sample.
The questionnaires and list of respondents are
included in appendix B. Forty-six of 66 departments
responded to part I of the survey (the University of
Arizona instrument) and 39 to part II (the Harvard
University instrument). Using background data from
the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
Development, we determined that, in general, the
groups of respondents and nonrespondents are com-
parable along the following dimensions: average
economic status, communities’ average distance
from large urban areas, and police departments’
usual administrative arrangements (638 contract
versus BIA policing). However, police departments
responding to the survey serve tribes that are some-
what larger (in both population and area), less active
users of their native language,and less involved with
the gaming industry than the nonresponding tribes.
One caution is echoed throughout this report and in
the work of other criminal justice researchers and
practitioners in Indian Country (for example, Elias
1998; Luna 1998; Luna and Walker 1998; Wood 1998).
All but the most basic and easily verified data must
be interpreted carefully; this is most emphatically
true for data collected by telephone or by mail. For
example, multiple inquiries often produced different
answers to the same questions regarding salaries,
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department budgets and size, and crime statistics.
The reasons are numerous and complex, but the
result is that we hold very loosely to what might be
termed the “statistical” portrait of police departments
in Indian Country offered later in this report, and
we develop a portrait of the typical department that
focuses more on management challenges. Indeed,
there is a growing consensus among researchers and
policymakers on management challenges faced by
Indian police departments, even while there is sub-
stantial disagreement on such issues as the budget
resources available and the ratio of law enforcement
officers to citizens.7
Notes
1. In some, but not all, cases our work was facilitated by
existing working relationships with tribes. However, hav-
ing such a relationship was not a criterion for selection.
2. PL 83–280 provides significant variation along several
of these dimensions. We excluded these different admin-
istrative and jurisdictional arrangements from our study,
however, because the impacts of the law—and the reform
options available to tribes whose policing institutions are
subject to it—are important enough to merit a study of
their own.
3. For example, interview with Brent LaRocque,
Criminal Investigator, Bureau of Indian Affairs Division
of Law Enforcement Services, March 1996.
4. The Gila River Indian Community assumed manage-
ment of its police department on August 10, 1998.
5. There are approximately 330 reservations in the lower
48 United States, but many fewer Indian police depart-
ments. This is because some BIA-administered depart-
ments serve more than one reservation (particularly
where tribal communities are small) and some tribes are
not eligible to have their own police departments.
6. Using the 1980 Census as a benchmark, the Harvard
Project on American Indian Economic Development sam-
ple includes tribes with population 1,000 or greater that
are located in traditional Indian areas of the continental
United States. However, the sample excludes Oklahoma-
based tribes, both because they lack distinct land bases
(the only reservation per se in Oklahoma belongs to the
Osage) and because the U.S. Bureau of the Census col-
lects data for them in a way that is not comparable to the
way it collects data for other tribes.
7. This was discussed by members of the Indian policing
panel at the National Institute of Justice Research and
Evaluation Conference, Washington, D.C., August 1998.
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Appendix B. Survey Respondents and
Questionnaires
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